Actors, Ideas and Rules in New Zealand Official Development Assistance Policy Change

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Candidate's Declaration

This thesis is my own original work, except where cited.

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Abstract

This thesis is an in-depth study of two cases of significant Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) policy change in New Zealand. It focuses on the roles of actors, ideas and rules in ODA policy change. To date there has been little in-depth study of ODA policy change. Yet civil society, multilateral and private sector entities expend considerable resources attempting to influence ODA policy – either to promote change or to defend the status quo. In the academic work that does exist, scholars have primarily explored the domestic factors influencing the amount of ODA given, where it is given, and the reasons why donors provide ODA. The case studies that have been conducted highlight the roles of interest groups, rules and the professional executive in policymaking. To contribute to learning about ODA policymaking, I focused on exploring policy goal changes. I created an analytical framework drawing on the broader literature of policy studies. Specifically, I drew from policy change theorists' insights about change and used this framework to explore and analyse two cases of ODA policy goal change in New Zealand. My findings show that key to New Zealand ODA policy goal change are actors behaving entrepreneurially, connected to an ideas-based network that cuts across societal interest groups and government. Ideas are an important motivating force for actors. These include ideas about the national interest, the relationship between development cooperation and other foreign policy outcomes, and power and control within government agencies. Unlike many policy change theorists, I explicitly examine formal rules, highlighting specific important rules, and how rules form the context within which actors act, including to avoid ambiguous rules. These findings are useful for actors wishing to influence ODA policy goals, for scholars who want to examine ODA policy change elsewhere, and for policy change thinkers.

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Acronyms

ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
ACEAD	Adivsory Committee on External Aid and Development
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CID	Council for International Development
CPT	Causal Process Tracing
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEV	Development Cooperation Division
DPMC	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
EAD	External Aid Division
ERD	External Relations and Defence (Cabinet committee)
FFP	First Past the Post
GNI	Gross National Income
JAG	Joint Action Group
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MMP	Mixed Member Proportional
NGOs	Non-Government Organisations
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
OAG	Office of the Controller and Auditor General
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OIA	Official Information Act 1982
SSC	State Services Commission
TEMR	Towards Excellence Ministerial Review

Chapter One: Introduction

Tantalizing tidbits of information circulated for weeks prior to the 5 May 2009 announcement about New Zealand's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Programme. Little substantive information was known beyond the fact that the new National Party-led government was conducting a review into its ODA. Significant policy change was anticipated. Opposition parliamentarians and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working in international development filled the information void with their views: large-scale change was not needed or wanted. Yet Minister McCully of Foreign Affairs forged ahead, declaring ODA changes only seven years after similar changes in 2001. NZAID (New Zealand Agency for International Development) – the semi-autonomous New Zealand government ODA Programme – would be absorbed back into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and ODA would now focus on economic development, not poverty elimination. Many in the New Zealand international development community were outraged, asking: how could this happen?

This question motivated this research. A superficial explanation of ODA policy change would be that government change in 2008 altered government's ideology and alliances with various societal interests, leading to a change in ODA policy. This is true, yet it is not the full story: this explanation overlooks important details about the interplay of diverse ideas, actors and rules in the journey to a final policy change decision[1]. A superficial explanation also does not answer why previous government changes did not see significant shifts in ODA policy. Government change may be necessary but not sufficient, raising questions about what other factors are required to create change, and in what order. The desire to explore the process leading towards a change decision, and the precise factors involved, inspires this research.

In this introductory chapter I first discuss why studying ODA policy change is relevant for scholarship and practice, then canvass the literature upon which this research is founded. I introduce the questions guiding this research, then prelude the

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[1] ODA policy is public policy, in that it is made by and for governments. From here on, when I use the term 'policy', I refer to public policy unless otherwise stated.

thesis argument. After summarising the research's contribution to knowledge, I present the two cases under examination and outline how I designed this research. I define key concepts, including Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), non-development foreign policy, development, and donors and recipients. Actors, ideas and rules – the components of the analytical framework deployed in this research – are defined in Chapter Three. The New Zealand context is then surveyed, before closing with an outline of the chapters to come, providing a brief thesis roadmap for the reader.

Why Study ODA Policy Change?

The international aid and development system is a multifaceted, global undertaking, involving governments, multilateral and regional organisations, the private sector, non-government organisations, and untold numbers of individual people across the world. ODA is a significant component of this system, worth at least US136 billion dollars in 2014 (Development Assistance Committee, 2016). The giving and receiving of ODA endeavours to contribute to the development of entire countries, engaging all societal and governmental actors in the recipient country, and encompassing all policy areas any government is concerned with. While a small part of a donor government's overall budget, ODA's ambitions and global scale make ODA policy a complex and important phenomenon to study.

ODA policy is also a fascinating policy domain to analyse, straddling foreign policy and domestic policy, but aiming to achieve benefits in other countries. This means ODA policy experiences accountability and feedback gaps, with donor taxpayers funding government spending for people in other countries who cannot vote in the donor country. Meanwhile, donor taxpayers are unable to observe or feel the results of ODA expenditure. I elaborate on these ODA policy characteristics further in Chapter Four.

From a practical perspective, individuals and organisations expend significant resources to influence ODA policy. Campaigns in New Zealand, such as the Council for International Development's (CID) 0.7% or Aid Works campaigns, have attempted to influence and change New Zealand ODA policy, and required NGOs to

invest scarce resources in attempts to influence government policy. Globally, various campaigns do the same, such as the Global Campaign for Education, Jubilee 2000 or the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (including the various Make**Poverty**History campaigns in countries like Australia, the United Kingdon, Canada and New Zealand). Mass media involvement, celebrity spokespeople, policy briefs, and meetings with parliamentarians and policymakers require substantial resources, and all aim to get decision-makers to make certain decisions to maintain or alter the status quo. Yet without knowing precisely how ODA policy actually changes, these sorts of campaigns are not as effective or efficient as they could be.

Overall, the world of international aid[2] and development is in constant flux. "Donor approaches change rapidly, and many agencies appear to be in a constant state of internal reform and restructuring" (de Haan, 2009, p. 60). Current times bring this instability into sharp relief, with a wave of policy changes breaking across donor countries. New Zealand led the way in 2009, aligning ODA more explicitly with non-development foreign policy goals and emphasising economic development activities. Canada and the Netherlands followed suit, with Australia in close pursuit. Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom has made similar moves. None of this is novel: the way particular donors bureaucratically organise their ODA has shifted over time (for example see Barder, 2005 on the UK experience); and since its inception, non-development foreign policy motives (a donor's own economic or strategic[3] concerns) have at least partially driven ODA (Lancaster, 2007, Alesina and Dollar, 2000). I discuss these issues further in Chapter Four. What this flux brings to the fore is questions about ODA policy change: what ideas, actors and rules shape ODA policy change, in what combination, at what time? These are, as yet, questions that evade sufficient scholarly exploration.

This limited scholarly understanding is a concern because ODA policy impacts on ODA's performance in achieving development goals. ODA policy is most effective and efficient in improving human welfare when it is focused squarely on development

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[2] Throughout this document I use the world 'aid' to denote the practice of assisting poorer countries to develop, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) in reference to donor government finances for international development.

[3] I use the concept 'strategic' to capture a donor's international strategic, diplomatic, political and security concerns.

outcomes, including poverty reduction, in developing countries.[4] World Bank research has shown that if ODA were given only for poverty reduction, the number of people who could escape poverty would increase from 30 million a year to 80 million (Collier and Dollar, 1999). Similarly, research into different types of non-development ODA highlights inefficiencies and even harm. For example, Riddell (2007, p. 100) reports a general estimate that ODA given to promote donor economic interests can inflate the cost to recipients by between 15 and 30 per cent. Another example, ODA given to influence voting at the United Nations, is less effective in spurring economic growth (Dreher et al., 2013). The needs of American food commodity producers drive USA food ODA policy (Diven, 2001), and research shows this food ODA contributes to conflict in and around countries that receive it (Nunn and Qian, 2012).

At a more granular level, ODA policy may be about achieving development, but if the policy is not of adequate quality in relation to this goal, then ODA will not be as effective as it could be. One component of ODA's effectiveness in achieving development impact is the performance of a donor government's ODA programme (Howes, 2014).[5] In turn, ODA policy's quality shapes an ODA programme's performance (at least to some extent). Additional to the studies outlined above, there is research to show how aspects of ODA policy can have negative or positive impacts. For example, how predictable or volatile donor ODA flows are can have a negative impact for governments who receive ODA (Arellano et al., 2009, Eifert and Gelb, 2005), and the selectivity of donors in deciding where to give their ODA can adversely impact upon an ODA programme's performance (Howes, 2014). Understanding ODA policymaking processes, including change, can help to uncover ways to enhance policy quality, and therefore increase the likelihood of positive implementation impact.[6]

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[4] This is an underlying, normative premise of my research. I do not engage in the substantial debates about ODA's impacts.

[5] There are other significant impacts upon development outcomes beyond an ODA programme and its control, including the capabilities of the partner government or organisation, and the country context.

[6] I recognise policy implementation studies show policy is not uniformly implemented in the way it was intended, and there are complex pathways from policy to impact. This area of study is beyond the scope of this research.

Given all of this, understanding what factors interact to create ODA policy in any given donor country is an important area of research. A greater understanding of domestic ODA donor policy dynamics can illustrate ways to most efficiently change ODA policy for the better, which in turn could advance ODA's performance in achieving development. As Chapter Four on ODA policymaking will show, few scholars have examined the processes of *how* ODA policy changes in any particular donor country – the focus of this research.

Scholarly Foundations

This research brings together two distinct scholarly areas: ODA policymaking analyses and policy studies. The questions structuring this research emerge out of the ODA policymaking literature, which is disparate and has not holistically examined ODA policy from a broad politics and policymaking perspective. Therefore, the insights from policy studies, and specifically policy change theories, can bring a fresh perspective to ODA policymaking analysis, and I use policy change theories to create my analytical framework (described in Chapter Three).

Curiosity about what domestic factors contribute to donor ODA decision-making has led to a small but solid literature base, providing a foundation for this research. The bulk of the literature exploring domestic donor ODA policy explores two questions: why donors give ODA, and what factors might explain varying levels of ODA across time and countries. Predominantly using statistical regression analysis, there has been research conducted into not only donor economic and strategic concerns and their impact on ODA policy, but also factors in ODA-receiving countries, public opinion, social welfare institutions, and political economy issues. Chapter Four introduces pertinent studies from this literature. A common finding from the literature is high levels of variation in behaviour between donors, and even within donors, and sometimes contrasting results. Overall, the literature indicates ODA policymaking is a complex process comprised of diverse factors that vary across time and countries. Digging into the process of change, attempting to make clear how various actors, ideas and rules interact, has the potential to highlight what factors or interactions are most important, and when. Furthermore, scholars call for more single or small-n case studies offering in-depth individual donor examinations. As Schraeder, Hook and

Taylor (1998, p. 139) point out: "[n]o two cases were alike, a fact that reinforces the need for detailed scrutiny of the individual cases". Over time, collectively, individual case analyses can build a generic understanding of the ODA policymaking process, including change.

Examining ODA policy processes explicitly with a policy change framework brings a new approach to ODA policymaking analyses. Instances of policy change present moments in time when the most important ingredients of ODA policymaking can be highlighted, giving a sharper view of the significant factors involved in ODA policymaking processes and how these factors interact. Unpicking the process leading to change, examining what actors, ideas and rules are involved, brings forth new insights, expanding knowledge in an under-explored area. As yet, only one study has applied a policy change approach to ODA policy.

Travis and Zahariadis (2002) applied the multiple streams approach to the United States of America's foreign aid policy. Like many who study ODA, the allure of ODA quantity as a measureable variable meant that this study extricated donor and recipient variables that play a role in ODA quantity decision-making, but did not explore the decision-making process within which various actors, ideas and rules interact to lead to ODA decisions. While the multiple streams approach was extended into a new policy domain (ODA policy), the use of quantitative methods meant the strengths of the multiple streams approach were not adequately used to analyse U.S.A.'s foreign policymaking processes. What multiple streams can bring to the ODA policymaking literature is an understanding of interacting actors, ideas and rules in the process towards government decision-making, but this paper overlooked this opportunity. Further, the authors examined incremental policymaking, and did not explore significant policy goal change. The American political system is also quite unique, and not easily applicable to parliamentary systems. Given all of this, the findings from this study did not offer anything new to the ODA policymaking literature, and left opportunities for further utilisation of policy change theories in understanding ODA policy processes.

One Piece of the Jigsaw

In contrast to ODA scholars, policy scholars have conducted far-reaching analyses of policy change and returned with the awareness that policy change is a complex phenomenon to study. What gets demarcated as policy change differs depending upon several factors, including methodology, how policy is defined, the policy component under examination, and the timeframes used (Knill and Tosun, 2012, Capano and Howlett, 2009, Capano, 2009). Policy goals may change, but may not filter through to policy objectives or settings. Alternatively, policy goals may remain the same while objectives and settings change (Howlett and Cashore, 2009). Further, what looks like substantial change in one time period may look different when viewed from a different temporal frame.

This research examines a small piece of the overall ODA policy change jigsaw: the agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making processes leading up to decisions to change policy goal ends and means. Chapter Three describes policy and its content, providing the reader with a definition of policy goal ends and means. Using this definition enables me to discuss the particular policy content aspect that the 2001 and 2009 change decisions were about. The focus of this research is about how the change decisions occurred – who was involved, what ideas they had, and how the rules helped or hindered them. Due to this focus, other policy change aspects are not analysed, such as the type of change, and whether or not change made in policy goals filters through to objectives and settings. I return to these challenges of studying policy change in Chapters Nine and Ten.

It is also important to emphasise that this research involves the analysis *of* public policy, rather than analysis *for* public policy. ODA policy and donors' development impact enjoy significant scholarly attention (a point I touch on in Chapter Four). In contrast, this research studies ODA policymaking processes, which is important for the reasons articulated above.

Research Questions

This thesis starts broadly at policy change theories, constricts the investigation into ODA policymaking, then further narrows to explore and analyse the two cases, before widening again to discuss the findings in light of the literature. Contributing to an answer for the overarching question – how does ODA policy change? – the research questions are as follows.

1) What actors, ideas and rules were involved in New Zealand ODA policy goal change agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making in the 2001 and 2009 changes? (Chapters Four, Five and Seven.)

2) How did actors, ideas and rules interact in the process towards New Zealand ODA policy goal change decisions in 2001 and 2009? (Chapters Four, Six, Eight and Nine.)

3) Drawing from the New Zealand ODA policy experience, what suggestions can be made for theory building and refinement to enhance theory's/theories' exploratory and explanatory value in ODA policy goal change? (Chapter Ten.)

These research questions are situated within two broader areas of academic enquiry: ODA policy and policy studies. I apply a policy studies framework to the ODA policymaking literature, and two ODA policy change instances, to advance knowledge about how ODA policy changes: who is involved, what ideas they have, and what rules help or hinder actors' efforts to achieve change decisions. Essentially, this research is about the domestic politics and processes involved in changing ODA policy goals.

Spoiler Alert

Before progressing, I briefly summarise the argument this thesis makes. What this thesis shows is the importance of individuals in the policy change process. In particular, individuals behaving entrepreneurially. Yet these individuals can not act alone. To drive change forward, they need other individuals and groups to support them or to hand the drive for change on to. Actors in New Zealand ODA policy goal change cut across society and government, and include NGOs, political parties, parliament, and the professional and political executive. What binds these actors

together to either prevent or advance ODA policy goal change are shared policy values – the underlying world-views, values, and beliefs that underpin an individual's engagement with the world. These policy values and associated policy goal ideas comprise notions about human progress within a nation state, New Zealand's interests abroad, and what ODA should achieve and how. Actors are helped or hindered in their change efforts by the formal rules. The most important rule is the requirement that every three years New Zealanders get the opportunity to vote, offering the potential for government change. Government change was necessary in both the policy goal change instances examined, and actors, particularly those behaving entrepreneurially, prepared for this potential. Once past this rule, there is greater opportunity for actors within the ODA policy domain to exert their agency, depending upon how well they know the rules, and the strength or ambiguity of certain rules. In this way, it is possible for actors to avoid or ignore particular rules. It is the rules that bestow power upon specific individuals or groups, and if actors do not know how to use the rules, they will not achieve change. The lack ODA-specific legisltion also shaped the context and types of actors involved, highlighting the importance of a rule's absence. To arrive at this argument, I analyse two instances of ODA policy change.

What's it Worth? Contribution to Knowledge

In answering the research questions above, this thesis will be of most interest to two main audiences. One audience involves people interested in policy change, and in learning more about the ODA policy domain. The other audience comprises people interested in how ODA policy changes: development practitioners, NGO advocates, the private sector or academics looking to deepen their knowledge about ODA policy dynamics. These audiences relate to the thesis' contributions to scholarly knowledge and to policy change practice.

The key way this thesis makes its contribution is through a fresh approach to examining ODA policymaking, and a specific analysis of policy change instances. This fresh approach uses a policy studies framework to explore two cases of ODA policy change, combining actors, ideas and rules. In doing so, the research brings

together two disparate literature bodies: ODA policymaking and policy change literature. The main beneficiary of this marriage is the ODA policymaking literature, which has not yet explicitly explored policy change. What the research offers is a specific analysis of ODA policy change, which does not appear to have yet been conducted. Alongside this, the research involves a single-country analysis of ODA policymaking. This is rare, despite the demand for it from ODA policy scholars. The research highlights the role of indviduals, ideas-based networks, and power bestowed by rules, illuminating how ODA policy changed in one donor country, offering an explanation that can serve as a light for exploring the depths of how other donors' ODA policy changes.

In the realm of policy studies, beyond the study identified above (Travis and Zahariadis, 2002), policy change theories do not appear to have been applied to ODA policy. This research therefore contributes findings from a different realm of policy – that of ODA policy – to the broader policy change literature. Policy change theories also benefit from this research, in that certain components of policy change theories are found in the empirical cases, emphasising their role in policy change. In particular, the role of ideas and entrepreneurial behaviour are emphasised, and the research also provides an in-depth analysis of rules, often missing in policy change theorising.

The thesis contributes markedly to the literature on New Zealand politics and policymaking. There is a small body of writing on New Zealand foreign policy, yet there is little academic analysis of the country's ODA policymaking (discussed further below). New Zealand's role in the wider world is an important part of its identity and history. Documenting and anlysing part of New Zealand ODA history gives New Zealand citizens an opportunity to better know themselves, and assists in charting the way into the future for a small nation at the base of the globe.

Finally, the thesis provides analysis and findings useful for policy change practitioners. Specific findings of relevance include the need for policy change advocates, or status quo defenders, to be aware of the rule-setting, nurture and engage individuals who can behave entrepreneurially, and forge networks based on policy values.

The Cases of Change

The two cases of change analysed in this research involve policy goal ends and means changes: alterations in the most abstract policy content, which I discuss further in Chapter Three. Of note, this research focuses on the quality of policy – its substance – not ODA quantity. While the first change under examination resulted in the creation of a new government budget line (Vote ODA), this change was almost a side effect of the drive for change, which was focused squarely on ODA policy quality. What this research explores is the process leading-up to the Cabinet decisions to make changes in the desired outcomes from ODA policy (goal ends) and how ODA should best be organised within government (goal means).

The first case this research explores begins in 1997 when civil society groups started to advocate for change. Prior to 2001, the New Zealand ODA programme was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) division, charged with achieving sustainable improvements in the living conditions of people in developing countries, especially the poor. ODA was also viewed as an important instrument of New Zealand non-development foreign policy (Hoadley, 1991). After instigating a Ministerial Review, in 2001 the centre-left Labour-Alliance coalition government set poverty reduction as the overall purpose for the ODA Programme, and created a semi-autonomous body attached to MFAT – called NZAID – to manage the ODA Programme. The entire ODA Programme was re-established in its own entity, tasked with the sole focus of eliminating poverty. An executive director position was created, along with separate ODA Programme human resource and ministerial policy advice functions. A new budget allocation – Vote ODA – was established. These were the largest changes to the ODA Programme since the External Aid Division was created in 1978 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987, p. 40). This case closes in 2005, when both a Ministerial Review and a five-yearly, routine Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review of NZAID assessed the new agency positively. A general election was also held this year, the results of which enabled the Labour Party to continue to lead government.

The second case begins where the first leaves off. Four years later, in 2009, within six months of taking power, the new National Party-led minority government changed ODA's policy goal end to sustainable development, with a core focus on economic development and alignment to non-development foreign policy. The government also dissolved the ODA Programme back into MFAT – a policy goal means change in ODA's organisational arrangements. This change involved an internal review by the State Services Commission, the Treasury, and MFAT, with input from NZAID. Again, Cabinet decided upon these changes, and they were high-level decisions about the desired outcomes for ODA and how the government would deliver ODA. The ODA Programme's semi-autonomous body status was rescinded, along with the separate human resource and ministerial advice functions, and the executive director role. Vote ODA was maintained. Essentially, this change returned the ODA Programme to its pre-2001 situation, highlighting temporal issues in analysing policy change, which I return to in Chapter Nine. The case closes in the year 2011, when the DAC released another New Zealand ODA Programme five-yearly review and the country held a general election.

Research Design

This thesis does not aim to test theory, but uses theory as an analytical framework to explore and analyse two cases. Chapter Three describes the analytical framework in detail. As ODA policy change has not been thoroughly and explicitly explored, it is appropriate to use an analytical framework that encompasses the broad components of ODA policy change (actors, ideas and rules), and the relationship between them. Findings from this exploration then provide theory-building and refinement suggestions for other scholars to use elsewhere.

As I detail in Chapter Two, a qualitative approach is appropriate for this research, given it involves historical phenomena that have already occurred and which I therefore have no control over. To gather data, I used interviews and archival research. To conduct the analysis I used causal process tracing. Little is known about ODA policy change processes and so causal process tracing allowed me to explore the pathways through which change decisions were made, in a subject area where different pathways may lead to similar outcomes, as occurred in the two New Zealand

cases. Causal process tracing also allows for an iterative approach, beginning with exploratory description and then engaging in analytical explanation within each case. This influences this thesis's structure, with Chapters Five and Seven providing descriptions about the change process, which are then analysed in Chapters Six and Eight. A comparison across the two cases enables assessment of similarities and differences in key conditions in each case, and is offered in Chapter Nine.

Important Concepts Defined

There are two key concepts the reader will encounter repetitively in this research: policy change and ODA. Each of these concepts is associated with others. ODA requires a definition of donors and recipients, as well as of development and non-development foreign policy: I define these concepts below. The concept of policy change is discussed further in Chapter Three, as are the concepts structuring the entire argument – actors, ideas and rules. These are further refined to the ODA policy domain in Chapter Four.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Up until recently the majority of countries giving ODA were members of the OECD DAC. The DAC was established in 1961 and provides a mechanism for donors to develop shared standards in ODA, hold each other to account for these standards, and share lessons learned. The DAC has a definition of ODA that their members use to guide their aid programmes.

> Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 10 (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). (Development Assistance Committee, 2010, p. 11)

This definition highlights the main purpose of ODA as development in the ODA-receiving country. Yet, as I detail in Chapter Four, this definition is not an adequate

definition of ODA *policy*, but can be completed by integrating a definition of policy with it. This results in ODA policy defined as a donor government's decisions and subsequent actions to promote economic development and welfare in developing countries, spanning ODA goals, objectives and settings, and what is to be achieved at each of these levels (ends), and how (means). As I explain in Chapter Four, ODA policy is a component of a donor country's foreign policy.

The global ODA landscape is changing, with so-called 'emerging' donors reacting against what they view as a patronising, colonial perspective of ODA, preferring to use the term 'development cooperation' to imply more equal relationships and sharing of knowledge and expertise, rather than merely funds. Yet, while the label 'ODA' may not accurately imply it, traditional DAC donors do more than deliver funds. The contemporary debates about ODA's definition are not a central concern for this research, beyond an acknowledgement they are occurring. New Zealand is a DAC member and DAC maintains the ODA definition outlined above, with which New Zealand must comply for its expenditure to 'count' as ODA.

Development

ODA is about development. Yet development as a concept and practice is hotly contested. This research does not enter into this contest, using a generic, uncritical definition of development as an ongoing process of improving human and environmental well-being, occuring predominantly within a nation-state's boundaries. Perspectives abound regarding *how* to improve well-being, and what well-being actually means. These perspectives are part of the story told in this research, but it is not my purpose to critique these perspectives. Rather, I present them as ideas important in making ODA policy change decisions.

Even when donors give ODA for foreign policy reasons other than a recipient's development, a recipient's development is usually at least a rhetorical desired outcome, or a secondary desired outcome. For this reason, I distinguish between ODA and *non-development* foreign policy. I use the term non-development foreign policy to depict foreign policy goals or objectives that are explicitly not about a recipient's development, such as a donor's economic imperatives or strategic concerns.

('Strategic' is a catch-all word I use to encapsulate diplomatic, political and security aims.)

Donors and Recipients

In a DAC framework, donors are countries that provide ODA and recipients are countries that receive it. In generic terms, developing countries are those who receive ODA, categorised as ODA-eligible according to their gross national income per capita, (using the World Bank's measurements). However, this definition no longer has traction across all countries, as poorer countries that receive ODA, such as Papua New Guinea, are also giving development funds to other countries. As this research is about domestic politics and policy in a DAC donor country, and does not delve deeply into the mechanics of ODA disbursement or examine development issues in recipient countries, it is satisfactory to use the DAC-shaped definitions of 'recipient' and 'donor', while ensuring that the reader is aware that these definitions are evolving in the broader context.

New Zealand Context

To enable the reader to situate the two ODA policy changes in their broader context, below I provide a brief outline of New Zealand's political and economic history, along with the country's foreign policy roots. Following this, I introduce the ODA Programme's beginnings, dominant ideas motivating the ODA Programme, and the main New Zealand actors involved in international development efforts up until the mid-1990s.

Political and Economic Backdrop

Colonised by the British, New Zealand's political system is a Westminster import – a liberal, parliamentary democracy, but with the 1996 introduction of a mixed member proportional electoral system. The country is ethnically diverse, with the indigenous Māori people, and large Pacific (particularly Polynesian) and growing Asian populations. International trade is crucial for New Zealand's economy, leaving the country vulnerable to global economic shifts (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999), which have social and political impacts at home. Economic changes in the 1970s, with New

Zealand's preferential export access to the United Kingdom's markets ceasing in 1973, and the oil shocks (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999), led the government to react by increasing spending and borrowing. By the snap election of 1984, New Zealand was in significant economic trouble.

In response, the New Zealand Labour government enacted substantial economic and public sector reforms, which the subsequent National government continued into the 1990s. "Indeed, in the decade 1984-1994, every aspect of New Zealand's economic policy was subject to radical change, from the decision to float the New Zealand dollar in March 1985 to the passing of the Fiscal Responsibility Act in June 1994" (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999, p. ix). Simultaneously the New Zealand public sector "underwent massive structural, organizational, and management changes" (Boston, 1991b, p. 1) to improve efficiency, performance, accountability and contestability. The business of government was corporatised and managerialised. In machinery of government terms, the changes were the most significant the bureaucracy had ever endured (Boston, 1991a, p. 233).

The ongoing impacts of the reforms are still debated today. During and after the changes, New Zealand experienced an eight-year recession, with severe increases in both unemployment and poverty (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999). "[I]t is clear that poverty levels rose sharpy during the reform programme, particularly in the early 1990s when the rate of unemployment reached double figures" (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999, p. 97). Yet New Zealand emerged from recession in the early 1990s with solid growth in gross domestic product (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999, p. 93). The reforms restructured the fabric of New Zealand society: widely-held ideas about egalitarianism and universalism were turned on their head, the social contract was broken, and New Zealand citizens felt betrayed (Le Heron and Pawson, 1996, p. 391). It is this betrayal that is often cited as the cause for the public to vote in the 1993 referendum to change the electoral system from First-Past-the-Post (FPP) to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system. The public wished to diminish the power of the two main parties – the Labour and National parties – and to increase diversity in parliament.

Following the first MMP election in 1996 the National Party led the government in coalition with the New Zealand First Party. This was an uncomfortable union, often divided and in conflict, leading to the coalition's termination in 1998 and subsequent National Party minority government. National lost at the polls in 1999, leaving Labour positioned to form a coalition government with the Alliance party. The 1999 election reaffirmed traditional ideological blocs, with the Greens, Alliance and Labour gaining a total of 66 out of a total 120 parliamentary seats (Aimer, 2014, p. 11). This government led the most significant changes to ODA policy since the late 1970s, which is the first case this research examines. By 2008, after nine years of Labour Party-led government, the National Party had rallied and won the 2008 election with 45 per cent of the party vote to Labour's 35 per cent (Aimer, 2014, p. 19). Establishing a minority government, the National Party entered into supply and confidence agreements with ACT, United Future and the Māori Party (Levine and Roberts, 2010, p. 349). In general, National did not enact radical reform during their first term (Aimer, 2014, p. 21). Yet when it came to the almost publicly invisible ODA Programme, substantial changes were implemented in 2009, a change that comprises the second case explored in this research. The National Party continued to lead through minority government following the 2011 election, with formal confidence and supply agreements with the ACT Party, the Māori Party and United Future.

New Zealand Abroad

New Zealand's geography and historical ties shape its foreign policy. As a small, isolated country some distance from world markets, a core part of the country's interests on the global stage have always been trade (McIntosh, 1977, p. 12). Throughout the reforms, and with increasing economic globalisation, New Zealand's trade interests were accentuated. From the mid-1980s these interests were based on the idea of global free trade, and the country has since negotiated a series of free trade agreements or 'closer economic partnerships' with several key trading countries.

The smallness and remoteness New Zealand experiences has shaped an identity as a country that works constructively with others on the international stage, with a sense of empathy with smaller and less powerful countries. This is particularly so given

New Zealand does not have the military or economic power to wield over other countries. New Zealand was active in the development of the United Nations, and in this process established its interests in nurturing a collective, rules-based global community. From WWII's end, economic and social concerns for other countries' development grew as a foreign policy issue for New Zealand (McIntosh, 1977, p. 32). The country evolved a perspective of itself as a constructive global citizen, working to advance collective rules that contributed to a stable, prosperous and peaceful world.

Following WWII, New Zealand's geographical interests began to shift from Britain and Europe, to the USA and the Pacific (McIntosh, 1977, pp. 31-32), and later into Asia. The move from allegiance to Britain to greater relationships with the USA was long and difficult, and part of a process of New Zealand asserting its independence. Destroying the 1951 Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) defence agreement, New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation of 1984 entrenched the country's ability to claim a foreign policy independent of allegiances to world powers, and became a topic of dissent between the National and Labour Parties until the National Party decided to remove its objection to the legislation in 2006. From the mid-1940s, with the 1944 Canberra Pact (McIntosh, 1977, p. 32), New Zealand's "encouragement and leadership" (McIntosh, 1977, p. 33) in the Pacific region was renewed, and this grew to a modern-day belief that New Zealand is of the Pacific, with significant Pacific populations living in New Zealand. These Pacific connections also influenced the ODA Programme.

ODA Programme

The New Zealand ODA Programme can be traced back to 1901, through the New Zealand government's colonial relationships with the Cook Islands and Niue, and then Western Samoa (now Samoa) since 1914 and Tokelau from 1925 (Hoadley, 1991, p. 198). The early transfer of funds was a component of New Zealand's colonial obligations and went predominantly to fund administration until after 1945 when funds were provided for basic social services and infrastructure (Overton, 2009, p. 4). Following World War II, the ODA Programme consisted of bilateral ODA to Pacific Island Countries, bilateral ODA to Asia as part of the Colombo Plan, and ODA to multilateral entities, such as the United Nations. This early ODA was motivated by a

mixture of enlightened self interest, humanitarianism, colonial responsibilities, security concerns, and mutual interests emerging from the movement of Pacific Island people from their country of origin to New Zealand (Hoadley, 1991). From this point on, the ODA Programme grew in size and sophistication to what it is today.

Through the 1970s the ODA Programme continued to solidify "from the early days of 'inspired ad hocery' to the present" (Sargison, 1978, p. 52, item 83(b), quoting External Aid Division Director David McDowell). Under Prime Minister Kirk's Labour government, ODA levels reached an all-time high in 1977, which placed strains on its administration. The External Aid Division (EAD) was established in 1978, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to manage the programme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987, p. 40), and this remained in place, with different names, up until the 2001 creation of NZAID. New Zealand's ODA Programme has never involved the enactment of ODA-specific legislation.

As international development thinking evolved, New Zealand began to integrate particular thematic issues into its ODA Programme, including humanitarian funding, the role of women in development, and environmental sustainability. New Zealand joined the DAC in 1973. Despite incremental policy improvements, during New Zealand's economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the ODA Programme experienced constant funding diminishment. By the mid-1980s, the ODA Programme, while being adaptable and effective, was experiencing

> an underlying malaise and approaching crisis… The aid system has just about reached the limits of its adaptability because the claims of external policies and dictates of financial control are not in touch with each other… there is no explicit linkage between aid policy, aid funding and future intentions. (Caughley, 1986, p. 28)

There was obviously concern within the 1984-90 Labour government about the ODA Programme, with a ministerial review undertaken in 1986, followed by a select committee inquiry, launched in late 1987. The Labour Party's Jim Anderton, Chair of parliament's then-named Foreign Affairs and Trade Select Committee, launched this Inquiry into New Zealand ODA, which culminated in a report tabled in parliament in

September 1990. This was only several weeks shy of the general election, after which the National Party began its nine-year hold on government. Also in 1990, the Labour government's Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fran Wilde, hosted a large conference on New Zealand Development Assistance (sponsored by the Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development), with a desire "to really do a substantive review of the aid programme" (former professional executive, December 2014, Interview 38). Time ran out for the Labour Party, yet the 1990-99 National Party government did make improvements in the ODA Programme. By the mid-1990s, the DAC peer review commended the ODA Programme for the "clear improvement" (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 8) in the ODA Programme's policy basis and professional management, while also suggesting it was time to expand on these gains and improve "staffing levels and aid management" (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 9).

Overall, like most donors, mixed ideas animated New Zealand's ODA Programme, regardless of which political party was leading government. Yet, different governing parties weighted particular ideas over others. The ideas of two Prime Ministers, Holyoake and Kirk, illustrate well the different weighting. In the late 1960s the National Party Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake (1960-72), emphasised New Zealand's economic interests, announcing significant changes to ODA and trade policies. Holyoake introduced new measures to promote New Zealand consultancy service exports, "to earn more overseas exchange, to gain experience and contacts of importance, to create trading opportunities, and to make employment openings for highly qualified professional people" (Sargison, 1978, p. 35, item 51). A direct invitation followed: the Prime Minister asked the private sector to assist in designing and implementing ODA activities.

In contrast, while not removing tied ODA, Holyoake's successor, Prime Minister Norman Kirk of the Labour Party, brought a different focus to foreign affairs in the 1970s. Kirk articulated a solid moral basis for foreign policy, emphasising international cooperation and international law, the need to help other countries, particularly those that are small, and to be responsive to the needs and hopes of other people, especially those in developing countries (Sargison, 1978, p. 46, item 68). As Kirk stated, he saw "investment of some of our material wealth now as a means of

helping to safeguard the future for that greater treasure – our human treasure – those who follow after us. This is an investment in justice, in people" (Kirk, 1973, p. 8, quoted in Sargison 1978, p. 47, item 69). After Kirk's death in August 1974, his successor, Rowling, argued ODA "is an 'investment for a world free of want… a world which is secure, stable, and just" (Rowling, 1975, p. 9, quoted in Sargison 1978, p. 50, item 77).

These differing emphases of New Zealand's overseas interests shaped the relationship between non-development and development foreign policy goals, embodied in ODA's policy goals. Straddling the two, a pervasive idea was evident across MFAT, and successive governments: "it is possible to pursue foreign policy and commercial goals without corrupting the quality of aid provided" (Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 1990, p. 16). (I discuss the idea of dual benefit policy goals in Chapter Four.)

Kiwis Going Global

Evolving alongside the government ODA Programme was a burgeoning set of international development actors within broader New Zealand society. These actors arose from community concerns about people in poorer countries overseas, and from the growing imperative for New Zealand businesses to export.

From 1944 the trailblazing NGO, the Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO), began to coordinate a deep engagement from the New Zealand people in post-WWII European reconstruction efforts. This included activities such as the Girl Guides, Boy Scouts and Junior Red Cross going door to door to collect 400,000 buttons, and a national clothing drive that saw CORSO sorting and packing 35,000 unpaired shoes to send to Europe (Thompson, 1965, p. 15). These actions evolved into international development work in places such as China (Thompson, 1965), and an eventual shift from relief work to examining the structural roots of poverty – a transformation that arguably led to CORSO's decline (Sutton et al., 2010, pp. 214-217). Meanwhile, other NGOs grew and emerged. For example, Save the Children entered the market in 1947 when it raised £30 (Thompson, 1967, p. 67), and Volunteer Services Abroad was formed in 1962, sending New Zealanders with

particular skills to assist people in developing countries (Thompson, 1967, p.74). World Vision appeared in 1971 (Tennant et al., 2008, p. 22) and quickly dominated the international development NGO community in financial terms. Oxfam arrived in 1991 (Tennant et al., 2008, p. 22), as did the Christian Children's Fund. Throughout the 1980s and onwards, NGO professionalism and diversity expanded (Tennant et al., 2008, p. 26). The ODA Programme provided funding for NGO international development activities, through the Voluntary Assistance Services Scheme (VASS) (established in 1975), indicating a growing government recognition of the importance of these entities. By the mid-1980s various international development NGOs realised they needed a collective entity.

Established in June 1985 with 22 members, the Council for International Development (CID) aimed to build cooperation between NGOs working in international development, and between these organisations and the government, as well as to lobby the government and raise public awareness on development issues (Council for International Development, 1986b). Similar to CORSO, CID's members were diverse, a mix of secular and church-based organisations. Despite this diversity, by November 1986 these members were able to agree on basic principles to guide CID's work (Council for International Development, 1986a). In the late 1990s CID gained funding from the ODA Programme, to support various activities.

As NGOs grew, so did the private sector. The initial idea behind involving the New Zealand private sector in ODA delivery was that New Zealand had areas of technical expertise and these should be used in the ODA Programme to help recipient countries to develop, while also bringing opportunities to New Zealand consultants and businesses. Apart from particular development project management expertise, the sorts of private sector firms involved included those working in agriculture (especially dairy and forestry), tourism, renewable energies (geothermal and hydroelectricity), conservation, and transport and communications infrastructure. By the early 1970s several consortia were developed to enable New Zealand consultants to collectively bid for overseas projects: the Engineering Export Association of New Zealand (ENEX), Asia New Zealand Development Consultants (ANZDEC) and Geothermal Energy of New Zealand (GENZL) (Sargison, 1978, pp. 37-38, Tonkin + Taylor,

2016). ANZDEC still exists today (now FCG ANZDEC Ltd), as does Geothermal New Zealand.

The ODA Programme's focus on the private sector's involvement waned during the 1980s, although there were several ODA Programme initiatives in place to engage them in international development activities (Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development, 1992, pp. 5-7). Yet in the mid-1980s businesses were expressing a renewed desire to gain access to the contracts and markets ODA work could provide them. Greater access came in 1990, with the new National government aiming to expand the "focus on private sector development under NZODA, and on New Zealand commercial sector involvement in the programme" (Development Cooperation Division, April 1992, p. 2). The Foreign Affairs Minister, Don McKinnon, aimed to simultaneously support New Zealand firms to contribute to development in recipient countries, "while at the same time building a foundation for trade and commercial expansion in the future"(Development Cooperation Division, April 1992, p. 3).

Although there is evidence the private sector lobbied for more support from the ODA Programme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987, p. 3, 16, 17, 41), beyond collectivising to win contracts there is no indication that the private sector consciously collectivised to influence policy. There were 'Joint Action Groups' (JAGs), comprised of various private sector representatives in particular technical areas (such as agritech, consulting and engineering), which were linked to TradeNZ (a separate government entity to MFAT), and the JAG for consulting services was connected with the MFAT (then named the Ministry of External Relations and Trade) through a staff member's participation on the JAG (Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development, 1992, p. 3, p. 5). Greater communication between the private sector and MFAT was recommended in 1992, potentially through the JAGs (Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development, 1992, p. 5), indicating a lack of formal engagement up until that point. Other existing mechanisms for collective private sector action included the Chambers of Commerce. But no collective body focusing on ODA policy is mentioned in the available data.

In terms of the general public, historically, New Zealanders were found to have little "spontaneous interest" (Applied Research Consultants, 1987, p. 35) in ODA policy, and approached the issue "with feelings of guilt, despair and boredom"(Applied Research Consultants, 1987, p. 32). In general, the New Zealand public support ODA but are neither particularly interested in it nor know much about it (UMR Research Limited, 2007, pp. 8-9). While the majority of people want to support poor people in poor countries (UMR Research Limited, 2007, pp.10, 45-47) and give to NGO appeals, the mass public's attention is rarely turned to ODA policy.

Related to this, ODA gets little media coverage, a fact many lament.

> At best one's message might get a few paragraphs in a metropolitan daily, or 3 to 5 minutes on [Radio New Zealand's] 'Morning Report' or 'Checkpoint' programmes. More usually it is a 5 second sound bite on television, or 15 seconds on radio. (McKinnon, 1993, p. 17)

When ODA does gain media attention, the coverage tends to be about an event, such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami, a perceived scandal, or ODA levels.

During the 1990s, academic engagement in international development, including ODA, grew. No development studies programmes existed in New Zealand universities in the late 1980s (Walsh, 1988), but by 1995 there were three (University of Auckland, Victoria University of Wellington and Massey University). 'DevNet', a development studies network, was established in 1996, and aimed to bring together academics, policymakers and practitioners (Aotearoa New Zealand Development Studies Network, 2016). Yet, the focus was on international development, rather than ODA specifically. While a new academic network – New Zealand Aid and Development Dialogues – emerged in 2010 to engage in ODA policy debates, overall New Zealand academics have had little consistent and systemic involvement with ODA policymaking.

Similarly, New Zealand ODA policymaking has received scant academic analysis throughout its life. Several historical reviews of the ODA Programme exist, including ODA policy description, analysis and critique, [for example: (Storey et al., 2005, Scheyvens and Overton, 1995, Overton, 2009, Hoadley, 1991). The 2009 ODA policy

goal change examined here inspired two studies. One explored government relationships with NGOs (McGregor et al., 2013), while the second gave "an overview of the shifts in New Zealand's aid policy over four decades" (Banks et al., 2012, p. 169). This latter paper relates to the research questions answered in this thesis and so I summarise the paper's findings here.

Banks et al. (2012) examined the gegraphical and thematic shifts in New Zealand ODA policy between 1970 and 2010, charting the relationship between the global aid regime and domestic practice, and political parties' and their individuals' influence on ODA policy. Eschewing a theoretical or methodological framework, this study sketched ODA eras in New Zealand, including the two policy goal changes examined in this thesis. The study's aims were ambitious, aiming to explore the relationship between structure and agency, and their impact upon ODA policy. The paper found that particular individuals in the political executive had an impact on ODA policy shifts, as did global and regional geopolitical events, and global aid thinking. These findings raised many subsequent questions, particularly regarding ODA's domestic politics and the processes leading to change decisions. While individual political executives are important, they cannot act in isolation. Who else was involved in championing or opposing change? What ideas did different actors have? Where did powerful politicians get their ideas from? How did the rules allocate power and how did actors negotiate the rules to achieve change? Further, in tracing four decades of ODA policy, breadth won out over depth, leaving space in the literature for an in-depth analysis of ODA policy change instances. This is what this research offers, providing a fuller understanding of how actors, ideas and rules interacted dynamically to result in New Zealand ODA policy goal change decisions.

As of the mid-1990s,the ODA Programme was a well-established MFAT division, focused on both ODA and non-development foreign policy goals, particularly New Zealand's economic imperatives. NGOs and the private sector were key actors,with scant public, media and academic engagement. While incremental improvements in ODA policy were made, the ODA Programme was slow to keep up with evolving global thinking. This was particularly so in relation to building a substantive cadre of development professionals within MFAT, with policy guidance focused on poverty

reduction in ODA receiving countries – an idea that was already guiding other donors across the world. As we shall see, this set the stage for the 2001 ODA policy changes.

Reader's Roadmap

To allow the reader to better navigate what follows, I conclude this introductory chapter summarising each subsequent chapter of this document. In Chapter Two I present the research design underpinning the approach I took to conducting this research: qualitative methodology tracing causal processes in two cases. I discuss the limitations involved in making causal inferences in qualitative work, and outline how causal process tracing is a useful analytical method for my research questions. I describe the challenges I encountered with interviews and archival research, including how to manage bias and gain a range of different perspectives. I introduce counterfactual evidence, and necessary and sufficient conditions: tools I use in the analysis. Ethical issues are also briefly outlined.

The analytical framework guiding the case exploration comprises Chapter Three, derived from policy studies literature, particularly policy change analyses. I draw on Ostrom's typology of frameworks, theories and models to sculpt a framework comprised of actors, ideas and rules. Policy change theories comprise this broad framework, enabling me to first explore and describe the change process in each case (Chapters Five and Seven), then to offer potential explanations in Chapters Six and Eight (consistent with causal process tracing).

Readers interested in the ODA policy literature should turn to Chapter Four, which forms a basis for examining research's question one and two. This chapter begins to address the question of what actors, ideas and rules are involved in ODA policy agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making processes. The Chapter introduces the ODA policymaking literature, embedding the subsequent analysis in what is already understood about ODA policymaking. I define ODA policy and describe three key ODA policy characteristics: ODA policy's relationship with foreign policy, accountability and feedback gaps, and ODA policy's particular politics. I then go on to discuss the actors, ideas and rules involved in ODA policymaking processes, and what the extant research indicates about ODA policy change.

The first ODA policy goal change case is covered in Chapters Five and Six. These two chapters begin to answer research questions one and two: what actors, ideas and rules were involved in the policy goal change, and how did they interact? Chapter Five details the steps along the route from agenda-setting, through policy-formulation to the final decision to change ODA's policy goal in 2001. Then, consistent with causal process tracing, Chapter Six articulates the explanation arrived at through applying the analytical lens to the change description in Chapter Five. Emanating from this application is the discovery that what formed the basis for actors' motivations for change, and their preferred policy goal change, were ideas about New Zealand's interests overseas and how ODA can contribute to achieving them. NGOs, political parties, two consultants, a ministerial advisor, ministers, central agencies and Cabinet were all involved in the change process, most of them connected by their policy values. A status quo defender did not emerge until the policy change was being formulated. Both MFAT and the Prime Minister did not want change, based on their prioritisation of New Zealand's close interests overseas. Yet the defenders were unsuccessful, and with a compromise, policy goal change occurred.

Chapter Seven and Eight continue to address research questions one and two, and mirror the relationship between the previous two chapters. Chapter Seven describes the process leading to ODA policy goal change in 2009. As explained in Chapter Eight, National Party parliamentarians worked hard to develop their preferred policy goal change while they were in opposition. Minister McCully was the main change proponent, connected to a wider societal network through shared policy values and the primacy of New Zealand's close interests and economic growth for human progress. Again, change resisters did not find out about the proposed changes until they were being formulated in government. These resisters were essentially the pro-change network from 2001, activated in 2009 to defend the change they won in 2001. Yet, by the time they were taking action it was too late, and Minister McCully had worked the rules of power to ensure his policy goal change was swiftly enacted.

Chapter Nine lifts the analysis to a more abstract level, comparing across the findings from the two cases, and relating the findings back to the existing literature. In this I explore the dynamics between rules and actors, actors and ideas, and the role of individual entrepreneurial behaviour. In doing so, I deepen the response to research

question two: how did actors, ideas and rules interact in the two policy goal changes? The findings offer insights to the growing understanding of entrepreneurialism in policy change, and detail a web of rules that both shapes actors' actions, and which actors can interpret to their advantage. In discussing ideas, I draw on the ideational definition created across Chapters Three and Four, and show how ideas acted as the 'glue' that brought and held actors together, and that these ideas are deep. Shaping ODA policy change decisions were ideas about New Zealand's interests overseas, embodied in what outcomes ODA should aspire to achieve, and how. To conclude Chapter Nine, I return to the nature of policy change and challenges in studying policy change.

Chapter Ten draws the thesis to a close, revisiting the research questions outlined above. I summarise the answers to research questions one and two, and respond to research question three in offering suggestions for theory-building and refinement. I also lay out suggestions for scholarly thinking about both ODA policymaking and policy change. I outline what practitioners can take from this research and apply in their efforts to change policy or protect the status quo. Future research ideas are offered, before I end with reflections on studying and making ODA policy, and what academics can contribute to the struggle for global social justice.

Up next, Chapter Two details the research design underpinning this thesis.

Chapter Two: Methodological Framework

Research design is this chapter's subject, enabling the reader to understand how the research findings were arrived at. First, I describe the philosophy of science underpinning the research design, touching on epistemic issues, and causation. This provides a foundation upon which the subsequent design rests and lets the reader situate this research amongst particular philosophical questions. Second, I address the research's theoretical ambitions and analytical approach to provide clarity for the following empirical chapters and investigative processes. Third, I justify the small-n case study research design employed, outlining case definition and case selection decisions. Fourth, the analytical method – causal process tracing – is reviewed, along with its limitations. Fifth, I describe archival and interview data collection methods, the use of counterfactual data, and how I managed challenges with these methods. Finally, I highlight remaining limitations with this methodology, and sketch out the ethical considerations attended to. Overall, this chapter informs the reader about the specifics regarding how this research was undertaken, offering a transparent description to allow the reader to assess for themselves the research design's strengths and weaknesses, and impacts on the findings.

Philosophical Underpinnings

The philosophy of science is a contentious world, where academics have long argued about what exists 'out there' to be known (ontology), and how humans can know what exists (epistemology). Here is not the place to resolve these debates, but it is useful for the reader to position this research amongst them. Below I introduce the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this research, and outline the approach to causation I take.

This research is based on a scientific realist epistemology situated within a weak realist ontology (Dowding, 2016, p. 10, Sayer, 2000): there is a real world out there beyond what human minds create and this can be known, even if not completely or with complete certainty. Yet, what exists to be known is often complex and

contingent. While there may be some general laws, knowledge of the social world requires mid-range theorising. Mid-range theorising is situated "in between grand, parsimonious theories and complex, descriptive narratives" (Checkel, 2015, p. 91), and involves "the development of 'localized' theories about specific pehnomena" (Hill and Hupe, 2009, p. 119). This perspective highlights the utility of building knowledge inductively, studying processes, and paying careful attention to context. In the area of government ODA policy, the current literature indicates significant variation in conditions across donor governments, indicating that the best way to build an accurate theory of ODA policy change is to start from individual case studies and accrete an understanding of what conditions and processes are present in groups of countries, rather than trying to build generic theory through examining the average effect of one (or several) variable(s) across many countries at once. Building from individual cases can create more reliable mid-range theories about particular groups of phenomenon, offering useful theories for policymakers and social actors to use (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 266).

Finally, a note on causation. The gold standard for causal explanations is experimental work, where a counterfactual can be factored into research design (Gerber and Green, 2012, pp. 2-7). Yet much useful social science research cannot achieve this gold standard, and to stick rigidly to it severely limits the questions that can be asked about the world, and therefore what social science can learn. This research aims to uncover causal processes and conditions, however, without a real-world counterfactual, it is not possible to definitively claim causation. Therefore, a reasonable and productive approach is to arrive at the best explanation possible (or explanations), and clearly articulate caveats or remaining alternative explanations.

Theoretical Considerations

Two theoretical considerations are important to note: this research's theoretical ambitions and the analytical approach taken. First, this research does not aim to test theory, rather, it is theory-refining and building. Through exploration and analysis, I draw findings from the cases and offer suggestions for theorising about policy change and ODA policymaking. These suggestions are derived only from New Zealand and so cannot be generalised elsewhere without further testing. Due to this, the

suggestions serve as nascent mid-range theorising about what specific conditions or variables could be important in ODA policy change. Second, and related, because this research is not testing theory, it uses an analytical framework to examine the cases. I describe this framework in Chapter Three. Below, I define what a framework is, and outline why a combined analytical framework is appropriate for this research.

Social science involves the endeavour to understand the human world and to distill its complexity into simpler 'stories' about particular phenomenon. These 'stories', or explanations, can be constructed at different levels of specificity. Ostrom (2007) distinguishes three levels of specificity in relation to any particular research problem: frameworks, theories and models (Ostrom, 2007). Frameworks are situated at the most abstract level and assist the scholar to organise a wide enquiry into their chosen phenomenon. Frameworks identify the broadest components of any particular phenomenon or problem, and the relationships between these components. Theories are more specific. Theories assist the scholar to specify the particular variables and relationships that are the most important to explore in trying to understand the problem under examination, and enable diagnosis, explanation and prediction. Models are precise assumptions about a narrow set of variables (or conditions), and often involve mathematical approaches.

I use this notion of frameworks to create an analytical framework (Chapter Three) that within the phenomenon of ODA policy change delineates actors, ideas and rules as the key components. The analytical framework then acts as a guide to what potential variables or conditions within each component could be important in ODA policy change. This allows me to explore widely within and across the three components. In exploratory empirical case research such as this, an open mind is important, ensuring the researcher investigates for "all kinds of possible explanations and [is] willing to follow the evidence wherever it leads" (Bennett and Checkel, 2012, p. 23). Yet it is impractical to cast the net too widely. Even wide exploration requires prior knowledge as a guide to what information is most relevant (Collier, 2011). I use established policy studies theories as a guide – in the form of the analytical framework – with which to explore ODA policy change.

Making use of multiple theories allows benefits to be gained from using each theories' specific explanatory power, particularly when no one theory robustly encapsulates actors, ideas and rules combined. In this sense, the framework employed in this research is pluralist, drawing from across multiple theories, but combining them into one framework to identify what sorts of conditions or variables could reasonably be thought to be relevant in ODA policy change.

To be useful, a framework needs to achieve three criteria (Hill and Hupe, 2006, p. 20). First, the framework needs to be comprehensive, able to capture the complexity of policy and its change. Second, it must be emipirically open to support systematic and normatively open empirical analysis. Third, it should facilitate middle-range theorising. The framework outlined in Chapter Three achieves this by combining the broad insights from policy studies about how policy change occurs, the actors involved, what ideas they have, how the rules help or hinder them, and how actors, ideas and rules interacted in the change process.

Scholars argue that combining multiple theories can have value in advancing thinking (Cairney, 2013) and supporting engagement in real-world, complex problems (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). In terms of policy change research, Capano and Howlett (2009, p. 1) argue that there is a "remarkable variety of unnecessary theories and frameworks", which "encourages the compartmentalization of perspectives which fail to enrich each other". In utilising the generic insights from across policy change theories about how particular policy change components function, the combinative framework employed in this research emphasises the commonalities and differences across policy change theories, and can contribute to theory-building through identifying factors that may be more important than others.

Small-n Case Study Approach

How ODA policy changes is the dominant analytical question underpinning my research. It is a question that lends itself to within-case analysis using causal process tracing, accompanied by the comparison of two cases (Yin, 2014, George and Bennett, 2005, Hall, 2003). This research is exploratory, and focuses on explanation and theory building. Small-n case studies are well suited to this type of analysis (Gerring, 2004, p.

349). Case study approaches are also suitable in researching events that have already occurred, which therefore the researcher cannot manipulate in an experimental manner, and within which it is challenging to clearly separate the boundaries between the broader context and conditions of interest within the case (Yin, 2004, p. 13). Further, small-n case studies can manage research topics with multiple observations of interest and evidence sources (Yin, 2004). Case studies also have strengths in examining complexity, such as multi-level interactions, path dependence, tipping points, multiple interaction effects, equifinality and multifinality (George and Bennett, 2005, Hall, 2003).

Many of these qualities are present in the ODA policy change cases that I have studied. The subject matter is contemporary and real-life, comprising events I cannot control for the purpose of researching them. Distinguishing ODA policy change conditions from their context requires delicate definition. Multiple, complex interactions are potentially important features. Uncovering how actors, ideas and rules interacted to achieve New Zealand ODA policy change decisions requires dissecting the connections between these three factors in the policy process to expose the multiple links and interactions that are likely to be involved. For example, decisions made in the 2001 changes may have contributed to the 2009 changes. Without tracing pathways and connections I would miss this sort of temporal interaction. Similarly, without exploring various actor-idea configurations, and the rules within which actors wield their ideas, mistaken conclusions may be drawn about how policy change came about. Given this, a small-n case study approach is the most suitable research design for the nature of my research questions.

Case Definition

I use George and Bennett's definition of a case "as an instance of a class of events" (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 17). A class of events is an occurrence of scientific interest that a researcher studies in order to develop theory about the causes of similarities or differences among various cases. For example, revolution is a class of events, as is policy change. In this research, the class of events is ODA policy goal change, and two instances, or cases, of policy goal change are analysed: one in 2002 and one in 2009.

Case Selection

Curiosity about particular real world events catalysed this research. As a result, the dominant analytical aim is to explain how the two ODA policy goal changes occurred. Examining two cases within the same country achieves an approximation of a 'most-similar' research design (George and Bennett, 2005, Bennett and Checkel, 2012, Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Broader contextual conditions can be held constant, or made obvious, avoiding the problem cross-country analyses face where unknown factors may influence particular countries' ODA policy change processes. However, even within one country it is still not always possible to hold everything constant. In this situation, the use of causal process tracing assists in highlighting where contextual changes have occurred and the impact they may have (Bennett and Checkel, 2012, pp. 37-38).

New Zealand is broadly comparable to other OECD DAC countries, meaning process explanations from New Zealand may provide suggestive results for testing elsewhere. Like most OECD DAC members, New Zealand has given ODA since the 1950s for a mix of humanitarian, political and economic reasons, and through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. New Zealand has a similar colonial history to other ODA donor countries such as Australia and Canada, and as a British colony New Zealand has much in common with the United Kingdom. New Zealand also has some commonalities with the Scandinavian donors, such as being a smaller country, having a proportional representation electoral system and a history of egalitarian values.

Some scholars argue small-n case selection can suffer from the malaise of 'dependent variable' (outcome) selection bias, arguing cases should not be chosen on the dependent variable (Geddes, 1990). These scholars would object to my research design because I have chosen cases based on the outcome – policy goal change. Yet even King, Keohane and Verba (1994) agree cases can be chosen on the outcome as long as there is outcome variation, which the two cases under examination in this research possess. Further, this research aims to understand the processes through which each ODA policy change decision came about and compare the processes of the two cases, rather than analysing the average effect of an independent variable on an outcome (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). Therefore, dependent variable selection

bias is not an issue for the validity of this research. Confirmation bias is a greater threat. I discuss this below.

I bind the cases within a particular timeframe: 1997 to 2011. I do this for two reasons. First, the changes under observation need to be totally encapsulated within the chosen time period (Knill and Tosun, 2012) with a lead-in time to ensure the full details of the change process are captured. This 15-year timeframe allows for this. Second, both dates offered key moments when different policy change could have occurred, but did not (Bennett and Checkel, 2012). The year 1997 was the start of a new government, following a general election in October 1996 under the new MMP rules. Similarly, the year 2011 saw a general election and release of the regular DAC Peer Review of New Zealand ODA – and therefore presented another point in time with the potential for altered direction.

Analytical Method

I employ Causal Process Tracing (CPT) to analyse the data. CPT is an ideal analytical method for this research, given the aims of examining how actors, ideas and rules interacted to achieve policy change decisions. CPT is a method that closely examines the process between an initial condition (or independent variable) and an outcome (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Collier defines CPT as "the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions" (Collier, 2011, p. 823). CPT offers a useful approach to establishing a pathway of linked conditions to their outcomes.

This thesis is structured according to my use of CPT. I first describe the process leading to each policy change decision (Chapters Five and Seven). I then apply the analytical framework (detailed in Chapter Three, refined in Chapter Four) to analyse how actors, ideas and rules were involved in each ODA policy change case, and deliberate over potential explanations for the policy changes (Chapters Six and Eight). This is what Beach and Pederson (2013) call 'explaining outcome' case-centric research: moving from a known outcome to look backwards, examining how the outcome came about. In Chapter Nine, I then compare the two cases. As outlined below, this is a useful step in good CPT practice. The purpose of comparing is to lift

the analysis to a more abstract level across the two cases, and draw out the most plausible explanation of how ODA policy goals changed. From this comparison I arrive at suggestions about New Zealand ODA policy goal change that can be used elsewhere.

Using CPT presents challenges. It is an evolving method, making it more difficult to use. While publications about the method have escalated over recent years [for example, (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, Beach and Pederson, 2013, Blatter and Haverland, 2012, Kay and Baker, 2015)], they remain predominantly theoretical, with few practical examples of concise research utilising CPT. At times the prescribed 'best practice' appears mismatched to practical realities. There also remain the debates about causation, which I referred to earlier. Given these limitations, I aim for the most plausible process tracing and acknowledge the limitations of this.

A related issue with CPT is the large amount of information required. To deal with this, I first constructed detailed descriptions of each case (Chapters Five and Seven), and then applied the analytical framework to these (Chapters Six and Eight). I articulate where data gaps exist and consider counterfactual 'evidence' and alternative explanations to mitigate against confirmation bias (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 217).

I followed Bennett and Checkels' (2015) steps for 'best practice' causal process tracing, as outlined in Table One below. Column one is a direct quote from Bennett and Checkel, while column two outlines my actions in relation to each point.

Table One: Best Practice Causal Process Tracing

Bennett and Checkels 'Best Practice' CPT Steps	My Decisions and Actions
"1. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations	As discussed earlier, the combinative analytical framework I utilise allows me to begin broadly in exploring the two cases. I assess various potential explanations, including ones interviewees put forward, within the bounds of the analytical framework.
2. Be equally tough on the alternative explanations	Chapters Six and Eight include consideration of potential alternative explanations, and highlight where I could not deny or confirm possible alternative explanations.
3. Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources	As outlined below, I managed biases in a variety of ways.
4. Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations	This step applies to theory-testing research. This research does not test theory with hypotheses that could be least or most likely.
5. Make a justifiable decision on when to start	I outline this research's time boundaries earlier in this Chapter.
6. Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision on when to stop	As outlined below, I used the concept of saturation, in conjunction with assessing different source perspectives, to decide when to stop. In some cases I exhausted the available evidence sources: individuals have died or I was not able to find them; some documents are not publicly available or have been discarded.
7. Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and feasible	I compare the two cases of ODA policy change in Chapter Nine. I compare to discover similar or different conditions present in each of the two cases, increasing or decreasing confidence that certain conditions may be more important than others.
8. Be open to inductive insights	This research is inductive and so open to insights.
9. Use deduction to ask 'if my explanation is true, what will be the specific process leading to the outcome?'	This is outcome-explaining CPT and so proceeds with outlining the process before arriving at the best explanation possible.
10. Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is conclusive." (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 21).	In my analysis I acknowledge any uncertainties in my posited explanations.

Data Collection Methods

This research uses archival documentary research and interviews as data collection methods. I used a question guide for interviews, and also when examining documentary data, to ensure I was consistently looking for the same information across sources. On occasion I also utilised counterfactual data to explore and exclude alternative explanations.

Archival and Documentary Data Collection

Archives provided documentation from the media, official parliamentary records, government policy documents, government publications, NGO reports, DAC reports, ODA expenditure data and academic literature. I sourced this information online, and at the National Library of New Zealand, the New Zealand Government Archives, the HOCKEN Library, Professor John Overton's personal collection, the Council for International Development's library, and the MFAT archives. Prior to commencing this research I had obtained some documentation from government agencies by requesting documents under New Zealand's Official Information Act (OIA) 1980. I also used some of these documents.

Accessing data held in MFAT's archives involved requesting particular files based on their labels. MFAT archivists then retrieved these files, and for those older than ten years, scanned them. I read the documents in a secure room at MFAT, under the supervision of MFAT staff. As this information was not fully scrutinised against the OIA, I consented to submit to MFAT for vetting the final chapters in which I drew directly on MFAT archival information. After vetting, MFAT cleared the use of MFAT archival data used in this thesis, and did not request any changes.

I approached documentary material with caution, due to the potential for author bias. All documents are written for a certain reason and audience, separate from that of any particular piece of research (Yin, 2014). The formal decision-making process, reflected in official documents, may be only one competing explanation for what actually occurred, or may represent the decision-making process in a particular way for a particular audience. Due to this, documents may contain biases that are elusive at first glance. To manage this I maintained a critical, questioning approach to reduce potential

bias, and in some instances checked documented information with particular interviewees.

Interview Data Collection

Interviewing decision-makers and people involved in New Zealand policy change is the second data collection method I used. The people I interviewed are elites, in that they have high levels of knowledge about the subject, and during the ODA policy changes many held positions of power within the government, private sector or non-government organisations. Interviews were semi-structured, allowing for both standardisation and flexibility to respond to each individual interviewee's particular experience (Burnham et al., 2008).

I used a mix of purposive and snowball sampling to obtain interviewees. Non-probability sampling approaches were suitable for my research as I was seeking specific individuals who were directly involved in the events (Tansey, 2007). Using a random selection approach may have led to the exclusion of individuals pivotal in the policy changes, therefore missing important evidence. I began with a purposive sampling approach, choosing individuals to interview based on their reputation and position. I then employed snowballing, to increase the likelihood I would interview as many relevant individuals as possible. I also identified individuals from archival documents, and sought them out through networks.

I first approached people with a written invitation to participate – either by mail or email – and then followed-up if they had not contacted me. I had a good response rate: out of 69 interview requests only three people did not respond (a parliamentarian, a private consultant and a professional executive), and seven individuals declined to be interviewed. Four of the seven refusals were current or past parliamentarians (two from the right and two from the left). Two refusals came from private sector individuals, one from a current civil servant and one from an academic. Overall, I achieved a reasonable balance across the various actors involved in ODA policymaking, although I interviewed more parliamentarians from the left of the political spectrum compared to those from the right. Table Two below summarises interviewees.

Table Two: Number of Interview Requests, Refusals and Participants

	Interviews	Refusals	Non-responders
Private Sector	16	2	1
NGOs	14	0	0
Professional Executive	11	1	1
Parliamentarians and Political Executive	11 (3R; 8L)	4 (2R; 2L)	1 (R)
Academics or Journalists	5	1	0
International Agency	1	0	0
Total	58	8	3

Total number of requests: 69

Standard qualitative interviewing advice is to stop interviewing when saturation is reached. Saturation means interviewees offer data already given in previous interviews, and additional interviews become repetitious. While this is useful as confirmation, repetition also wastes resources and for this reason researchers are advised to stop at saturation. However, in combination with snowball sampling, saturation can lead to bias in that interviewee referrals to potential interviewees rely on networks. Given ODA policymaking involves different actors situated within different networks, it was likely that I could reach saturation within one network but still miss out on important information from actors of a different network. To avoid this, I made efforts to reach outside of my known networks, and those of my interviewees, to obtain broader views. I drew on information from New Zealand and wider literature to ensure I obtained interviews from the spectrum of those who may have an interest in the ODA programme. As discussed further in Chapter Three, recipient governments and individuals from recipient countries have been deliberately ommitted from the analysis, as domestic politics are the focus of this research and if they factor into domestic decision-making, the pespectives of people in recipient countries can reasonably be expected to reflect in domestic actors' ideas.

Similar to documentary analysis, elite interviewing has particular pitfalls. Interviewees are not objective observers: the information they share is coloured by the way they wish to be perceived (Burnham et al., 2008, Tansey, 2007). Memory lapses can contribute to inaccurate or piecemeal recollections, particularly for the historical cases involved in this research. Bias is a significant issue in any interview method, and the use of open-ended questions common in semi-structured interviews can exacerbate validity and reliability issues (Berry, 2002), as they allow the interviewee greater leeway.

I mitigated these problems in several ways. I drew on Berry's (2002) advice: being alert for exaggerated claims, asking interviewees to critique perspectives other than their own, and using probing questions. I critically evaluated each interview, considering the particular perspective the interviewee was bringing to the interview, what impression they might have had of me and how this may have influenced their responses, and if they could have had any reason to talk with me beyond wanting to assist me and share their views (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 100). I analysed the degree of access each interviewee had to the decision-making process, and was able to obtain information from first-hand witnesses or actors centrally involved in the changes. Through broader research and prior knowledge, I also had a reasonable understanding of each interviewee's reliability and any possible biases they might have brought to the interview (Tansey, 2007, p. 767). I used this knowledge to assess data reliability.

Finally, I used triangulation to weigh information from different sources, including documentation. Where diverse sources gave the same information, I assessed these claims as stronger and more valid than when only one source offered information, or when only sources from a particular perspective offered the information. In interviews I used probing questions to test out strong assertions or explanations that another source had provided. In combination with weighting more reliable information, I carefully balanced the various perspectives offered in interviews (and documentary data).

Counterfactual Data

I also used counterfactual evidence, which essentially consists of non-existent causal process observations that oppose those found from primary and secondary evidence (Kay and Baker, 2015). Counterfactual evidence "must be *conceivable* and *plausible* given the character of the individual case" (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, p. 120). The researcher asks "'what *could have* happened but did not *in fact* happen'?" (Kay and Baker, 2015, p. 14). Using counterfactual observations added strength to the evidence gathered from interview and documentary data sources (Kay and Baker, 2015), and brought into relief the importance of particular evidence. Counterfactual analysis did this through forcing me to question what I was concluding from the empirical evidence, and thereby highlighted the need for more data to establish a robust explanation or to explore other causal pathways. I created counterfactual observations using theory and knowledge of the case (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012), and by asking interviewees questions (Kay and Baker, 2015). For example, I asked interviewees about particular

conditions that appeared important, such as "if there had not been a Ministerial Review, would substantial policy change have occurrred?". This process enabled me to ascertain what may have occurred if the condition under analysis was not present, as well as gauging the importance of that particular condition.

Limitations

Beyond the specific limitations involved with each of the methods discussed above, the research design I utilised limits the degree to which I can generalise from the research findings. While I offer suggestions for theory refinement or future testing, this research cannot generalise about how ODA policy changes beyond the New Zealand context. What this thesis does provide is one explanation that could be tested out in other countries.

Ethical Issues

I gained Human Ethics Approval from the Australian National University Human Ethics Committee. Each potential interviewee was sent an information sheet and a one-page summary with more detail about the research. Once an individual agreed to an interview, I provided the individual with a consent form. The consent form offered the potential interviewee choices regarding tape-recording of the interview, and quoting in final research products. Prior to obtaining an interviewee's consent, I gave the person an opportunity to ask further questions regarding the research. Some individuals requested I show them their quotes in context before they would consent to the quote's use. I have done this. Through this process I ensured participants were fully informed before they consented to take part in the research, and that their identity is protected in accordance with their wishes.

Conclusion

No research design is perfect. What is crucial to robust research is for the scholar to clearly articulate their methodological choices. This enables readers to critique the research findings with full knowledge of the approach taken to arrive at those findings. This Chapter lays out the methodological framework I utilise, in conjunction with the analytical framework specified in Chapter Three, and elaborated on in Chapter Four. The historical, qualitative research undertaken here is in the minority amongst the ODA

policymaking literature, in which quantitative, cross-country regression analysis dominates. Both research approaches have limitations in that they are not experimental and cannot account for the counterfactual, regardless of how much effort is taken to do so. Yet, if all research is limited to the experimental, there are many important questions and issues that would go uninvestigated in the social sciences, leaving significant gaps in knowledge. Using causal process tracing offers a robust approach to examining historical cases in-depth, such as the two policy goal changes about to be explored and analysed. Tracing an interactive process between various conditions enables the researcher to dissect and weigh-up the evidence, arriving at the best account possible for what occurred. Case by case, findings can then be accreted to expose broader commonalities across change processes, and therefore build theories of ODA policy change, and policy change in general. The analysis in the upcoming chapters and subsequent findings make a contribution to this process.

Chapter Three: Analytical Framework

Introducing policy scholars' policy change insights to the ODA policymaking literature is a core aim of this research. Therefore, it is appropriate for this chapter to outline the specific insights from policymaking analyses with which I will subsequently explore both the literature about ODA policymaking and the two empirical policy change instances. Policy scholars' work on policy change provides the analytical framework I use to explore, describe and analyse New Zealand ODA policy change As discussed in Chapter Two, this framework is broad, allowing space to explore different potential conditions within each of the three components of policy change phenomena – actors, ideas and rules.

In this chapter, I define policy, because policy is the core subject matter studied in this research. Policy and policymaking are complex phenomena: to simplify them I introduce the policymaking cycle and a way of delineating policy content into six orders. It is these six orders – ends and means for policy goals, objectives and settings – that enable me to be explicit in subsequent chapters about the type of change under analysis in this research. I also touch on policy change analysis challenges, before describing the key components of policy change, actors, ideas and rules, and how they are involved, and interact, in policy change processes.

Everything a Government Does or Doesn't Do

Policy Defined

A crisp description of public policy is "whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (Dye, 2008, p. 1). Jenkins (1978, p. 15) offers an enriched approach, defining policy as "a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve". Together these two definitions indicate that the central actor in public policy is the government, and the core action involves making decisions about goals and how to achieve them (bearing in mind that not-deciding is akin to making a decision to do nothing), in a particular domain or area of government action.

Yet there is more to policy than this, particularly when examining a specific policy area. Policy has a nature, such as regulatory or distributive, and can be associated with different politics (Wilson, 1995, Wilson, 1989, Lowi, 1972, Lowi, 1964, Knill and Tosun, 2012). Policy has been categorised by its effect into outputs, outcomes and impacts, while some scholars have attempted to identify different policymaking styles (Knill and Tosun, 2012, pp. 28-36). Policy also intermingles with policymaking processes, which I outline further below, meaning policy takes on different states according to where it is in the policymaking cycle – policy may be being formulated, implemented or evaluated, for example. Further, an individual policy has its own substance or content, divided into goals, objectives and settings (Hall, 1993).

It is possible to further divide policy goals, objectives and settings into ends and means, creating six policy content 'orders'. Goals are abstract, purpose-level policy ideas, which translate into more specific objectives or programmes (Kay, 2011, pp. 152-153). Settings then contain the particular aims regarding how the policy will be put into operation in the most specific, real-world situation (Cashore and Howlett, 2007, p. 536). The final content division is to separate each of the levels into ends – what the outcome is – and means – how that outcome will be achieved. "The implication of this taxonomy is that… every 'policy' is in fact a complex regime of ends and means-related goals, objectives, and settings" (Cashore and Howlett, 2007, p. 536). Chapter Four details this taxonomy for ODA policy.

For the purposes of this research, the focus is on the abstract, purpose-level policy goal ends and means: what the overarching desired outcome of ODA policy is and how ODA should achieve that outcome. What this research aims to understand is how the decisions regarding the policy goal ends and means were arrived at. This means this research predominantly focuses on the actors, ideas and rules involved in the early elements of the policy process, as discussed below.

Cycles and Elements

Policy as an individual 'product' is the end result of a policymaking process, yet it is also caught-up in this process, because policy is not static but continually evolving. Stability and change co-exist within the policymaking process, which can be divided into a cycle of elements.

The policymaking cycle provides a structure to assist scholars in analysing the complexity involved in researching policy and policymaking. In reality policy processes do not neatly flow from one element to another, as the policy cycle implies, and the policy cycle has met with substantial criticism for this and other reasons (Howlett et al., 2009, pp. 13-14, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 3). Yet, scholars are not ready to discard it, recognising that the policy cycle offers a useful guide to what would otherwise be an unwieldy study subject (Hill and Hupe, 2009, p. 6, Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 21, Knill and Tosun, 2012, p. 10, Howlett et al., 2009, p. 14). In a similar spirit, I use the policymaking cycle as a structuring guide to delineate between different elements of the process leading to the 2001 and 2009 ODA policy goal change decisions.

Various authors apply slightly different labels to the policy cycle elements but they are broadly conceived as: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 22, Howlett et al., 2009). Agenda-setting is the process whereby a particular issue gains political actors' attention from amongst the vast array of issues a government could potentially address. The word 'agenda' does not refer to a particular list of items, but to the variety of issues a government is dealing with or has identified as requiring action. The agenda "is the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time" (Kingdon, 2011, p. 3). An issue can arrive on a government's agenda through internal or external drivers (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 24). Examples of internal drivers include an election commitment, a coalition agreement, a minister's idea or an alert from the professional executive, while external drivers might involve interest group pressure, a judicial review, or an international event (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 24). Setting the agenda also involves defining the problem to be addressed (Knill and Tosun, 2012, p. 9). In defining a problem, actors gain ownership of it and can tactically present the problem in a way that heightens the chance the issue will appear on the agenda. Actors that are likely to be involved in agenda-setting include societal actors, such as civil society or business associations, the political and professional executive, and the media.

Policy formulation is the next policymaking cycle element, sometimes incorporated with decision-making (Knill and Tosun, 2012, p. 9). Formulating policies involves an

analytical process of working through various options for addressing the issue or problem that has made it on to the government's agenda. The first step in policy formulation is to ensure that the issue is defined in a way that leaves it responsive to action. Alternative policy options are assessed, based on past experience, research, consultation and the government's general policy goals and political values. Finally, a preferred policy is formulated and prepared for decision-making. This process involves a wide range of actors, including those engaged in agenda-setting, with a greater role for parliamentary actors, such as select committees (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 22).

Following this, a decision is made regarding the issue and the particular policy formulated to address it. Depending upon the rules involved, different government actors will be involved in final decision-making. For abstract policy decisions, such as those about the policy goal ends and means, it is likely the political executive will make the decisions. Once the decision is made, policy implementation occurs, which entails subsequent decisions on various factors, including potential legislation, required resources (although, depending upon amounts and the type of resources, the political executive may have made some decisions about resources), specific implementation processes or instruments, and how the policy will be evaluated. The final element in the policymaking cycle is evaluation – an assessment of whether or not the policy had an impact upon the original issue.

It is worth re-emphasising that this cycle artificially represents what occurs in reality. The policy cycle may function as a linear cycle at times, but more often policymaking is a dynamic process of implementation, assessment, formulation and decision-making: a process that encapsulates both change and stability. Even when policies are described as stable, routine, low-level adjustment still occurs. For example, implementation feedback may indicate a small policy setting change is required, and a change decision may be made at a low level within the professional executive. This is change, but simply not significant change. Significant changes or new policies are more likely to evolve through a substantive process, potentially involving a greater number and diversity of actors, such as the policy goal changes under examination in this research.

Change Analysis Challenges

Analysing policy change is a challenging activity and one that is dependent upon how a particular policy change is conceptualised and defined. Defining change is a strategic choice with inherent challenges (Capano and Howlett, 2009, p. 2, Knill and Tosun, 2012).

> It really makes a substantial difference if policy change is defined in terms of the transformation of the definition of the issues in question, or as the structure and content of the policy agenda, or in terms of the content of the policy programme, or as the outcome of implementation of policy. (Knill and Tosun, 2012, p. 258)

Each individual researcher must negotiate these challenges, based upon the policy issue, the researcher's judgement and the theories in use (Knill and Tosun, 2012). What is judged as change "depends on the measuring rod against which change is assessed" (Knill and Tosun, 2012, p. 260). Temporality is also a policy change analysis confounder, involving judgements about "how we make events or experiences intelligible in terms of time" (Kay, 2006, p. 3). What is considered to constitute policy change can alter according to whether one takes a long-term perspective or a short-term snapshot. Scholars suggest explorations over longer timeframes bring forth more valuable insights than shorter time periods, ensuring that the change under observation is totally encapsulated within the chosen time period and important conditions are not overlooked (Knill and Tosun, 2012).

At its most basic level, policy change is movement from the status quo (Knill and Tosun, 2012). From there, various scholars have defined types of change, change processes and change patterns. For some time, it was generally thought that policy went through long periods of stability, 'punctuated' by an external shock that lead to significant policy goal change. Yet, new insights and emerging thinking highlight that large-scale change can accrue over time from within a policy domain (for example: (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, Capano and Howlett, 2009)).

This research examines change in ODA's policy goal ends and means. These changes are described in full in Chapters Five to Eight, but involved Cabinet decisions about what the ODA Programme was to achieve and how. It is not within this research's scope to analyse the nature of these changes as they were implemented. Yet, a study of policy change such as this one inevitably raises issues worth considering about the

nature of policy change and how to assess it. I return to these issues in Chapters Nine and Ten.

Actors, Ideas and Rules in Policy Change

As can be seen thus far, analysing policy is a complex endeavour (Peters and Pierre, 2006). Policy processes involve diverse elements that interact over time. Hundreds of actors from across state and society are involved in both technical and value-based discussions, decisions and actions about a wide range of national and global problems and potential solutions, at various levels of government (Sabatier, 2007). In attempting to make sense of this complexity policy scholars simplify it into organising frameworks and theories. What is shared across various policymaking analyses is "common analytical dimensions – actors, institutions [rules], and ideas – although at various times different theories have tended to emphasize one element over the other" (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 2).

Policy change theories incorporate actors, ideas and rules in different ways. Each theory includes all three elements, but the degree of emphasis varies. The Multiple Streams approach centres around ambiguity in policymaking, and focuses on actors and ideas (Kingdon, 2011, Zahariadis, 2007). Ideas play a leading role in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Weible et al., 2009), as they do in the policy paradigm approach to policy change (Hall, 1993). Ideas are also important for the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, along with institutions (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Rules are front and centre in various institutional analysts' thinking. Below I integrate the insights about actors, ideas and rules from across these frameworks and theories to create a broad framework (as discussed in Chapter Two) through which to analyse the two ODA policy goal changes.

Actors

Actors situated in both the domestic and international realms influence domestic policymaking. Broadly speaking, an actor is an individual or entity (such as an organisation or agency) involved in any particular policy domain. Their actions include a range of behaviour, such as influencing policy agendas, formulating different policy options, making decisions, implementing, evaluating and terminating policy, and communicating policy. Actors can be divided into three broad categories based on the

sector of society they inhabit: governmental, societal and international. I briefly outline specific actors in each of these categories, starting with governmental actors. Following this, I introduce the individual actor behaviour of entrepreneurialism.

Governmental Actors

Democratic governments are generally comprised of three arms: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The judiciary is the court system, made up of a hierarchy of courts, alongside specialist courts, tribunals and other bodies. The judiciary interprets and enacts legislation, thereby enforcing rules, while simultaneously shaping the rules through their interpretation. The legislature, or parliament (or House of Representatives), is comprised of individual members of parliament and the Sovereign. In parliamentary systems, such as in New Zealand, the parliament's role is to pass legislation and hold governments to account, and in doing so the parliament impacts upon policymaking. The government, or executive, is central to policymaking, given its constitutionally derived mandate to govern the country. The executive makes the majority of decisions about policy, and can be split into: the political executive – those individuals who are elected into the role; and the professional executive – the professionalised public service. The professional executive is a powerful actor in the policy process, having been delegated a great deal of parliament's and the political executive's functions as governing has become more complex (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 65, Peters, 2009, pp. 15-19). The political executive comprises Cabinet and ministers, but also parliamentary under-secretaries and ministerial (political) advisors. Advisors can play a crucial role in policymaking, providing advice to the minister that is independent of the professional executive and filtered through a party-political lens (Peters, 2009, p. 292).

Societal Actors

The second category of actors – societal actors – is broad, and includes the general public, the mass media, academics, interest groups and political parties. The public's role in policymaking is limited, although not inconsequential. In a democracy, the moment of greatest mass public power is voting in general elections. Once the public have chosen their representatives, they are then more limited in their ability to influence policymaking. Yet, influencing options exist, such as directly lobbying their member of parliament, or collectively engaging through interest groups, protest, social movements and the media. It is likely the public have most impact on constraining government action, rather than stimulating it (Kingdon, 2011).

The media is an important actor in the policymaking process, communicating and amplifying policy issues, and influencing policymakers and decision-makers. Media reporting on particular issues can raise the salience of the issue amongst the public and, ever-wary of public opinion, politicians are likely to pay attention to some degree. At least in relation to ODA, the bureaucracy also pays attention to the media, aiming to avoid appearing in it and possibly risking punishment from their political masters for failures made public (Van Belle et al., 2004).

Academics and research organisations engage in the policymaking process in several ways. Academics can act as individuals, providing sustained analysis of policy issues, and are sometimes employed as consultants (Howlett et al., 2009). Through organisations such as universities, research institutes and think-tanks, academics and other researchers also provide collective input into policy. Think-tanks tend to lean more towards action akin to interest-group advocacy, working to publicise their analysis and target particular government actors to gain traction for their ideas. The increased engagement of 'policy experts', or area specialists, touches on a debate dating back to the 1920s regarding the role of experts in democracies (Schudson, 2006). Without engaging in this debate, the reality is area specialists play a role in policymaking today through providing information to various other actors who use that information to shore-up their preferred policy or to shape policy.

An actor earns the label of 'interest group' when they specifically act to influence government policies. Interest groups are "privately organised groups that seek to influence government policies through means other than holding political office" (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 195), and are "motivated to conduct political action on the basis of a commonly held interest" (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 24). Both civil society and the private sector give rise to particular groups, or networks of groups, which engage in efforts to influence policy.

Political parties are difficult to categorise neatly within either the governmental or societal category because they bridge the two. Parties are an organised group of people who have the collective purpose of gaining government power (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011), and "operate along the boundary between state and societal actors, sometimes acting as gatekeepers on which actors will gain access to political power" (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 67). I include political parties under societal actors because, while they are

closely linked to the individual party members in parliament, political parties are not government entities. Political parties serve a range of functions. They bring together diverse interests, binding them within the party's broader political ideology. Parties enable citizens to channel or structure their vote in accordance with the party's policy manifesto. In turn, this enables parties to mobilise and integrate citizens into the political process. Parties also provide a mechanism for political leader recruitment, public policy formulation and government organisation (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011). Supporting these latter two functions, political parties often provide staff for members of parliament (Howlett et al., 2009).

International Actors

International actors are the third and final actor category. Increasing globalisation has expanded international actors' importance in domestic policymaking. While state sovereignty remains a central principle of international governance, international actors influence both a country's government and society. These actors include: other individual governments; governmental international organisations, such as the United Nations, International Financial Organisations (e.g.: the International Monetary Fund World Bank) and regional intergovernmental bodies (such as the Association of South East Asian Nations – ASEAN); non-governmental international organisations, such as Oxfam; and transnational corporations and groups that act on their behalf. The extent to which these actors influence domestic policy varies across countries and policy sectors, as well as upon the nature of broader international regimes (Howlett et al., 2009).

Although some international actors may become part of domestic actor groupings, and do have influence at the domestic level, international actors are generally not *directly* involved in domestic policymaking. With rare exceptions domestic actors can choose whether or not to integrate international actors' ideas or rules into domestic legislation and policy decisions. International actors have a greater role in ODA policymaking, due to the presence of a significant international 'industry' of multinational actors and the standard-setting role of the DAC, and I elaborate on this in Chapter Four. Yet ultimately, ODA policy in a donor country still remains the responsibility of the domestic polity. Global organisations and other governments do not have binding power over a donor country's ODA policy. Ideas from the international realm will only enter the domestic ODA policy processes through domestic actors.

Individual Entrepreneurialism

Scholars have found that individuals have specific and important roles in policy change processes. A key individual actor type is a policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 2011, Baumgartner and Jones, 1991{Mintrom, 2009 #603, Mintrom, 2013, Mintrom, 2000, Mintrom and Vergari, 1996)}. Policy entrepreneurs are active in setting a change agenda, advocating for their preferred idea(s) (Kingdon, 2011). An entrepreneur can be found anywhere in a policy domain or broader polity. To be successful they must be persistent, have a claim to be heard (such as expertise, authority or representation), and be good at negotiating or have political connections. Access to policymakers is important to a policy entrepreneur's success (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 35), and entrepreneurs need to be able to "clarify or create meaning for those policymakers, or others, who have problematic preferences" (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 30). Entrepreneurs are key in the process of 'softening-up' a policy domain and wider polity, sometimes spending years communicating and advocating their idea, particularly to those who oppose it. Then, when the moment presents itself, an entrepreneur takes an opportunity to advance her or his idea to the point where a decision may be made (Ackrill and Kay, 2011) (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016).

Further work on policy entrepreneurs has refined descriptions of policy entrepreneurs' characteristics. Mintrom and Norman (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, pp. 651-654) "suggest that four elements are central to policy entrepreneurship". The first, social acuity involves the ability to perceptively understand others and engage in policy discussions, making use of policy networks. The second element, defining problems, sees entrepreneurs framing issues in particular ways to attract attention and support. Building teams is the third element, requiring entrepreneurs to form and maintain effective working teams, use and develop their networks, and create and capitalise on coalitions. Finally, entrepreneurs lead by example, often putting their idea into action to prove its worth. The authors note that it is their "expectation that all policy entrepreneurs exhibit these characteristics at least to some degree" (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, p. 651). In a sense, what this description provides is a policy entrepreneur archetype, and the authors admit different contexts may necessitate different behaviours (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, p. 654).

Ackrill and Kay (2011, p. 74) argue past work on policy entrepreneurs situates the entrepreneur as separate from the decision-maker, and analysis since these authors

published continues this trend [for example, (Mintrom, 2013)]. For greater analytical power, it is useful to distinguish between a set of policy entrepreneurial behaviours and the role an individual inhabits, accepting that decision-makers can and do behave entrepreneurially (Ackrill and Kay, 2011). One individual in a particular role may exhibit the entrepreneurial behaviour described above while a different individual may not. Excluding decision-makers from investigations about entrepreneurial behaviour risks overlooking important actors' actions in policymaking and change.

Another preoccupation of policy entrepreneurial scholarship has been to focus on entrepreneurialism during agenda-setting. Yet, entrepreneurial behaviour also occurs during decision-making (Ackrill and Kay, 2011) (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016). Actors behaving entrepreneurially can employ three distinct strategies to achieve their desired decision on a particular policy. They may make concessions – conceding parts of the preferred policy to gain the support of a decision-maker. They may create package deals – including other policy goals in a package with their policy goal to gain a decision-maker's support. Third, and not so different from their masterful manipulation behaviour, they can also use a particular tactic – working to convince decision-makers or the public (who will then influence decision-makers) that the problem has worsened and the policy entrepreneurs' policy goal is the best solution (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, pp. 8-11).

Two ODA policymaking studies indicate entrepreneurial behaviour may be a significant factor in ODA policy goal change. In analysing ODA policy transformations in the Czech Republic, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015) identified at least one important individual and hinted at his potentially entrepreneurial behaviour. (This study is further discussed in Chapter Four.) An in-depth investigation into Belgium ODA policy examined the failure of the Belgium Minister of ODA to enact policy change (Breuning, 2013). While not using the term 'policy entrepreneur', Breuning (2013, pp. 320-321) argued that although the Minister had strong policy ideas to implement, he did not build and use relationships, or know the system he was working in and negotiate it to advance his desired policy changes. To achieve change the Minister needed to be a "savvy political [actor] with a deep understanding of [his] institutional context and the processes by which winning coalitions might be constructed", as well as engaging in "persuasion and bargaining" (Breuning, 2013, p. 322) – all key entreprenerial attributes

and behaviours. In effect, the Minister did not behave entrepreneurially, reducing the potential for success in his change efforts.

While individuals behaving entrepreneurially may be present for a policy change, they are not necessarily alone. In any particular policy domain, different actors group together to achieve their desired policy goals. I discuss this further below, under the section 'alignments'. Now I turn to the second policy change element: ideas.

Ideas

Ideas and ideational shifts are important in policymaking and change. The reader may ask: 'ideas or interests?'. I address this question below. Also in this section, I highlight how ideas motivate actors, including the role of deep ideas and learning, and go on to define different types of ideas involved in policy change and ideas' role in policy change.

Interests are Ideas

There is a potential point of confusion in relation to ideas – are they separate from or the same as interests? I reason that interests are ideas. It is not possible to maintain the separation of objective interests from subjective ideas about interests (Schmidt, 2008). Actors have ideas about their interests, reflect on them and subject them to other ideas. Therefore, interests are not fixed and they are not necessarily material. It is also difficult to separate ideas from interests methodologically (Sabatier, 1993, p. 28). "[B]elief systems [ideational systems] are normally highly correlated with self-interest and the causation is reciprocal" (Sabatier, 1993, p. 28). These authors use an example of the Sierra Club and steel company leadership to highlight the challenge: do the leaders of these entities have different views on air pollution control because their organisations have different economic interests involved, or because people join organisations in affinity with the organisation's stated goals? The answer to this is difficult to disentangle, both for researchers and the researched. It is more fruitful to examine actors' ideational systems and how these change over time, rather than attempting to separate out interests from ideas.

The Notional is Motivational

Actors are not merely rational, utility maximising individuals, strategically calculating their every move. Individuals are boundedly rational, with limited capabilities to process information (Weible et al., 2009, Ostrom, 2007). Individuals tend to remember

losses more than gains, and use information to confirm their biases while ignoring discordant information. Given all of this, individuals use beliefs as their dominant guide in making sense of the world and arriving at decisions (Weible et al., 2009). A number of scholars argue it is ideas that predominantly motivate actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Hall, 1993, Schmidt, 2008, Lancaster, 2007, Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), and I follow their lead. It is through ideas that actors view the world and are guided about what problems are the most important and what is the best way to deal with them. "At the most fundamental level, ideas define the universe of possibilities for action" (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 8). Actors will engage in reasoned argument to promote their ideas and strategise to see their ideas enacted in policy. They seek out other actors with similar ideas, and source and exploit resources to advance their ideas, within the rules.

New ideas emerge through scientific exploration and learning. Actors, or groups of actors, learn from past experience and scientific advances, and incorporate new information into their ideational frameworks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Hall, 1993, Kingdon, 2011). Policy objectives and settings are where actors learn most readily, and past experience is incorporated into action at these policy levels (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Hall, 1993). Learning at deeper ideational levels does occur, but this level of belief is more resistant to change. Actors use scientific information to shore-up or promote their underlying worldviews and values (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), shape a policy image (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), and assess potential policy problems and solutions (Kingdon, 2011). Scientific information is most likely to be used at the level of policy objectives and settings, as policy goals relate more to broader social and ethical issues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), and deeper ideas.

Ideas Defined

As outlined earlier, policy content is divided into goals, objectives and settings, and their corresponding ends and means. Related to these policy content orders are ideas. These ideas move from governing ideas about policy goals – the ideas informing a particular policy's desired outcomes and how those outcomes can be best achieved – down to more specific policy setting ideas about what the policy aims to achieve in particular implementation settings and what instruments are appropriate.

There is another set of ideas that also come into play: deep beliefs, values or world-views – the ideas that underpin all policy content, and which form the basis of an individual's personal philosophy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 31, Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 13).

> World views and principled beliefs structure people's views about the fundamental nature of human life and the morality of practices and choices. They reflect beliefs about the nature of the universe, and about right and wrong. (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p.13)

I group together world-views, principled beliefs, and the Advocacy Coalition Framework's 'deep normative core' and 'near policy core' beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), into a set of ideas I label 'policy values'. I use this label to denote the connection with policy these ideas have, and also to indicate that the ideas are about the fundamental values individuals use to guide their actions in the world. 'Policy values' is a catch-all label. It is no doubt possible to dissect and categorise the diverse policy value ideas various actors carry. Here I simply introduce the types of ideas captured in the label 'policy values', but in Chapter Four I draw out ODA-specific policy values.

Policy values include ideas about the nature of the problem (Hall, 1993, p. 279) and priority values, such as freedom, security, wealth, and justice, and the role of the state versus the market (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 31). Policy value ideas form the basis of various political parties' ideologies or shared belief systems. Policy values are the ideas that influence policy goals and which are most resistant to change. Table Three below shows policy values alongside goals, objectives and settings to highlight the range of ideas involved in policymaking. As this research is about policy goal change, policy values and goals are the most pertinent. Chapter Four applies this analytical framework to the ODA policymaking literature, and in doing so further refines the ideational definition presented here to incorporate ODA policy-specific ideas.

Table Three: Policy Content Ideas

Policy Values	Policy Goals	Policy Objectives	Policy Settings
World views, values and beliefs that act as foundational guides for actors' behaviour and policy preferences.	Ideas about what is to be achieved through a particular policy and how to achieve it.	Ideas about specific policy actions (programmes) required to achieve policy goals.	Specific ideas about technical policy implementation aspects, such as targets and indicators, and how particular instruments are to be used.

[Adapted from (Cashore and Howlett, 2007), and incorporating(Kay, 2011, p. 152, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Lancaster, 2007, Goldstein and Keohane, 1993).]

Rules

Rules are a key policy change component (Howlett et al., 2009) and are important in ODA policymaking (Lundsgaarde, 2013, Noël and Thérien, 2002, Noël and Thérien, 1995, Lancaster, 2007). The study of rules forms a component of the large, contested and actively evolving study of institutions (Peters, 2005). I do not aim to engage in this debate, simply take useful ideas from it. I focus on rules, rather than the broader category of institutions. To enable greater analytical clarity, this research also only explores formal rules. I justify these two choices below. Ultimately, rules are about power. The rules constrain or enable actors through their instruction of what particular actors can or cannot do – essentially prescribing the exercise of power. In what follows I draw on the main policy change theories' insights into rules to define rules.

Rules and Policy Change Theories

All policy change theories address rules yet tend to brush over rules' explicit role in policy change processes. Ideas and actors are commonly placed at the centre of theorising (Hall, 1993, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Kingdon, 2011). Policy change theorists are inclined to place rules amongst other factors, or incorporate them with analysis of organisational entities' roles (captured under the generic label 'institutions'). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) incorporate some types of rules in their model, such as the exogenous factor of constitutional rules, or the number of decision-making points in a policy sub-system, but little attention is paid to interrogating these rules in detail. Similarly, Hall (1993) acknowledges paradigm shifts depend on who has power and authority when he states that "the outcome will depend, not only on the arguments of competing factions, but on their positional advantages

within a broader institutional framework, on the ancillary resources they can command in the relevant conflicts, and on exogenous factors affecting the power of one set of actors to impose its paradigm over others" (Hall, 1993, p. 280), but he does not explicitly address how rules come into play here. Despite some recent contributions to the Multiple Streams framework (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, Zahariadis, 2007, Zahariadis, 2008), the framework's attention to rules is scant, with the assertion that while "[i]nstitutions make things possible, …people make things happen" (Zahariadis, 2008, p. 526).

The emphasis on ideas and actors in policy change theories may be a reflection of empirical findings, yet without a clear approach to analysing rules to begin with, there is the possibility that rules' importance in policy change is overlooked. Further, as Lundsgaarde (2013) established, rules are important components of ODA policy processes, acting to prevent or allow actors access to decision-makers, shaping the number of decision points actors need to reach, and dispersing authority within government. Therefore, it is important to give rules equal weighting in any approach to exploring ODA policy change, at least until the evidence shows otherwise.

One policy change theory that arguably pays heed to rules is Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) punctuated equilibrium approach to policy change, due to its analytical unit of 'policy venues'. In this conception, policy venues are both organisational entities and their decisional biases (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, p. 1047), both of which involve rules, but specific rules are not pulled out of these categories for precise analysis.

Conflating rules with organisational entities is not an unusual approach, although it is problematic. Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 2) articulate how historical institutionalists generally use "a definition of institutions that includes both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct", while recognising that how to define an institution is a matter of scholarly debate. Ostrom (2007) highlights the lack of clarity emerging from definitions including as institutions both organisational entities, and rules. This murkiness arises because while rules are important parts of organisational life, and may create and shape organisations, organisational entities are more than their rules: they involve various actors, cultures and identities that extend beyond rules, while also being shaped by rules. Conflating organisational entities with rules obfuscates analysis.

For these reasons and to enhance precision, I use the term 'rules' rather than institutions. Organisational entities are captured in this analytical framework as 'actors'. Due to the limitations of policy change theories described above, I draw on the substantial insights from institutional scholars to add greater depth to the treatment of rules in this analytical framework.

Rules Defined

Rules are resilient components of the political and social world that distribute power – resources, access, authority – and therefore structure actors' behaviour (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010b, pp. 7-8). Rules can be formal or informal (North, 1990, p. 4). Formal rules tend to be documented, such as legislation or an organisation's procedures. Informal rules tend to be unwritten, but generally accepted, prescriptions for appropriate behaviour in particular contexts, such as conventions. Due to the challenges associated with delineating informal rules, and the debates surrounding their definition, I focus on formal rules only: those that are captured in writing in various legislation, or in parliamentary, governmental and organisational documents.

Rules are nested or hierarchical: rules at one level shape rules at another, lower level (Ostrom, 2007). The constitutional level is the highest level and is where rules and procedures are established to govern policymaking (collective choices). In turn, policymaking establishes rules that impact upon the operational level. The operational level involves day-to-day interactions and decisions, governed by rules established at the two higher levels. This research focuses on rules at the constitutional and policymaking level, because these levels relate to policy goal development, and problem definition, agenda-setting and decision-making.

For policy goal change, important rules involve a country's constitution, other legislation pertinent to the policy domain, rules dictating roles and relationships within the policy domain, and rules prescribing how government, societal actors and international actors can and cannot interact. Chapter Four deepens the specificity about ODA policymaking rules, while Chapters Five to Eight shed light on the precise rules involved in New Zealand ODA policy goal change. Here, I move on to discuss actor-idea-rule interactions.

Alignments

Actors With Ideas

At the broadest level, the range of actors described above comprises the policy universe – all the actors who may engage in a particular policy area (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 12). When these actors are engaged in policymaking in a particular policy area or issue, they comprise part of that policy domain. These actors can come from anywhere within government or society (Weible et al., 2009, p. 122), and also, increasingly, from the international sphere. Within a policy domain, actors can be divided into those who wish to defend the status quo and those who wish to change it, although not necessarily neatly divided into two competing groups, and there may be divergence regarding the desired end result.

The nature of policy domain actor groupings is a long-standing area of exploration in policy studies. Thinking has evolved regarding state and societal actor coordination, collaboration and competition in policymaking. It is generally accepted that in their policymaking behaviour actors group together in some shape or form. Below I introduce the evolving thinking, leading to a statement summarising how I will approach actor interactions in this research.

Policy networks are a concept scholars have paid great attention to in trying to assess actor groupings (Thatcher, 1998). Policy networks can be used as a "*generic label* embracing the different types of relationship state/interest group [sic] that exist in the process of determining any individual policy output" (Jordan and Schubert, 1992, p. 11, italics in original). A seminal contribution to the literature was the insight that policy networks exist along a continuum between policy communities and issue networks, characterised by their membership, degree of integration, and possession of resources and power (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). Issue networks are comprised of diverse, conflicting but consultative membership, with limited resources. Zero-sum games characterise issue networks (one participant wins, the other looses). At the other end of the continuum, policy communities have a limited, consistent and consensual membership, often based on professional or economic interests. Even if one group dominates, the community will only endure if a positive sum game exists (where all benefit).

Public policy network explorations have expanded from these early days, leading to new contributions and critique. While the policy network concept offers an important, detailed examination of actor interactions, including categories and characteristics, problems also exist (Thatcher, 1998). The same terms are well-used, meaning "[d]efinitions have therefore sometimes become weak or contradictory" (Thatcher, 1998, p. 393). The policy network approach also has limited explanatory power and only covered a small part of the policymaking process (Dowding, 1995, Dowding, 2001). Finally, analysis of policy network change, and how networks relate to policy change, are also weaknesses.

Other scholars have also theorised a 'policy community', similarly based on professional allegiances. In the multiple streams framework, policy communities are comprised of specialists in any particular policy area, "scattered both through and outside of government" (Kingdon, 2011, p. 117). While the main factor bringing this community together is a shared concern in a particular policy area, this policy community can potentially fragment in relation to ideas, particularly in the absence of common goals, and due to different policy modes and types within a policy community. Baumgartner and Jones (1991, p. 250) also talk of a policy community, who share professional norms and ways of thinking (belief systems), both within and without government. A policy community in these conceptions does not include political decision-makers, such as elected officials.

This separation between political actors and specialist actors is too rigid. There is significant interaction between the two and political actors often share the same ideas as particular specialist groups. This is not to argue that politicians do not consider different ideas, simply that the division between the technical aspects of policy and the political aspects cannot be so easily made. As Kingdon himself writes "in instances of disagreement among the specialists, conflicts spill over into the larger political arena" (Kingdon, 2011, p. 133). But even in the absence of conflict, politicians actively and regularly engage with those with similar ideas, throughout policymaking processes. Therefore, conceived in this way, a policy community doesn't provide a satisfactory concept to explain how actors interact across government-society-international divides.

Another approach incorporates insights from policy network analyses, as well as the role of knowledge-based communities (such as epistemic communities) and policy

experts. Known as the Advocacy Coalition Framework, this approach has been widely tested and offers a potentially more robust theorisation of how actors group, and how their groupings impact on policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Actors coalesce around their shared belief systems to form an 'advocacy coalition' (hence the name of the framework). Between two to three coalitions can emerge in a particular policy domain, and membership tends to be stable. Coalition members can come from any part of the policy domain, cutting across all types of societal, governmental and international actors.

Yet, although the actor coalition concept is more satisfactory than a limited-membership policy community, evidence from research into ODA policymaking questions the ability of actors to form functioning coalitions. Lundsgaarde's (2013) work highlights that at least some actors struggle to function in the cohesive, coordinated manner befitting an advocacy coalition. International development NGOs tend to direct the bulk of their funding towards on-the-ground activities in developing countries, with little remaining for influencing policy. Compounding this is their need to gain funding for their work. Efforts to gain private funding lead NGOs to compete rather than build collaborative relationships. Also, NGOs' desire for, or receipt of, government funding acts as a brake on advocacy activities that may be viewed as criticizing a government that also provides the NGO with funding. Simultaneously, NGOs struggle to collectively organise for the goal of policy change, although there are exceptions to this, (for example, Swiss NGOs managed to work collectively) (Lundsgaarde, 2013). Further, NGOs are often issues-based, and while they have shared world-views, sometimes find it difficult to agree on key messages for advocacy activities.

Given these findings, a sensible approach to examining actor interactions in this research's two ODA policy goal changes is to accept that actors do group together in particular ways, but the exact shape and form of actor interactions differ in different contexts (Marsh and Smith, 2000). Therefore, in some contexts actors may group closely together in advocacy coalitions, while in others their interactions may be more like issue networks. The overall policy network criteria proposed by Rhodes and Marsh (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992) are useful criteria to use in assessing actor interactions: what particular actors group together within a policy domain, how closely they work together, and their access to resources. It is necessary to also add the criteria of shared ideas and ideas' role in actor groupings. Kingdon highlights how "common values, orientations,

and world views form bridges, at least to some degree, between those inside and those outside of government" (Kingdon, 2011, p. 45), as do other policy change theories (Berman, 2013), most strongly the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Evidence from the ODA literature reinforces the idea that actors group together based on shared ideas (Lancaster, 2007, Lundsgaarde, 2013). Therefore, shared ideas appear to be a powerful stimulant for actor groupings. Yet, the rules also shape actors' actions, including grouping with other actors.

Actors and Rules

Rules can create path dependence: existing rules prescribe power relations that dictate or influence who has more power over the creation of new rules, and therefore existing rules can create a self-perpetuating stability. Yet path dependence should not be overstated. Different actors arrive into roles and broader contextual elements shift over time, bringing opportunities for rule changes.

> The origins of the institutions [rules], as well, are chronologically independent from the actors and their strategies. That is, institutions [rules] are most certainly created by social actors engaged in a struggle for social power. However, the actors that participated in the battles over institutional design [rules] are not necessarily, and in fact only rarely, identical to those that participate in later policy conflicts. Thus the view that institutions [rules] are somehow congealed social structure is not especially helpful. (Immergut, 1992, p. 85)

There is a dynamic relationship between rules and actors. While rules do shape actors' behaviour in both obvious and internalised ways, actors are also able to 'see' rules and analyse them, and therefore act to change them (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.10, Schmidt, 2008). "This alternative 'non-sticky' or more 'flexible' approach… thus emphasizes agency, the dialectical interaction between agents and institutions [rules]", and "holds each to be mutually constitutive in a *dialectic* manner" (Bell, 2011, p. 892, 891, italics in original). Particular groups of actors, such as advocacy coalitions, can strategise over time to exert the power the existing rules give them so as to change rules in their favour (Sabatier, 1993, p. 37), and policy entrepreneurs can 'work' the rules to achieve their desired policy outcome (Zahariadis, 2008).

In this sense, rules are not self-reinforcing, but interpreted, enforced and applied by actors, within the power allocations existing rules allow for (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010a). Some rules lack clarity, even when written down. In these situations, actors

make use of rule ambiguity to advance their preferred policy, (which may involve a rule change). Rules also create veto possibilities: enabling particular actors to use their power to defend the status quo or promote policy change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010a, Sabatier, 1993, p. 18, Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, Lundsgaarde, 2013, Lundsgaarde et al., 2007). However, some rules are less ambiguous than others and require greater power to change, such as constitutional rules. Given this, actors need to know which rules can be changed, negotiated or manipulated, and which cannot.

Simultaneously, rules shape actors' behaviour. For example, studies show how rules can influence the shape and effect of policy networks (Thatcher, 1998, Zahariadis, 2007, Sabatier, 1993), or of how particular individuals can take part in policy processes (Marier, 2008, Zahariadis, 2008). Rules, such as the constitutional arrangements of a country's political system, the coalition opportunity structures regarding consensus required for policy change, and the number and accessibility of decision-making venues in a policy domain, all impact upon what actors can and can't do (Sabatier, 1993), and the fate of policy change efforts (Hall, 1993). Lundsgaarde (2013) shows how rules constrained or enabled pro-development actors to influence government decisions regarding ODA's development purpose, arguing rules were the key explanatory factor in success or failure. Similarly, Lancaster (2007) found electoral and legislative rules were important factors in ODA policymaking. (More detail on the ODA policymaking literature is introduced in Chapter Four.)

Ideas and Rules

Ideas are also an important component in the interplay between rules and actors. In policy change, government authorities make decisions based on the ideas advanced by various actors in the policy domain. These ideas-based decisions create rules, which prescribe power (i.e.: resources and authority) to different actors and ideas, in turn influencing policy outputs and impacts (Weible et al., 2009, Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). How a particular policy is perceived ideationally – the issue's policy image – can influence which organisational entities engage with the issue. Different entities have different rules, which impacts upon the policy process and can also shape the policy image (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Further, the rule context within any particular organisational entity impacts upon who can speak to whom, and how, regarding particular policy ideas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).

Change Processes: What Matters Most?

Policy change theories are all based on a 'logic of combinative causality' whereby each theory addresses the questions of how variables work together to create change: change occurs through combinations of variables, rather than a linear separation between independent and dependent variables (Knill and Tosun, 2012). Consistent with the idea of a framework (outlined in Chapter Two), the preceding sections have discussed the different elements – actors, ideas and rules – that are broadly involved in a policy change process. Here I outline the process through which these components could be viewed to interact to lead to policy change. In particular, I focus on what the existing policy change theories tell us about which specific element dominates or leads the policy change process.

One approach is to place ideas as the main change perpetrator. In 'normal' policymaking – routine alterations in policy objectives and settings – actors integrate experience and emerging information into policy (Hall, 1993, p. 278). Yet for significant policy goal change, the underpinning ideational framework – a policy paradigm or policy values – shifts. Here, as the current policy values governing policy become unable to cope with emerging events and societal demands, actors experiment with alterations in policy objectives and settings, but ultimately fail. This erodes both the policy values' authority and that of the actors who support those policy values. As Hall summarises "the movement from one paradigm [set of policy values] to another that characterizes third order change is likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between competing paradigms" (Hall, 1993, p. 280). Spillover will likely occur beyond the state to the broader political realm. Paradigm [policy value] change can be said to have occurred when those who support the new paradigm hold authority positions and have been able to reorganise policymaking structures, systems and procedures to institutionalise the new paradigm. Hall (1993) sees a change in actors' power as a critical component of paradigm shifts, but this comes as a product of idea failure, rather than as a change in rules conveying power upon different actors.

In contrast, another ideational approach – the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) – also prioritises ideas, but makes room for the potential for

exogenous rule changes to impact upon the policy domain. Here, the actors with shared policy values within a policy sub-system (or domain) are the dominant change drivers (the meso-level), aggregating into competing coalitions. Actors coalesce into advocacy coalitions based on their policy values, and strategise and manouveure to get their policy values integrated into policy. They use shallower ideas, such as scientific facts, to defend, promote and justify their deeper ideas. The strength of different coalitions is prescribed by the rules outside of the policy sub-system, which convey power to the sub-system actors. Like Hall's (1993) approach, routine policy change can occur through learning. Yet for major policy change, such as policy goal change, changes in the broader socioeconomic and political context must occur: a change in government, for example. This exogenous change impacts upon the rules prescribing power to policy sub-system actors, radically altering coalitions' constraints and opportunities (resources), and shifting the balance of power between coalitions. Although, significant internal sub-system events can also lead to major policy change. In this approach, while ideas are central to how actors group together, rule changes or major events must occur before substantial policy change takes place.

Actors play a leading role in the Punctuated Equilibria approach to policy change, whereby a policy domain is comprised of entrenched actors with particular ideas, and rule and organisational settings within which policy processes occur. This is called a 'policy monopoly' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The policy monopoly controls ideas surrounding policies, creating a 'policy image'. In combination, the policy monopoly and policy image inhibit alternative ideas from entering into the policy process. In response, these alternative actors who wish to see policy change may attempt to: alter the organisational entity overseeing the particular policy domain, or alter the rules and organisational entities within the policy domain. What results is a battle between actors with different ideas, similar to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, but in this case, actors are attempting to change the rules to achieve their policy preference, rather than wait for the rules to change and then make their move. In this approach, over time a stable set of actors with particular ideas within particular organisational entities (policy monopoly) will break-down, causing significant policy instability, followed by change.

Another actor-centric approach puts individual policy entrepreneurs as the main policy change drivers (Kingdon, 2011). As discussed above, policy entrepreneurs are individuals with policy preferences, and with specific behaviours and attributes to

promote their policy preference. In daily policymaking processes, three streams – problems, policies and politics – flow along independently until a point in time when something occurs to bring them together. The problem stream in a particular policy area consists of multiple problems. Indicators, focusing events and feedback can raise attention to a problem, meaning the problem enters onto the political agenda. Meanwhile, the politics stream flows along, disturbed by national mood changes, elections of new politicians with differing ideologies, and interest group demands. The policy stream is where new proposals are developed and selected (assessed for their technical feasibility, resonance with a policy community's values and anticipation of future constraints) from ideas floating around and recombining in the "primeval soup" (Kingdon, 2011, p. 200). It is the policy stream where ideas are most important. At sometimes unpredictable times, a policy window opens, at which point in time a policy entrepreneur can act to bring the three streams into alignment. These windows open in either the problem stream – where a new problem becomes apparent, presenting an opportunity to attach a solution to it – or in the political stream, when politicians go in search of a problem for their favoured solution. While the policy window opportunity does not last long, policy entrepreneurs can act to hold them open longer (Ackrill and Kay, 2011). Other actors scramble to fit their problems and proposals to the window. When actors can join all three streams into a policy window, they vastly increase the potential the issue rises high on the decision agenda. The actions of policy entrepreneurs are key in this process.

> During open policy windows persistent policy entrepreneurs, who constantly search for solutions to important problems, attempt to couple the three streams. Success is more likely when all three streams are coupled, depending on the type of window that opens and the skills, resources, and strategies of entrepreneurs to focus attention and bias choice. (Zahariadis, 2007, pp. 78-79)

In these approaches, either actors or ideas emerge as leaders in policy change, with rules playing a broader role and sometimes with actors attempting to alter rules. In applying this analytical framework to the two ODA policy changes, I aim to remain open about what element may lead in the policy goal change process, and will return to the literature in Chapter Nine. Yet, what seems apparent at this point in time is that rules are generally subsidiary to their relationship with actors, and actors have particular ideas. It is actors and ideas that are most important in policy change.

Conclusion

The above presents the analytical framework I will use in answering the questions: what actors, ideas and rules were involved in ODA policy change, and how they interacted in the change process. As this research is exploratory first, then analytical, a broad analytical framework is appropriate, as discussed in Chapter Two.

When examining actors, I will look for actor types, if and how actors grouped together, and the presence of individual entrepreneurialism. In terms of ideas, policy values and goal-related ideas will be the most pertinent for the two policy goal changes under analysis, and I elaborate on these ideas in Chapter Four. For rules, I will analyse the type of rules, and how they helped or hindered actors with ideas, and how actors with ideas negotiated the rules to advance their policy change aims.

In contrast to those who study policy, with important exceptions, ODA analysts have not attended to the complexity of policy and policymaking processes in their efforts to understand why donors give ODA, how much they give and to whom. ODA is a particular policy domain, with its own peculiarities. The literature on the actors, ideas and rules involved in ODA policymaking is disparate. Yet, the literature does hold important information about aspects of policymaking processes and politics. This work can be shaped according to the policy studies' insights, and in the subsequent chapter I apply the analytical framework described above to the ODA policy literature. This also assists the reader to understand ODA policy, which is the subject of this research.

Chapter Four: ODA Policymaking

While there are commonalities across all policymaking, different policy domains have their own peculiarities, not least of which involves the policy content. It is partly for this reason that I devote this chapter to introducing ODA policymaking. The other reason for this Chapter is to begin to explore the question of how ODA policy changes – what the literature already shows about who is involved, what ideas they have, what rules shape their actions, and how these three components interact. Examining the literature in this way starts to answer the first and second research questions, through providing potential answers for what actors, ideas and rules are involved in New Zealand ODA policy change, and how they interact. The chapters that follow (Five to Eight) then present the empirical findings, which are related back to the literature in Chapters Nine and Ten. Below I define ODA policy and describe its nature, as well as introducing the actors, ideas and rules involved in ODA policymaking. The existing literature is only occasionally explicit about the fact it is exploring ODA policy and policymaking. Therefore in canvassing the literature I pull together disparate analyses under the ODA policymaking banner, aiming to draw out what is already understood about the factors involved in ODA policy processes.

ODA has been the subject of examination since its beginnings in 1947. The weight of scholarly attention is given to ODA's implementation, and the impact in recipient countries. Research areas have formed about diverse issues, such as the question of whether ODA contributes to economic development (Qian, 2014, Mekasha and Tarp, 2013, Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2013), ODA's role in recipient governance (Jones and Tarp, 2016), ODA conditionality (Molenaers et al., 2015), and factors contributing to ODA's effectiveness in achieving development outcomes [for example, (Copestake and Williams, 2014, Bigsten and Tengstam, 2014)]. Amidst this, little attention has been paid to the ODA policymaking process: the domestic donor politics of creating ODA policy.

A small number of scholars have turned their minds to questions about why donors give ODA, how much they give and where. The general direction these studies take is to understand whether development or non-development foreign policy aims drive ODA, as well as what broader factors in the donor country impact upon these policy decisions.

Overwhelmingly, the approach used in these studies is cross-country statistical regression analysis, whereby particular variables are tested to gauge their effect on ODA volumes and geographical spread, or to infer back from ODA volumes and spread to understand what concerns drive donors to give ODA [for example (Berthélemy, 2006, Alesina and Dollar, 2000)]. A comon conclusion these studies reach is that donors vary from one to another [for example, (Brech and Potrafke, 2014, Neumayer, 2003, Claessens et al., 2009, Hoeffler and Outram, 2011, Younas, 2008)]. This indicates individual case studies may have greater power in exploring and explaining what factors are most important in ODA policymaking, in what contexts and at what times.

There are a small number of qualitative studies available. Some aim to understand what domestic factors influence aspects of ODA policy, such as ODA's purposes, distribution, and geographical and temporal variation (Lundsgaarde, 2013, Lancaster, 2007, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, Van Belle et al., 2004). Others examine deeper drivers of ODA levels and purpose, such as frames (van der Veen, 2000) or national interest (Hook, 1995). None have yet explicitly examined policy change instances. Still, the collective literature provides useful information about ODA policymaking, which is summarised in this chapter. To begin to understand ODA policymaking, a definition of ODA policy is necessary.

Decisions and Actions: ODA Policy Defined and Described

Despite the mixed purposes countries assign to their ODA, all DAC members must conform with the DAC ODA definition (see Chapter One) to enable their funds to be officially recognised as ODA. This definition sets the main purpose of ODA as development in the ODA-receiving country, but does not preclude parallel purposes for ODA, leaving space for the variety of non-development foreign policy aims influencing ODA expenditure. In effect, the DAC definition is a guide and an aspiration, one which donors can subvert when non-development foreign policy aims trump overseas development goals, so long as this subversion is not too blatant. The DAC's ODA definition offers a reasonably precise definition of the finances involved, and what they should do. Yet this does not define ODA *policy* – the substance and processes of different donor ODA decisions and actions.

To begin to define ODA policy I integrate the DAC ODA definition with the basic policy definition outlined in Chapter Three, which noted public policy involves governmental decisions about desired outcomes and how to achieve them. Integrating the two definitions sees ODA policy defined as a donor government's decisions and subsequent actions in relation to whether, why and how it spends taxpayers money to promote economic development and welfare in developing countries, often also including consideration of non-development foreign policy goals.

In terms of content, ODA policy goals involve decisions about the desired end or outcome from ODA policy: whether ODA should be focused on development outcomes only or also used to achieve non-development foreign policy aims (related to how the donor's interests overseas are assessed, discussed later under 'ideas'). These desired ends then translate into policy goal means decisions regarding how the donor government will organise its ODA. Given this research is about policy goal changes, I do not elaborate on policy objectives and settings. This basic definition of ODA policy and its content do not fully illustrate ODA policy's nature. Therefore, to complete this ODA policy description, I introduce three core ODA policy characteristics.

ODA Policy's Character

To fully describe ODA policy, three characteristics require elaboration. First is the relationship between ODA policy and broader foreign policy. Second are the severe feedback and accountability gaps present in ODA policy, which shape ODA policymaking processes to a larger degree than other policy domains. Third, and related to the second, is the particular type of ODA policymaking politics.

ODA is Foreign Policy

Often discussions about ODA policy neglect its roots in foreign policy, as if the two policy domains are estranged. In reality, ODA policy is a domain within a wider foreign policy domain, because ODA policy involves a donor state acting beyond its boundaries. Foreign policy can be defined as "the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations" (Hill, 2003, p. 3). "[F]oreign policy is thus a guide to actions taken beyond the boundaries of the state to further the goals of the state" (Russett et al., 2000, p. 117). As such, ODA policy is foreign policy. Yet, the relationship between ODA policy and non-development foreign policy is complex.

The prime reason for this complexity is because ODA policy at times has mixed and multiple purposes assigned to it, related to different individual donor countries' rule settings (Lundsgaarde, 2013), and differing ideas about interests overseas, how development occurs, and what ODA should be spent for. Rarely are non-development foreign policy aims clearly stated as part of a donor's ODA policy: they tend to be left implicit or hinted at through statements about 'aligning' ODA and foreign policy, or achieving a donor's 'national interests', without explicitly defining what these interests are. This increases the complexity.

There are those who argue ODA is simply an instrument states can use to advance their power in a chaotic world. Morganthau's (1962, p. 309) 'political theory of aid' views ODA as a tool of foreign policy aims, asserting that "a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation". Taking the lead from Morganthau, McKinlay and Little (1977, p. 80) also craft a model of ODA as foreign policy, proposing that ODA's use "enables the donor to form relations of commitment and dependency. These in turn afford foreign policy utilities that can be used by the donor to promote and protect certain of its interests".

Yet realist assertions of ODA as a foreign policy tool cannot fully explain why donors give ODA, because development concerns do drive ODA decision-making (Lumsdaine, 1993). As Lumsdaine found, (1993, p. 32) "evidence about what donor countries did and about which countries and persons supported aid shows again and again the role played by humane concern, domestic welfare values, and a commitment to being a constructive part of a sound international society". Other analyses also highlight humanitarian motivations and development concerns as key ODA drivers (Mosley, 1985, Heinrich, 2013, Feeny and McGillivray, 2008, Lancaster, 2007, Lundsgaarde, 2013, van der Veen, 2000), showing that states do have humanitarian interests beyond their border.

In practice, ODA is a foreign policy through which donor countries often attempt to *concurrently* achieve development, *and* economic or strategic goals (an effort I label 'dual benefit ODA'). Consistent with this, ODA has been used simultaneously as a tool for development and/or a tool of non-development foreign policy aims, such as giving

ODA but requiring the recipient to purchase goods from companies situated in the donor country (an instance of what is called 'tied aid'). While the late 1990s and 2000s led some to argue that a norm had developed that ODA should predominantly be spent on development goals, particularly poverty reduction (Lancaster, 2007, p. 5), questioning this claim are the recent changes amongst donors to make economic and strategic foreign policy aims more explicitly a desired result of ODA expenditure. To summarise, in general, ODA may not necessarily be used for non-development foreign policy aims, but ODA is a core component of any donor state's international engagement, and therefore foreign policy.

Feedback and Accountability Gaps

The second ODA policy characteristic involves two gaps in the usual relationship between a state and its citizens. ODA policy is implemented in a different country to that where the policy is devised. The individuals that ODA policy impacts upon do not vote or pay taxes in the donor country. This simple reality creates two gaps: an 'accountability gap' and a 'feedback gap' (Seabright, 2002, Martens, 2002). While these gaps may exist in all policy domains, there is no other domain where the gaps are as pronounced as when a government spends taxes to assist people in another country. These people cannot respond by voting and the donor government has no other straightforward mechanisms to assess the impact of its decisions implemented in another country.

The 'feedback gap' is about assessing performance and contributes to the accountability gap. It is difficult for donor governments and voters to gain information about how well ODA is achieving its policy goals. Internally, ODA agencies have processes for monitoring and evaluation, which can provide information to feed into policymaking. But the challenges in gathering meaningful performance information mean ODA programme staff prioritise low-value inputs, such as the spending of budgets, over high-value activities, such as evaluation and learning (Seabright, 2002, Gibson et al., 2005). This means little meaningful information about impact gets integrated into policy improvement cycles. For the average voter, the complexities of ODA policy implementation and assessment are not a subject area they devote attention to. In all donor countries, while publics tend to support giving ODA, their knowledge of international development issues is limited, and "public awareness about ODA and development cooperation policies is also low" (Fransman and Solignac-Lecomte, 2004,

p. 1). Similarly, the media struggles to gain useful information about ODA policy impacts, and combined with low public interest, this means ODA policy gains little media coverage. Overall, most donor country voters do not directly hear, feel or see the positive or negative impacts of their government's ODA policy. Therefore, voters are not in a position to assess the impact of ODA, leaving them unable to adequately hold the government to account even when voters do care. Because ODA policy is of lower relevance to voters, it therefore becomes of lower priority to politicians than, for example, domestic health issues. There is no direct accountability link between those who benefit from a donor's ODA policy and the donor government – the accountability gap.

ODA Policymaking Politics

These feedback and accountability gaps contribute to specific ODA policymaking politics. First, when a donor country considers its budget, advocates for development-focused ODA are at a disadvantage in relation to the various domestic constituencies who potentially loose funding for their interests if it is allocated to ODA (Lundsgaarde, 2013, pp. 22-24). As a result, particularly in times of donor budget deficits, ODA is more vulnerable to cuts because, due to the feedback and accountability gaps, politicians will suffer little electorally if they decide to cut ODA in order to balance the budget. Research supports this: studies show that, in fact, donor governments do cut ODA in times of budget hardship (Dang et al., 2009, Frot, 2009, Fuchs et al., 2014). Further, even when donor taxpayers care about social justice, when they are enduring economic inequality and hardship, they tend to oppose ODA expenditure (Noël and Thérien, 2002).

Second, because ODA goes to help people in another country (and due to the feedback gap), ODA policy has low public salience, leaving the way clear for other actors in ODA policymaking. Low public salience means that ordinary parliamentarians will expend little energy attempting to understand overseas development. Therefore, ministers and the professional executive are more likely to play a strong role in ODA policymaking processes (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 24), although a seminal study argued the professional executive dominates (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, p. 4, 14). Further, low public salience provides greater space in the policymaking process for specific interest groups, such as the private sector and NGOs (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 24).

In summary, ODA policy is a narrow, specialised policy domain, in an increasingly complex industry, integrated within broader foreign policy. Low public salience, combined with the feedback and accountability gaps, means ministers, the professional exeuctive and interest groups (NGOs, think-tanks, businesses) tend to dominate ODA policymaking. Yet while these are dominant actors in ODA policy, their interactions or potential interactions with others, such as parliament, the media and the public, can provide for limited democratic accountability, even if only when things go badly wrong, or if the feedback gap can be bridged.

ODA Policymaking Actors, Ideas, Rules

Using the analytical framework outlined in Chapter Three, here I detail the specific actors, ideas and rules the literature indicates are involved in ODA policymaking. This provides a more fine-grained lens through which to examine the New Zealand cases (Chapters Five to Eight).

Actors

Governmental

ODA policy governmental actors include parliament (in Westminster systems), and the political and professional executive. Parliament is involved in ODA policymaking through its scrutinising role. The parliamentary committee system allows parliament to examine foreign affairs and ODA, and parliamentary questions and debates in the House are further ways for parliamentarians to engage. Parliamentary characteristics and composition can have an impact on decisions about ODA amounts: a disparate parliamentary opposition tends to lead to lower ODA levels (Round and Odedokun, 2004), more women in parliament generally means greater ODA amounts (Breuning, 2001, p. 47), and when a government wins power with a larger vote share, they tend to give more ODA (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009, p. 331). A poorly informed parliament can lead to greater professional executive dominance over ODA policy, because the parliament is unable to effectively hold the executive to account (Lancaster, 2007, p. 20).

The degree to which Cabinet considers ODA decisions relates to particular donor countries' rules about decision-making, and whether or not there is a Cabinet level

minister responsible for ODA, or if ODA is subsumed under a foreign affairs minister's role. The presence of a minister or associate minister is associated with ODA focused on development purposes (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, p. 18), and "strongly associated with higher ODA/GNI ratios, honoured commitments, lower volatility of ODA flows and better aid quality and effectiveness" (Prizzon, 2012, p. 24). Exploring minister's impact on ODA policy more deeply, another study found some relationship between greater ODA quality and quantity, and ministers' personal characteristics (experience in parliament, being a woman, and experience in international development were positively correlated), but these findings did not withstand robustness checks (Fuchs and Richert, 2015, pp. 23-24).

Alongside the minister, the professional executive plays a major role in ODA policymaking, comprising the individuals who will advise the minister, and guide ODA policy iteratively through the policy cycle. How the professional executive is organised for ODA management relates to particular ideas and rules, which are discussed further below. Overall, the ODA professional executive can be: fully integrated with foreign affairs, often organsied geographically; a specific unit or programme within the foreign affairs ministry; split between a policy ministry and a separate implementing agency; or a stand-alone, separate government entity responsible for development cooperation (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, pp. 30-34). A separate ODA Programme has been found to correlate to higher ODA levels (Fuchs et al., 2014).

Other government entities (for example, the police or the health ministry) can play an important role in ODA policymaking, both through ODA delivery and through shaping government systems. The degree to which other government entities are involved varies across countries (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, p. 32-34). Central government entities concerned with state sector administration and public finances, as well as the overall running of government, (such as the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet), are also important to ODA policymaking due to their control over how government works and how decisions are made, including budgetary decisions.

Societal

A range of societal actors have at least some impact on ODA policy. In the following sub-section I detail those identified in the existing literature, including publics and the media, interest groups, philanthropies, academics and think tanks, and political parties.

As discussed above, the public do not play a major role in ODA policymaking. Some segments of the public are more attentive (Chong and Gradstein, 2008, Paxton and Knack, 2012, Milner and Tingley, 2013) and can be activated politically (Cobb et al., 1976). Studies across donor countries that examine public opinion about ODA find reasonable support for ODA, persistent over almost two decades, as well as a desire for ODA to be effective in helping developing countries (McDonnell et al., 2003). This support varies across donor country publics, depending upon factors such as the country's history, government education campaigns, and the country's current and past economic situation (McDonnell et al., 2003). Nevertheless,

> [t]rying to link those levels of public support with ODA levels almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that the former does not have a direct influence on the latter. Indeed, on the whole, and in spite of some differences among OECD Member countries, foreign policy decisions, and more particularly those relating to aid and international development co–operation, are hardly influenced, at least directly, by the general public's preferences. (McDonnell et al., 2003, p. 17)

Although scholars tend to have ruled out strong, direct links between public preferences and ODA policy, a more subtle, complex interaction may occur. It is unclear what other factors may lead decision-makers to ignore or attend to public concerns. While ODA policy may not be a voting issue, politicians are ever-wary of public opinion, even that which is latent. In turn, the professional executive keeps a watchful eye on the media, as one way of gauging public opinion, to pre-empt any problems that might arise to damage their minister's reputation in the public realm. While official voices dominate the media, the political and professional executives are highly sensitive to the potential problems that may arise from the public voice's "occasional but dramatic entry into the content of the news media" (Van Belle et al., 2004, p. 145). Professional executives have to keep their actions, and their minister's, within the boundaries of what the public will accept.

> The media will cover those who protest, and if that protest resonates in the electorate, challengers and opponents are constantly waiting to take advantage. Thus, what the media might report is just as important for a democratic leader as what it does report. The latent is just as important as the actual. (Van Belle et al., 2004, p. 146)

This interaction hints at an indirect, although limited, public role in ODA policymaking. In effect, as long as the public remains broadly supportive of ODA to help recipients, the public act as an insurance policy, to be activated by interest groups if they need more support for their policy preferences. At the same time, the public's views are closely monitored by the government to avoid anything that may erode the government's political capital.

Unlike the public and media, interest groups play a significant role in ODA policymaking (Lundsgaarde, 2013), sitting alongside the professional and political executive as the key actors in ODA policymaking. NGOs and the private sector dominate here, and can have a impact on whether ODA is spent for development or non-development economic purposes (Lancaster, 2007, p. 220). In their analyses of Eastern European ODA Programmes, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015, 2016) found NGOs were crucial actors in ODA policymaking.

Donor country civil society actors have a long history in international development. Formal NGOs date back to 1863 when the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement was established, followed by Save the Children Fund in 1919 (Lancaster, 2007, p. 37). During WWII and into the 1950s NGO numbers grew, initially to assist in post-war recovery but once the need for this decreased, these organisations turned their efforts to help poorer countries, and some gained government funding for this work (Lancaster, 2007, p. 37). By 1989 NGOs in OECD countries devoted to international development numbered approximately 4,000 (Desai, 2002, p. 495). NGOs are diverse: they may be voluntary with their work supported solely from community donations, or more professionalised and formalised, receiving funding from a combination of sources; they may focus on one issue or community overseas, or work across several issues and countries; they may be entirely indigenous to the donor country or associated with an international NGO.

By the 2000s NGOs were viewed as central development actors, with particular strengths in local community development and humanitarian assistance. Often, developed country NGOs work in ways and places governments can not, extending a donor country's presence and information networks. Even though NGOs receive donor funding [on average, approximately 15 per cent of ODA goes through NGOs (de Haan, 2009, p. 54)], NGOs have organisational mandates bestowed by their members or

governance bodies, and exist to achieve these varying individual missions. While NGOs are important ODA actors, their impact, governance and accountability has been critiqued (Edwards, 1999).

Dating from the 1950s, NGOs began to play a significant role in ODA policymaking. NGOs bring international development expertise, knowledge and a donor communities' interests into discussions with the ODA Programme (when permitted). NGOs are value-driven, often (at least rhetorically) prioritising solidarity, human rights, empowerment and community development. The Jubilee Debt Campaign and the Make**Poverty**History campaign (stemming from the Global Call to Action Against Poverty) are examples of global campaigns, based mostly in developed countries, whereby NGOs and other civil society groups came together and mobilised the public to demand rich governments take more action to assist the neediest people on earth. Yet NGOs can struggle to act collectively to influence domestic politics, and competing priorities and limited resources constrain their advocacy efforts (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 193-194, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2016). Donor government policies can also impact upon NGOs' ability to engage in advocacy work (Brown, 2012). These challenges have recently seen NGOs endure a new wave of critique, in that they are eschewing their stated commitments to the poorest and to advocacy, favouring funding and growth, risking becoming government contracted service providers (Banks and Hulme, 2012, Smillie, 2012).

Alongside NGOs, the private sector comprises the other main set of interest groups involved in ODA policymaking. The umbrella term 'private sector' opens over a diverse range of actors, and consequently the private sector does not have homogenous ideas about ODA policy. Some private sector entities can be supportive of greater ODA amounts, particularly if the funding supports businesses in some way. In relation to ODA's development purpose, the private sector can also support this purpose, depending upon any particular businesses' work area and values. For example, Lundsgaarde (2013, pp. 194-195) found in some instances business groups were able to constrain ODA for poverty reduction, but in others, they supported ODA for this purpose.

While the private sector's role in development has always been acknowledged, since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, and the 2011 Busan Fourth High Level Forum on Aid

Effectiveness (and the resulting Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), the private sector is increasingly viewed as a critical actor for development, predominantly due to its central role in driving economic growth. Yet, specifically in relation to ODA policy, the private sector's role in policymaking is unclear. Like other interest groups, private sector actors lobby government with their own ideas, and these efforts are most likely to focus on profit, or relationship-building for future profit, but can also incorporate other concerns, such as development outcomes.

It is possible to categorise different private sector types in a donor country. I delineate three categories: international development consultants; technical, service provision companies; and businesses wishing to export overseas. These are generic categories and there is overlap between them. International development consultants have experience in international development. In terms of their engagement with ODA policy, it is likely at least some consultancy businesses will have a desire to see policy reflect good practice in international development, although this is by no means certain. For some, merely their own business interests will dominate. Consultants also often have the experience and incentive to engage in ODA policymaking. Overall, it is likely that international development consultants exist along a continuum. At one end, consultants will engage in ODA policymaking to produce better quality ODA, while at the other end, some consultancies may simply engage to advance policy that supports their business success.

Technical, service-provision companies exist to provide a particular service, such as construction, engineering or generic project management. These companies offer their services to a wide range of potential customers, increasingly on a global scale. They focus on their specialist area and do not necessarily have international development experience and skills (although they may well contract such expertise in). These companies may aim to provide a high quality service, but are not necessarily concerned about broader development issues, such as partner government capacity to maintain infrastructure that is built, or whether or not gender is considered in the delivery of their product. Technical, service-provision companies tender for an ODA Programmes' contracts for services, just like they would for any other potential customer. If there are not ODA programme contracts available, they will look elsewhere and continue their business. When these companies believe their business interests can be advanced through a particular ODA policy, they will attempt to influence policy. International

development outcomes are not a primary concern in this effort, even if individual staff may wish to achieve positive development outcomes from their work.

Potentially overlapping with service-provision companies, some private sector entities also view ODA as a means to gaining a foothold in emerging markets in developing countries, or a way to build their reputation. For example, a seed producer in a donor country could gain an ODA contract for a smallholder farming project, use their seeds in the project, and therefore create a market for their seeds after the ODA contract has ended. These entities have no concern for good practice international development, beyond tender requirements, a desire to do a good job, or corporate social responsibility commitments. Where they believe it will help their export or reputational goals, these types of private sector entities will attempt to influence policy to best support their engagement in, and development of, markets overseas.

Often emerging from private enterprise are private foundations, or philanthropies, which have increasingly become a societal actor in international development. Leading the way in private philanthropy, the US-based Rockefellar Foundation was established in 1913, initially funding research into tropical diseases (Lancaster, 2007, p. 27). Since the Gates Foundation entered the sector in 2000, private foundations have become a more prominent actor in the ODA policymaking world (de Haan, 2009, p. 54). These foundations tend to invest in niche sectors, where they believe extra funds can catalyse greater change. These entities can have high levels of access to government, due to the personal wealth of their founders, generally amassed through business. At times philanthropies engage formally in efforts to influence ODA policymaking, such as the Gates Foundation's funding to the Australian Aid Campaign in the mid-2010s, but they also have significant informal access to government actors and can influence policy merely by where they chose to direct their funds, impacting on pending, current or future government decision-making.

International development research institutes, and development focused university courses, started to emerge in donor countries in the 1960s and 1970s (Sumner and Tribe, 2008, p. 32). Entities such as the Overseas Development Institute in London and the University of Sussex's Institute of Development Studies have been joined by numerous other development studies courses, research institutes and think tanks across the world, including in developing countries. Research institutes and think-tanks often aspire to

engage in policymaking, some more than others. The Centre for Global Development in the USA is a good example of a think-tank that explicitly and deliberately functions to influence policy. Some entities, such as the World Bank and United Nations, have internal research divisions that feed new knowledge into their internal policymaking processes, and disseminate knowledge globally. Increasingly, academics and universities sell their services to ODA Programmes, in which situations they can also behave as private sector actors.

Finally, while there is no research on this, political parties are likely to be important in the ODA policymaking process, particularly given ODA's low public salience. There is great scope for party members, and individual spokespeople, to shape the party's ODA policy manifesto. In doing this, the party policymaking apparatus considers other political parties, likely allegiances and the voting public, alongside their party's particular value set and preferred policy positions.

International

Two international actors have involvement in a donor's ODA policymaking: recipient countries and international organisations. However, I argue that these actors only have an impact on domestic policymaking if a domestic actor chooses to act on the basis of an international actors' ideas. The countries that receive ODA are key actors in ODA policymaking, given they are the recipients of ODA. Yet, they have little influence over donors' high-level ODA policy decision-making. In instances, recipient country actors can influence donor decisions by sharing their views with donors' ministers, ODA Programme staff and interest groups, but recipients have to rely on domestic donor actors taking up their cause. While I acknowledge recipients' importance in ODA policymaking in general, their views only influence donor ODA policy through donor domestic actors. Further, it is likely that recipient views are most powerful and pertinent for ODA policy objectives and settings, not goals (see Table Four on p. 99).

There is no doubt that international organisations are an important set of actors in a donor ODA policy domain. This is a complex relationship, based on funding arrangements but also a great deal of policy dialogue. While donor governments influence international entities' policy positions, these global entities also influence a donor's ODA policy, particularly through sharing information and learning, and setting and monitoring standards. Conversely, international ideas influence donor country's

ODA decisions (Lumsdaine, 1993, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015). The DAC has advanced discussions about quality ODA and has been a key standard-setter, in areas such as donor policies on tied ODA, ODA effectiveness, gender, environment, and ODA for trade. The United Nations and International Financial Institutions can shape policy objectives, such as the drive for primary education or ODA for poverty reduction, or set overall development directions, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which filter back to donor country priorities. However, similar to recipient countries, global entities only shape domestic donor policy through the minds and actions of domestic actors. In the area of international development, there is no global external law to bind domestic actors' actions. As Hudson (Hudson, 2007, p. 128) articulates, "foreign actors do not have the power to make policy decisions for any sovereign national regime". International entities' domestic ODA policymaking influence plays out predominantly through ideas' roles in donor ODA policymaking.

Ideas

Drawing from the ideational definition introduced in Chapter Three, here I incorporate ODA policy-specific ideas. Given the changes under examination in this research are about policy goals, which are influenced by policy values, the two columns to the left of the table below are the most pertinent. I include ideas for all policy content to show the reader where the spectrum of ODA policy-relevant ideas are situated within the policy content. Beneath the table I detail policy values and policy goal ideas.

Table Four: ODA Policymaking Ideas

Policy Values	Policy Goal Ideas	Policy Objective Ideas	Policy Setting Ideas
Policy values are the world views, values and beliefs that act as foundational guides for actors' behaviour and policy preferences. Policy values include: • a state's interests overseas: close or distant • the political party/ies in power and their beliefs about the role of the state versus the market, individual versus collective responsibility, and how social change/development occurs.	Goal ends: the desired outcomes from ODA policy. These include: ideas about whether ODA should be spent solely for development outcomes, for a variety of development and non-development foreign policy outcomes, or for non-development outcomes; and ideas about the relationship between ODA and non-development foreign policy aims.	Objectives ends: the programmes required to meet the goals. These involve ideas about where ODA should be geographically and thematically allocated to achieve goals – country programmes, regional programmes, thematic areas, specific relationships.	Settings ends: the specific aims of regional, country and thematic programmes. Included here are ideas about what each discrete country/regional or thematic programme should do. For example, a 19 million dollar programme of assistance to the Solomon Islands (policy objective), encompassing the education sector, WASH and Policing (policy settings).
For example whether to support broad-based social, economic and environmental development, or focus on economic and private sector growth.	Goal means: how ODA should be spent to achieve its desired outcomes. These include ideas about: whether to focus on good practice ODA for development, or simple technical assistance and funding; and the degree of authority and autonomy an ODA Programme should have vis-à-vis other foreign policy aims.	Objectives means: the instruments to be used to achieve programmatic outcomes. These involve ideas about: whether relationships are bilateral, or with multilaterals, NGOs, donor government agencies, the private sector or others; and types of engagement, such as policy dialogue or funding.	Setting means: how to best achieve the specific settings. Included here are ideas about the most appropriate modes or mechanisms of funding to achieve the setting ends. For example, budget support, sector wide approaches, projects, facilities or competitive tenders.

Policy Values

As Chapter Three discussed, policy values encompass world views, philosophies, values and deep beliefs. These policy values interact with each other to form a complex belief system for each individual. It is not possible to examine all policy values in this research. Here I extract the most pertinent ones for ODA policymaking. Overall, a country's interests on the global stage are the key focus here, influenced by ideas about national identity. Also important in ODA policy are underlying political policy values about social progress, human action, and state and market roles in development. From these policy values come ideas about ODA policy goals, including what ODA should be spent to achieve and how.

Interests Overseas and Government Policy Values

What is in a donor country's interest globally, and therefore what its ODA and non-development foreign policy aims are, depends upon the underlying "norms and ideas that reside in the nation's collective consciousness, associated with conceptions of national identity" (van der Veen, 2000, p. 26). As Wallace (1991, p. 65) states "foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the sources of national pride, the characteristics which distinguish a country from its neighbours, the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad". This national identity emerges from a country's historical and cultural background, creating underlying values the country, or at least the government of the day, believes it represents. National identity notions are factored into a government's decision regarding how to project its country on the global stage. This perspective is often articulated as the 'national interest'. The phrase 'national interest' is an "elastic concept" (Hook, 1995, p. 5) that governments use to justify diverse actions, giving the national interest multiple meanings over time and geography. While there may be some shared agreement across the political spectrum regarding a country's identity, each government will take aspects of this identity to form a particular government's conception of their interests overseas. For this reason, I do not use the term 'national interest', instead articulating in more detail a continuum of a donor country's interests overseas. (See Figure One below.)

Where a particular government sits along this continuum depends on the underlying policy values of the political party/parties that constitute the government. Parties can be classified into 'families' based on their policy values along two continua: one for

economic values and one for social values (Miller, 2015, p. 169). Condensing this taxology into a generic left-right spectrum, sees the left emphasising the structural conditions of human well-being, an active state, and collective action and responsibility to achieve social justice outcomes. In contrast, the right places priority on economic growth, individual responsibilities, a small state and the free market as the key mechanisms for advancing human wellbeing.

These different political party policy values lead to varying assessments of national identity, and therefore specific definitions of overseas interests. The spectrum of overseas interests can be captured in a continuum, as depicted below in Figure One. At one end, governments can view their interests in a short-term, self-focused manner: promoting the donor country's immediate economic and strategic objectives on the global stage. I label these interests as 'close' interests, because the desired outcomes are close in terms of time horizons, and involve more immediate or core donor domestic imperatives, the results of which will be felt relatively quickly at home within the donor state's borders. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a donor's interests overseas can be defined in longer-term, globally-focused ways: promoting a global community of peaceful and prosperous countries, based on the idea that all people everywhere are entitled to basic human rights, and it is the obligation of richer countries to help poorer countries to ensure these rights for their people. I label these 'distant' interests, due to the longer-timeframes involved and the benefit to citizens beyond the donor country's borders.

Figure One: ODA Policy Values Continuum

Distant interests: global social justice

Close interests: domestic imperatives

Different governments' underlying policy values impact on ODA levels and goals, reflecting divergent emphases on distant or close interests. In general, left-leaning governments tend to give more ODA (Chong and Gradstein, 2008, Tingley, 2010b, p. 44, Thérien and Noël, 2000, p. 151, Ahmed et al., 2011, pp. 15-16), although this relationship differs according to ODA goals and objectives (Brech and Potrafke, 2014,

Milner and Tingley, 2012). Left-leaning governments appear more likely to give more ODA based on ODA-recipient need (Brech and Potrafke, 2014, Tingley, 2010b).

This is not a straightforward relationship. For example, one study found that "changes in aid [ODA] flows to projects with a more commercial orientation appear unaffected by changes in donor political orientation" (Tingley, 2010a, p. 4). Some evidence also indicates donor unemployment and income levels have significant effects on ODA levels, but that this is so mainly under left-leaning governments, causing them to decrease ODA. For right-leaning governments, ODA levels appear relatively unaffected by domestic conditions (Ahmed et al., 2011, pp. 15-16). Further, country context matters. For example, in Germany, when the government was ideologically left-leaning it gave less ODA, on average, and commercial motives increased in importance (Dreher et al., 2013). This is likely due to the importance small businesses play in the German economy and their alignment with left-leaning governments in a corporatist political system.

In practice, how donor overseas interests play out in policy is more complex than this: regardless of the political stripes of the government, donors place different emphasis on close or distant interests for different countries at different times. Yet the generic classification improves clarity when discussing a government's interests overseas.

ODA for Development or Not

How any particular government prioritises close and distant interests is reflected in how they prioritise development within their foreign policy. There are two generic possibilities. When distant interests are emphasised ODA policy's development focus is an equal priority alongside other non-development foreign policy goals. Alternatively, when close interests are singularly paramount, development outcomes become subsidiary to non-development foreign policy goals and ODA policy is intertwined with achieving non-development foreign policy.

Between the distant and close ends of the continuum are two midway points: enlightened self-interest and dual-benefit ODA, as illustrated in Figure Two below. Enlightened self-interest involves the idea that giving ODA can bring positive economic and strategic outcomes to the donor, over a longer time horizon. For example, giving ODA to ensure healthy populations in recipient countries can also bring long-term

benefits to the donor country, in that contagious diseases will be prevented and their potential regional or global spread contained. While the core focus is on improving the well-being of people in the recipient country, there are also some close interest ideas included in this conception of the overseas interest. Closer to close interests, dual-benefit ODA is the idea that a donor can gain both their own short-term strategic and economic goals, while also contributing to development outcomes. A simple example of dual-benefit ODA would be allocating ODA to build a road in a recipient country, and ensuring a business in the donor country gains the contract to build the road. As I argue below, which end of the continuum a donor government situates itself influences its policy goal means decisions.

Figure Two: ODA Policy Goal Ends Idea Continuum

Enlightened self-interest   Dual-benefit ODA   Non-development foreign policy, or mixed outcomes

Development outcomes from ODA

Close or distant interest emphases in policy goals has been a core focus of research into ODA. At the aggregate level, close interests certainly govern ODA policy, particularly economic and strategic foreign policy goals. Yet, there is a good deal of variation between different donors, emphasising how different donor country contexts, including policy values, impact upon the desired outcomes from ODA policy – the policy goal ends.

On the whole, research supports the claim that a donor's commercial and trade interests are an important factor donors consider when making ODA policy (Fleck and Kilby, 2006, Schraeder et al., 1998, p. 321, Dreher et al., 2013, Younas, 2008, p. 668). Donors tend to give more ODA to countries with which they have an active trade engagement (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009, p. 331, Hoeffler and Outram, 2011, p. 249), although the relationship varies over time and between donors (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004, Berthélemy, 2006).

Strategic concerns, including security and geopolitical, play a role in ODA decision-making (Alesina and Dollar, 2000, Fleck and Kilby, 2006, Bueno de Mesquita and

Smith, 2009, Hoeffler and Outram, 2011), with different concerns featuring for different donors. For example, supporting like-minded African recipient regimes was a motivator for American, Japanese and Swedish ODA allocations during the 1980s, while the French used aid to spread their culture (Schraeder et al., 1998, pp. 320-321). France and the USA also used ODA to address security concerns, such as the containment of communism for the USA and French support of pro-French elites (Schraeder et al., 1998, pp. 320-321). The Cold War was often argued to be a key driver of ODA, yet for the average donor, there may have been no relationship (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011), with reactions varying across donors (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011, Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007). For example, at the Cold War's end the USA decreased aid, while France, Japan and the United Kingdom all increased aid (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011, p. 246). The 'War on Terror' has had similar effects (Woods, 2005, Fleck and Kilby, 2006). Some donor countries give more ODA to recipients that vote with them at the United Nations (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011, p. 249), again, with variations across donors (Balla and Reinhardt, 2008, p. 2577).

Alongside ODA's use for a donor's economic and strategic foreign policy goals, it is also clear that a desire for a recipient's development shapes ODA policy. Recipient human rights conditions are factored into donor calculations (Neumayer, 2003, Younas, 2008, p. 667, Hoeffler and Outram, 2011), as are recipient poverty and social needs, such as infant mortality (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004, Berthélemy, 2006, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006, Younas, 2008, Hoeffler and Outram, 2011) and gender inequality (Dreher et al., 2014). Democratisation, political openness, and policy and institutional settings appear to be important (Alesina and Dollar, 2000, Berthélemy, 2006, Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004), even if only for some donors (Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006, Hoeffler and Outram, 2011). Conflict in or near a recipient country seems to influence donor ODA decisions, but exactly how and for which donors is contested (Balla and Reinhardt, 2008, Berthélemy, 2006, p. 192). Several donors were found to be more likely to select a recipient when there was a conflict internally or bordering that recipient (Balla and Reinhardt, 2008).

One point that stands out from these predominantly cross-country regression analyses is variation across and within donors. Overall, some countries appear to emphasise close interests more than others. Decisions about ODA policy seem to involve a complex interplay of factors over time and space, which is why in-depth, individual case studies

may shed greater light on ideational frameworks influencing ODA policy goal decisions. Regardless, how a donor prioritises development in relation to its non-development foreign policy aims is implicit in their policy goal ends: whether ODA policy aims to achieve development alone, or aims to achieve non-development foreign policy goals. How the ODA Programme goes about attempting to achieve the desired goals involves their policy goal means.

Authority for Good Practice or No Need

The two policy goal means important here are the degree to which a donor attends to good practice in its ODA policy, and the way it organises its ODA Programme within government. Donors that have development as their ODA policy goal will engage with global standards, thinking and learning about good practice ODA policy, and will arrange their ODA Programme to promote its autonomy and authority for achieving development outcomes. Donors that prioritise non-development foreign policy goal ends for their ODA policy, or mix development and non-development goal ends, will not attend so closely to good practice ODA policy, and will organisationally arrange their ODA to ensure close interests can unproblematically dominate implementation. For these donors, the ability to control ODA is more important than giving ODA policy automony and authority vis-à-vis non-develpoment foreign policy. These policy goal means are illustrated on a continuum, in Figure Three below.

Figure Three: ODA Policy Goal Means Idea Continuum

The first ODA policy goal means involves whether or not a donor will strive towards good practice ODA or not. Good practice ODA policy has evolved over time through shared global learning across donors, and standard-setting by global entities, particularly the DAC. The 'Aid Effectiveness' agenda, begun in Rome in 2003 and continued through international meetings in Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2012), established some basic standards for improving ODA, as has learning from DAC donor peer reviews. There is also ongoing learning about what works for

development outcomes in various countries and sectors, which comprise a donor's decisions at the policy objective and setting levels.

While it is elusive to achieve, and continually evolving, there are some generic concepts that good practice involves. Arguably, it is not possible for a donor to actually achieve good practice. The point here is that the donor that aims to achieve development outcomes with its ODA (policy goal ends) will systematically strive towards good practice, engage with evolving thinking in this area, and work to improve ODA's contribution to a recipient's development. A good practice ODA Programme will focus on reducing poverty, aim to provide ODA to the countries with greatest need (Lomøy, 2013, Development Assistance Committee, 2009), and allow the country context to dictate appropriate action in any particular recipient country. In doing this the ODA Programme will balance activities across the social, economic and environmental spheres, and ensure that its ODA is not spread thinly across numerous countries but concentrated in a smaller number. The ODA Programme will have a clear policy goal focused on "the long-term common interest in effective development" (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, p. 17). Cross-cutting issues, including human rights, gender and the environment, will be considered in the ODA Programme's work (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, p. 85). ODA expenditure will be predictable and untied, and the ODA Programme will provide transparency about its policies and expenditure, and the results it achieves. A good practice ODA Programme coordinates and harmonises its actions with other donors and multilateral agencies, aligns its actions with recipient country priorities and plans, and supports recipient country ownership of development activities (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, p. 75). Ongoing learning about what works is imperative, and an ODA Programme striving for good practice will integrate learning across all its systems, including monitoring and evaluation. ODA Programme staff will be experienced and knowledgable in development, and the ODA Programme will have a senior political figure responsible and publicly accountable for the ODA Programme (Development Assistance Committee, 2009, p. 14, 15, 29). Finally, the ODA Programme will not only focus on effective ODA, but also work across the donor government to ensure other domestic policies are conducive to the development of other countries. Striving to achieve a good practice ODA Programme is a complex endeavour that requires significant and specialist resources.

If a donor government has dual-benefit or non-development foreign policy goal ends for its ODA, it will not invest the required resources to build a good practice ODA Programme, because this is not essential. From this perspective, a recipient country has multiple needs and there is always something a donor country can provide that will assist. Further, it is often necessary for a donor government to offer simply what a recipient country asks for, because this contributes to positive diplomatic relationships. A donor government that is not concerned with focusing on the greatest need or whether or not a recipient government is democratically accountable to, or representative of, their people, will not risk undermining the relationship for better development outcomes. Therefore, ODA is given in ways that can enhance a donor's strategic and economic foreign policy goals, and that do not risk damage to bilateral government relations. In this situation, ODA policy means involve the straightforward provision of funding and technical assistance, the latter commonly as either donor country individuals working in the recipient country or through scholarships for recipient country individuals to gain skills. These scholarships often involve studying in the donor country, as this contributes to relationship building and also acts as advertising for the donor country's educational service exports. These sorts of ODA policy means do not require engagement with the complex good practice endeavour described above.

The second policy goal means is how the ODA Programme is organisationally arranged within government. A government with a policy goal end to achieve development will give their ODA Programme centralised control over ODA, allowing it the authority and autonomy to shape development-focused ODA policy, rather than have various other government agencies or the non-development foreign policy apparatus shape ODA policy. ODA Programmes that have autonomy and authority over ODA policy have been found to focus more on development outcomes (Lundsgaarde, 2013, Lancaster, 2007), and separate ODA Programmes are associated with greater ODA quantity (Fuchs et al., 2014). In contrast, when a donor government is concerned with policy goal ends that are about strategic and/or economic outcomes, it becomes more important to ensure the ODA Programme is organisationally arranged in a manner that provides non-development foreign policy authority over ODA policy. This means that the professional executive working to advance non-development foreign policy goal ends does not have to argue their case with a development-focused ODA Programme with the authority over ODA, and which may provide conflicting advice to the minister.

What the above discussion highlights is that a complex ideational interplay structures ODA policy goals. Policy values about a donor country's identity mix with the government's political party values to create an individual donor government's interests on the global stage. These interests shape perspectives about the relationship between ODA policy and non-development foreign policy, embodied in policy end goals about ODA policy's desired results: development, or strategic and/or economic outcomes. Form begets function, and how a donor government chooses to achieve its desired policy goal ends is dictated by what the donor government desires to achieve from ODA. An ODA Programme that systematically engages with global good practice and is organisationally arranged with the autonomy and authority to prioritise development goals will be established if a government's ODA policy goal ends are development. If a government's policy goal ends are non-development foreign policy, building an ODA Programme that strives for good practice, and has centralised authority over ODA policy, will not be primary concerns.

Rules

Rules play an important role in ODA policymaking. As outlined in Chapter Three, rules allcoate power to both actors and ideas, and structure how policymaking occurs. Foundational constitutional rules sculpt ODA policy, as they prescribe what governments can and cannot do with their ODA programmes. Most broadly, the constitutional rules, such as electoral rules, shape the make-up of parliament, and how parliament and government functions: allowing and constraining decision-making power at the policymaking and operational levels.

Electoral Rules

Electoral rules are core constitutional rules and shape the context within which ODA policy is made and altered. Political executive dominance over parliamentary decision-making is more likely in paliamentary democracies with majoritarian electoral systems, whereas paliamentary power is likely to be greater in proportional representative electoral systems and in cases where there is constitutional clarity regarding the separation of powers (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 36). These rules then have an impact on how intra-governmental politics plays out, and who gets to have the final say over ODA policy decisions.

Intra-Governmental Rules

How the rules disperse authority across government is important in ODA policymaking (Lundsgaarde, 2013, pp. 34-38). Government entities each have a mandate for their existence and an associated specialism, and will defend these in the policymaking process. Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015) conceptualise ODA policymaking as an intra-bureaucratic bargaining process between the various agencies involved in ODA delivery, as well as within the ministry of foreign affairs. While at times government entities compete, they can also collaborate, therefore weilding more power with the political executive. Therefore, whether one government entity is responsible for ODA delivery, or several, will impact on ODA policy decisions.

For those wishing to influence ODA policy, fragmentation of authority over ODA provides a greater number of access points, which can be an advantage for their advocacy efforts, although it also stretches their resources. Conversely, because authority is dispersed across government, each government individual's authority is limited and more individuals have to be persuaded, which makes a policy influencer's job harder (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 35). On the other hand, centralised decision-making authority means there are fewer targets for persuasion. This can make policy engagement more straight-forward, unless it is not possible to access the individual(s) with authority.

Access for External Actors

Alongside the rules defining the concentration of authority over ODA policy, the rules regarding the level of access societal actors have to government policymaking processes are also important (Lundsgaarde, 2013, pp. 32-36). Societal actors, such as interest groups, have myriad ways to gain access to government, including formal consultations or informal actions, such as emails or letters. Yet, a government's openness to societal groups has an impact on what resources are required to gain access: an open government requires fewer resources, while a closed government requires greater resources (potentially for little gain). When access is easy, external entities may use more informal means of engagement, but when access is occluded, 'outsider' strategies may be used, such as public mobilisation, the media or protests (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 33).

Insights into ODA Policy Change

Above, I have outlined the ODA policymaking domain, and summarised what is known about actors, ideas and rules in ODA policymaking. Overwhelmingly, research efforts have attempted to uncover specific variables that determine ODA amounts and policy goal ends. The resulting knowledge base indicates diverse variables are factored into ODA policy decisions, and there is dissimilarity across and within donor countries: "the origins of foreign aid politics of the northern industrialized democracies are complex and varied" (Schraeder et al., 1998, p. 319). Yet, the literature provides scant analysis of policymaking processes: how donors balance various factors when making ODA policy decisions. As Claessens, Cassimon and Van Campenhout (2009, p. 207) suggest, "[i]t would be desirable for future research to take into account the policy and institutional environment not only in recipient countries, but in donor countries". Several in-depth, cross-country case studies exist that examine various domestic donor factors, but these often scrutinise one factor at a time, for example, national interest (Hook, 1995), national role conceptions (Breuning, 1995), or the way country frames translate into ODA policies (van der Veen, 2000). Three studies have broadly investigated ODA policymaking domains in small-n cross-country comparisons (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, Lundsgaarde, 2013, Lancaster, 2007). While these studies did not explicitly examine policy change instances, their excavations of policymaking over time unearthed change – even if not always significant change – and therefore insights about what factors are important in ODA policy change.

Through inspecting ODA policymaking's domestic politics, Lancaster (2007) aimed to answer five key questions: "why aid has been given over the past sixty years, how and why aid's purposes have differed from country to country, and why and how they have changed over time" (Lancaster, 2007, p. 2), using Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and the USA as case studies. Explicitly eschewing a theoretical framework, Lancaster (2007, pp. 18-22) structured her analysis using ideas, institutions (constitutional rules, and local government, advisory groups and NGO involvement), interests (businesses supporting ODA for donor economic reasons, NGOs supporting ODA for development, and religious and ethnic groups associated with recipient countries), and organisations (aid delivery and agency structures).

In drawing conclusions Lancaster highlights the impact external factors have had on donor ODA decision-making, such as events, trends and pressures. However, she argues that these factors "often work through domestic political forces and those forces also produce change, independent of what is going on beyond their borders" (Lancaster, 2007, p. 222). What Lancaster's research underlined is the related roles of rules, ideas, interests and aid's organisation in ODA policymaking decisions, particularly regarding ODA's purpose.

Digging deeper, Lundsgaarde (2013, p. 31) used a clear theoretical framework that blended actors (interest groups – NGOs and business groups) and institutions (formal and informal rules, procedures and practices) to assess the domestic politics of ODA amounts and purpose in Denmark, France, Switzerland and the USA. Lundsgaarde's (2013, p. 196) major conclusion was that "[i]nstitutions do much of the heavy lifting", finding that NGO resources and cohesion inadequately explain a donor's ODA policy choices.

> On the one hand, institutions determine the way that societal interests are incorporated into the policymaking process, both by providing channels of access to governmental actors with decision-making authority and by determining how many prime targets of influence exist in a given political system. On the other hand, institutions structure the nature of competition between governmental actors by determining how policymaking authority is distributed among them. (Lundsgaarde, 2013, pp. 196-197)

Yet Lundsgaarde also reinforces the significant role actors play in policymaking, and the need to incorporate actors into any analytical framework.

Policy change was not a major focus for Lundsgaarde, [although, he does state he wishes to explain why ODA policies change over time (p. 6)], but he does discuss it. While arguing ODA policy change potential was limited, Lundsgaarde (2013, p. 40) proposed that if change was to occur, it would come through either exogenous or endogenous factors, and would not necessarily involve rule change. Exogenous factors would be infrequent, including a change in the international environment, a change in the domestic economic conditions, or changes in other policy domains, which would then impact on ODA policymakers. Endongeous factors would include the ongoing interactions between societal and governmental actors, and the exchange of ideas, or

increased resources among societal actors. He suggests a solution to understanding policy change over time should "emphasize how the changing power and preferences of actors operating within a given institutional setting can serve as forces for policy change" (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 197).

In contrast to Lundsgaarde's rule-centric model, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015, pp. 2-4) take an actor-centric approach, building an ODA policymaking model to explain the factors and dynamics involved in ODA policymaking in five Eastern and Central European donors (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), as well as variation between them. This model emphasises ODA policymaking as an intra-bureaucratic bargaining process, whereby the ministries of foreign affairs and their development departments are the key actors, as well as implementing agencies or line ministries involved in ODA policy and delivery (including ministries of finance and/or economy). These scholars argue that parliament and the political executive pay little attention to ODA issues. Influencing the bureaucracy (professional executive) are two main external actor types: international actors, predominantly the European Union, the DAC and the United Nations Development Programme; and domestic stakeholders, specifically international development NGOs. International actors influence the professional executive through conditionality, although this was generally weak, and social learning. NGOs engage in advocacy work to influence ODA policy. Five factors facilitate or hinder NGOs' advocacy work: NGO power relations and composition; NGO organisational capacity; NGO ability to garner support from international entities; foreign donor funds and knowledge transfer to NGOs; and state actors' attitudes and administrative abilities (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, p. 28).

While excavating the Czech Republic's ODA policymaking history, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot encountered a "spectacular transformation between 2007 and 2011" (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, p. 7), with the creation of a development agency and new legislation on international development (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, pp. 137-141). Less successful attempts at significant changes in Slovenia also highlight important actors, ideas and rules for ODA policy change (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, pp. 164-167).

In both cases, other line ministries, particularly the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy, were involved in ODA delivery and did not wish to loose their power

through organisational arrangement changes. In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Finance's support for change was won through concessions and other line ministries consoled through the creation of a cross-government consulative body. In Slovenia, intra-ministry budgetary battles and ideational differences about ODA's outcomes constrained reform. Similarly, little interest from the political executive or parliament in Slovenia undermined change efforts, unlike in the Czech Republic where politicians could see the value of ODA for gaining overseas markets and building Czech prestige globally. Further, both the Czech President and Prime Minister supported the change efforts. One factor that did assist change in Slovenia was "an activist foreign minister" (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, p. 167), and an ideational shift that saw ODA viewed through a foreign policy lens rather than that of finance. In the Czech Republic, NGO and DAC calls for policy change were used by the ODA Programme to lobby internally for change (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015, pp. 137-139), highlighting the importance of domestic NGOs and ideas from international organisations. Finally, a policy entrepreneur was present in the Czech Republic, in the form of Šimon Pánek, who had long-term relationships with many politicians and established a prominent, vocal NGO that acted to raise awareness of international development issues amongst the public and politicians.

What these Eastern European cases show are the importance to policy change of rules about who has power over ODA within government, and ideas about a donor's overseas interests and what ODA should be spent for. Particular actors were also central: the professional executive (specifically the foreign affairs ministry, the ODA Programme, ministries of finance or economy, and line ministries implementing ODA), NGOs, and the political executive. The role of parliament was vague, and while there was support for change from the Czech Republic's parliament and disinterest in Slovenia, it is not clear whether this was crucial to change or stability in each case. International organisations played an important role in both cases, predominantly through their provision of ideas for domestic actors.

As described in Chapter Three, also found in the Czech and Slovenian cases were individuals behaving entrepreneurially, supporting Breuning's (2013) findings in Belgium regarding an important role for particular behaviour from important individuals. In a New Zealand analysis (also discussed in Chapter One), Banks et al. (2012) concluded that key individuals in government had influenced broad shifts in

ODA policy over four decades, although the individuals' precise behaviour and interactions were not analysed.

As all the ODA policymaking literature highlights, various actors, ideas and rules have a role to play in policy change, and there are opportunities for more exploration, particularly of particular instances of change (similar to the Czech Republic case detailed above). Scholars exploring motivations for ODA's existence, levels and purpose have not explicitly examined policy change. Yet, academics who study policy, and policy change, have developed sophisticated insights into policymaking phenomena, as outlined in Chapter Three. This research brings these two literature bodies together, contributing to the ODA policymaking literature through using a broad policy change framework to examine two ODA policy change instances.

Conclusion

Using Chapter Three's analytical framework as a scaffold, this Chapter describes the ODA policymaking domain, highlighting particular characteristics of ODA policy, and the particular actors, ideas and rules involved in its making. This construction also enabled me to canvass the existing literature pertinent to ODA policymaking. While recent in-depth case analyses offer promising insights, overall, the literature is inconclusive about what actors, ideas and rules rise to the fore in policy goal change. Further, variation is a common finding.

> [T]here is little consensus in the aid literature concerning which factors most influence changes in donors' aid efforts. Even when scholars agree on which variables matter most, they frequently disagree on the precise effects that those variables will have. (Ahmed et al., 2011, p. 6)

Given this, there is an opportunity for single-country case studies such as this one to enable in-depth examination of individual donors. As Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) point out: "[n]o two cases were alike, a fact that reinforces the need for detailed scrutiny of the individual cases" (p. 319).

The empircal research endeavour discussed in upcoming chapters was designed in a particular manner, as detailed in Chapter Two. To answer research questions one and two, the upcoming chapters lay out the findings of the New Zealand case analyses, structured and guided by Chapter Three's analytical framework and the current

Chapter's ODA policy exposition. Consistent with causal process tracing, first I describe key steps in each change process – the 'story' about how change decisions came about (Chapters Five and Seven). After each description, I then analyse the actors, ideas and rules involved, and the dynamics between them (Chapters Six and Eight). These analyses are subsequently compared and discussed in Chapter Nine.

Chapter Five: A Perfect Storm – 2001 Change Story

Most people recall 11 September 2001 for the twin tower terrorist attacks in the United States of America. For those interested in New Zealand ODA policy, this date is also memorable because the previous day Cabinet announced the biggest changes to New Zealand ODA policy since its inception. Despite the Prime Minister's opposition, ODA policy was given greater autonomy and authority in relation to other foreign policy areas. ODA was also tasked with eliminating poverty: an ambitious goal for a small ODA Programme, but one that focused its policy squarely on achieving development outcomes for the most vulnerable people in poor countries. Consistent with my use of causal process tracing, this Chapter details the important occurrences in the process leading-up to Cabinet's change decision, which is subsequently analysed in Chapter Six. In describing what actors, ideas and rules were involved in the 2001 ODA policy change, this Chapter responds to my first research question and lays the foundations to answer research question two.

The path to ODA policy goal change in 2001 is laid with several milestones. NGOs led the way, working to set the agenda through CID (the NGO umbrella body) campaigning on ODA policy's quality. Like-minded political parties integrated NGOs' ideas into their 1999 election manifestos, paving the way for ODA policy goal change to emerge on the new government's agenda after the 1999 general election. Ministers led a review into ODA policy, and then entered a protracted policy formulation period, at which point Prime Ministerial and MFAT opposition arose. Finally, through a compromise, the Cabinet agreed to change ODA policy's goal ends and means. Overall, what occurred was a confluence of factors over time, what one interviewee described as a perfect storm. The following delves deeper into this change process.

1999: A "Credible" Aid Programme?

"[A] serious and credible aid programme" (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-16) was how the DAC Peer Review summarised the New Zealand ODA Programme in its five-yearly review in 2000. Strengths identified included the ODA Programme's ongoing support for Pacific Island country development, assistance in

various Pacific regional conflict and humanitarian situations, ongoing improvements in policy focus and analytical capacities, and consistent engagement globally on development issues (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-11 - II-16). The ODA Programme's principle purpose was "to achieve lasting improvements in the living conditions of present and future generations of men, women and children in developing countries, especially the poor" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998, p. 4). New Zealand NGOs had received increased funding throughout the 1990s (Clark et al., 1998, pp. 50, 52053), and the ODA Programme had been making incremental improvements in areas such as ensuring gender and environmental issues were incorporated across its work.

Efforts had been made throughout the 1990s to expand the New Zealand private sector's involvement in ODA. As the Minister at the time, Don McKinnon, articulated "[o]ne of the hallmarks of New Zealand's Official Development Assistance is the way the programme combines developmental and commercial objectives" (Development Cooperation Division, April 1992, p. 3). This approach was captured in the ODA Programme's key policy document 'Investing in a Common Future', which included a core principle to involve New Zealanders where-ever possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998, p. 4). By 1995, MFAT found direct returns to New Zealand from it's ODA expenditure "of 59% of bilateral ODA spending in 1993/1994, and 279% [of] multilateral spending"(Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-54). The 2000 DAC Peer Review indicated that seeking economic returns to New Zealand from ODA expenditure could be problematic, referring to "[r]ecent work in the DAC Informal Network on Poverty Reduction [that] indicates that pursuing multiple objectives may compromise an aid agency's poverty reduction goal. This may be occurring with the New Zealand programme" (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-13).

Alongside this caution, the DAC Review also diplomatically stated significant challenges for the ODA Programme to address, including: developing a clearer focus on poverty reduction; examining the suitability of the ODA Programme's structure for current ODA policy trends; constructing a core group of development-focused staff with development experience and political skills; making greater use of recipient country services and goods; addressing the wide dispersion and fragmentation of ODA

expenditure; setting a target for increasing ODA; and expanding its public engagement (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-11 - II-16). These concerns echoed many in the New Zealand international development community, who believed New Zealand was lagging behind international standards and delivering low quality ODA policy.

NGOs and the Aid Works Agenda

By the mid-1990s New Zealand international development NGOs were a credible and influential voice in New Zealand's international development community, and their umbrella organisation, CID, was growing in strength. In 1994, Pat Webster became CID's Executive Director, simultaneously resigning her Labour Party Senior Vice-President role. As Webster came to grips with her CID role, she learned that while CID member NGOs shared similar world views regarding development, their diversity in other areas posed challenges for collective action. Yet, CID was learning how to negotiate differences and provide a forum for open discussion, rather than confrontation (Council for International Development, 1998, p 6), and the NGOs agreed on enough to be able to develop core goals for CID's strategic direction. The new Strategic Plan for 1997-2000 set key goals for CID, including to promote: increased quality and quantity of ODA to the poorest, NGOs' involvement in the ODA Programme's strategic direction and implementation, cooperation amongst New Zealand NGOs, and development education (Council for International Development, 1998, pp. 8-9). These goals guided a deeper engagement in policy advocacy. As Webster states,

> what we talked about at CID at the time… we worked out that far more aid went to development through ODA than the NGO sector, in total [meaning all of NGO expenditure combined compared to total ODA]. So we began to focus. We'd done a lot of work in boosting the amount of money that came in for development — the amount, but hadn't done much else. It seemed to me we didn't understand enough about how it was spent. (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview)

A new campaign – called 'Aid Works' – was endorsed at the 1996 CID Annual General Meeting (Council for International Development, 1997). The Aid Works campaign became a key agenda-setting mechanism for CID. A steering committee was established

to provide overall governance to Aid Works, including Oxfam's Phil Twyford, who was "most campaign-minded" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview) and so a source of advice and support in devising the Aid Works campaign. CID members agreed research on the ODA Programme would provide a substantive grounding for the Aid Works campaign. A group of CID members contributed funding for the research, encapsulated in the 'Partners in a Common Future' report (Council for International Development, 1998, p. 10).

Launched in parliament in April 1999, by Minister Don McKinnon of Foreign Affairs, the report set out key CID demands for New Zealand ODA (Council for International Development, 1999, p. 9). These were that ODA should: be focused on poverty eradication, taking into account "inequality, human rights, gender and environmental needs, as well as shortage of the physical necessities of life" (Davenport and Low, 1999, p. 6); continue to prioritise the Pacific but review ODA to Africa given the continent's high poverty levels; increasingly direct Pacific ODA to basic health and education, and ensure economic reform accounts for people's basic needs and the environment; reorient education ODA to basic education; set a realistic timeframe to achieve 0.7 per cent of GNI to ODA by 2015; formalise the relationship between New Zealand NGOs and MFAT; and increase funding to civil society organisations (Davenport and Low, 1999, p. 6). "So, that was the start of the process for us. We had this avenue. We pursued it. And it was very influential. And it was something that was the foundational document" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview).

Over the next few months, CID devised an Aid Works lobby kit to assist CID member NGOs to take the Aid Works messages to their local parliamentarians (Council for International Development, 1999, p. 9-10). Ongoing discussions with MFAT based on these messages did have early some impact within MFAT, such as agreement to reconsider ODA's education funding priorities, and discussion on how to integrate a poverty focus across the ODA Programme (Council for International Development, 1999, p. 6). The Aid Works campaign was the most political CID had been to date: it put forward a researched argument that ODA policy quality in New Zealand needed to improve, and began to set the agenda for significant change.

Manifesting Manifestos

Meanwhile, also in the lead-up to the 1999 general election, political parties were creating their election policies. The two political parties involved in the 2001 ODA policy change process were the Labour Party and the Alliance. Before discussing their ODA election policies, it is worth noting other parties' ODA policies.

In terms of right-leaning parties, the National Party's manifesto statement on foreign policy focused predominantly on trade and defence, with little specific detail on ODA (The National Party, 1999, p. 10). The ACT Party had yet to publish their foreign affairs policy in the only copy of their 1999 election manifesto that is available (ACT New Zealand, 1999, p. 12). The populist New Zealand First party contained more detail, stating they would maintain ODA's Pacific focus, and "review the level of Overseas Development Assistance, and its global allocation and ensure that it is focused on facilitating priority projects" (New Zealand First Party, 1999, p. 52), within their broader desire to strengthen the country's exports. Another centrist party, United Future, became a supporter of increased ODA and was likely to support its focus on development, yet its 1999 foreign policy manifesto cannot be located. On the left, the Green Party foreign policy manifesto is also not available, although its statement on justice, including international justice, indicates that the Green Party was focused on human rights, environmental sustainability and building strong communities (Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, 1999).

The Labour Party foreign affairs manifesto had

> … much greater detail than might have been expected, which shows that those working in the area had kept-up with what was happening internationally, and had a feeling that there were better ways of delivering that would more closely meet the sort of moral imperatives that Labour put in this area, rather than the intensely pragmatic imperatives that you often see from a conservative government. (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

The Party's 'Overseas Aid and Development Policy' stated "[t]he principle purpose of NZODA is to contribute to the international effort to eliminate poverty and to the development of just and equitable international economic social and environmental policies, the benefits of which will be shared among present and future generations" (New Zealand Labour Party, July 1999, p. 2). Several principles to guide Labour's

approach to ODA policy were articulated: social justice, equality and equity, fairness, sustainability, peace, interconnectedness and partnership. Labour identified the Pacific as the core focus for ODA, but did not rule out other countries or geographical areas. The Policy specified a commitment to "conduct an inquiry into New Zealand's ongoing relationship with the Pacific" (New Zealand Labour Party, July 1999, p. 2) and review ODA to other countries. A "task force" would conduct the Pacific inquiry (New Zealand Labour Party, July 1999, p. 9). Specific attention was given to using ODA in context-specific ways to build institutional capacity in developing countries. Labour pledged that if in government their ODA would align with the OECD's International Development Goals, soon to become the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), advocate globally for debt relief, increase development education efforts, progressively move towards the 0.7 per cent of GNI ODA target, and increase skilled staff and overhead budgets at MFAT. Of note, key individuals on the Labour Party's foreign policy committee included Pat Webster, CID's Executive Director, and Graham Kelly, the Labour Party's opposition spokesperson for ODA.

The Alliance's final published manifesto stipulated that the Alliance would focus its ODA on eliminating poverty, basic health and education, and community projects, and raise ODA levels to 0.7 per cent of GNI over ten years (Alliance, 1999). Interviewees recall that during the campaign "[i]t was taken-up enthusiastically by the Alliance to have a policy of independent review of ODA, and as government, to then act upon the recommendations, assuming we were in agreement. Labour had something similar" (Hon. Matt Robson, former Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview). The Alliance would also work with NGOs where possible, and believed, "the eradication of poverty is a key defence policy for New Zealand" (Development Resource Centre and Council for International Development, February 2000, p. 12) – emphasising New Zealand's distant interests.

Important individuals within the Alliance had long-standing interest and engagement in international development issues. Once such person was Matt Robson who had worked as a teacher and an immigration lawyer, and had been an active Labour Party member until he followed Jim Anderton to form the NewLabour Party in 1989. Robson was a strong human rights advocate, having worked alongside "'various organisations which have overseas development as their focus, and in terms of my work within the Alliance, that's been my focus for some time'" (Development Resource Centre and Council for

International Development, February 2000, p. 13). Alliance leader and Deputy Prime Minister, Jim Anderton also had an interest in ODA, and had instigated a 1990 Select Committee Inquiry into New Zealand ODA before leaving the Labour Party. Also, David Cuthbert had been active in CORSO and CID, and in government became Anderton's senior policy advisor and Alliance Caucus Secretary.

Look Left: A New Government

On November 27, 1999, New Zealanders elected a new government in an election that reaffirmed pre-MMP traditional ideological blocs, with the Greens, Alliance and Labour gaining a combined 66 seats amongst a total 120 parliamentary seats (Aimer, 2014, p. 11). As they had hinted in the lead-up to the election, the Labour Party and the Alliance formed a coalition government (Boston and Church, 2000). Leaders Helen Clark (of Labour) and Jim Anderton (of Alliance) respectively became the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

The Labour Party's Phil Goff became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Minister Goff had only been the foreign affairs spokesperson in opposition for a short time, stepping into the role when Mike Moore left to join the World Trade Organisation in September 1999. Yet, Goff was an experienced parliamentarian, in parliament since 1981. His late arrival into foreign affairs meant he had not been part of the foreign affairs policy development process. The Alliance's Matt Robson became Goff's Associate Minister, and was responsible for ODA (as well as holding portfolios for corrections, courts, and land information). Both Ministers had a collegial working relationship. As Hon. Phil Goff recalled,

> we always had a pretty cooperative relationship… and I guess one of my roles as Minister of Foreign Affairs would have been not having direct responsibility for that portfolio but to work in to ensure that developments within that portfolio were consistent with the Labour Party's thinking. But I don't recall any significant battles at all with Matt. (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

Hon. Matt Robson agreed: "certainly on aid, we came to an agreement" (Hon. Matt Robson, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview).

In an important contribution to the change process, Minister Goff recruited David Shearer as a ministerial advisor (political advisor) in early 2000. Shearer had come from ten years working internationally in humanitarian operations, including for the United Nations and NGOs (Shearer, 2009). Shearer was tasked with responsibility for the ODA review, facilitating the review and subsequent decision-making processes, and writing the final Cabinet papers.

> Phil seconded a very good person — David Shearer. He was instrumental. He came across to my office and we worked very closely. He knew what he was doing. He knew about this process and about aid. (Hon. Matt Robson, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

Ministerial Review and Consultant Selection

Once the Ministers had settled into their offices, they began to consider options about precisely how to review the ODA Programme. The Ministerial Review was not an inevitable decision. In the early moments consideration was given to a select committee review, similar to that undertaken in 1988 to 1990. After the election the Labour spokesperson for ODA, Graham Kelly, became Chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee (hereafter, Foreign Affairs Committee). During a trip to Timor Leste in early 2000, Kelly had discussed the ODA review with Minister Robson, expressing the view that it would be something substantive for the Foreign Affairs Committee to engage in and build the cross-party agreement on New Zealand's approach to Pacific Island countries (9 Feb 2000). Kelly was also part of discussions with others about the need for the review to be independent, managed from the Ministers' offices.

> We decided on the political side of things that we needed a ministerial review so we could keep control of what was happening… What happened was, there was this group of us, four of us, talked about how to progress this. It was clear that it had to be a ministerial review. (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview)

By 20 March 2000 internal MFAT documents indicate that the decision for the review to be a ministerial one was imminent (MFAT File, 20 March 2000).

> So we wanted a fairly thorough-going review. I don't think we had in mind in 1999 necessarily setting out an independent analyst to come in, but that was the path that we ultimately decided to, to really get something that was more in-depth and freed from simply an internal, foreign affairs review that may be somewhat self-interested in terms of its perspective on separation. (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

MFAT put forward suggestions for potential consultants, including Terence O'Brien and Joseph Grossman, along with a narrow terms of reference (MFAT File, 20 March 2000). David Shearer also sought the input of others, "Gordon [Shroff, of MFAT] mentioned a few names and I sort of shopped them around with a few people that I knew in the aid world. And Annette Lees and Joseph Grossman came to the fore. And both were perceived as being very sharp, very on to it" (David Shearer, former political advisor, December 2014, Interview). Former MFAT diplomat, and Founding Director of the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies, Terence O'Brien, was initially selected to chair the team (MFAT File, 21 June 2000).

Eventually the ministerial review got underway, but in the absence of Terence O'Brien, who decided not to participate, leaving Annette Lees and Joseph Grossman (MFAT File, 21 Aug 2000). By September 2001, Grossman and Lees had met with the Ministers and discussed the review, with a draft report due by mid-February (MFAT File, 18 Sept 2000). The terms of reference had morphed from a shallow assessment of New Zealand ODA and Pacific needs, to a comprehensive, purpose-level analysis of the ODA Programme. The review's goal became "to present a report to the Ministers that analyses and makes recommendations on the overall priorities, objectives, focus and institutional arrangements of ODA" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 104). The consultants were to explore how ODA can best

> contribute to the elimination of poverty and building of capacity…[;] assist in the development of just and equitable economic, social and environmental policies for present and future generations… [; and] address the root causes of problems facing Pacific Island states given New Zealand's close relationship with the region. (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 104)

As well as this, an assessment of Pacific issues was requested. The Ministers wanted "the team to provide a vision for NZODA centred on excellence in aid delivery that effectively and strategically contributes to the elimination of poverty" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. i). This terms of reference was quite altered from the original drafts, and the Towards Excellence Ministerial Review (TEMR) consultants had assisted in expanding it from the original.

Towards Excellence

Grossman and Lees took several months to review the ODA Programme, with some assistance from Margaret Chung, a Fiji-based consultant (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. i). The review involved interviews and focus group discussions with MFAT staff, ODA recipients and New Zealand-based stakeholders. Meetings took place in Australia, including with the Australian Agency for International Development, and the TEMR team took opportunities to talk with people at international meetings, such as the Asian Development Bank Strategic Framework consultations. Country visits occurred to Samoa, Fiji (where Margaret Chung resided) and Vanuatu, and a TEMR team member participated on the annual New Zealand Foreign Minister's Pacific trip to New Caledonia/Kanaky, Niue, Tonga and Vanuatu. The TEMR team called for written submissions from interested parties and received 80 submissions (Grossman and Lees, 2001, pp. 124-125). The TEMR team also hosted public consultation meetings in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, to which 78 individuals attended (Grossman and Lees, 2001, pp. 122-123). New Zealand Treasury wrote a submission and several Treasury staff were interviewed. A State Services Commission staff member was also interviewed, and although this is not recorded in the review, the consultants recalled the meeting in my interviews with them.

Eventually, the TEMR was submitted to the Ministers in late March 2001 (MFAT File, 18 April 2001, MFAT File, 8 February 2001). An advance copy of the report was sent to the Prime Minister in mid-April 2001 (MFAT File, 18 April 2001). It appears that MFAT did not see the report until after 6 May 2001 (MFAT File, 6 May 2001). The final TEMR report was released to the public on 11 September 2001, gaining reasonable press coverage. For example, 'Damning Report Brings New Overseas Aid Focus' (Verdon, 12 Sept 2001), 'Botching the War on Poverty' (Roughan, 12 Sept 2001) and 'New Aid Unit Formed After Critical Report' (Langdon, 12 Sept 2001). However,

the twin tower terrorist attacks in the USA made news in New Zealand in the early hours of 12 September 2001, and these overshadowed the report's release.

The TEMR report began with brief history and basic facts about New Zealand's ODA, progressing through to a rationale for ODA, an explanation of poverty, considerations of where New Zealand should give ODA, and New Zealand's relationship with the Pacific. Following this, the TEMR report provided a vision for ODA, based on "recognised international best practice…, extensively studied by the review team to ensure it is applicable and workable in New Zealand's own context" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 25). This vision outlined several requirements for a 'best practice' ODA Programme: one clear goal focused on poverty reduction, a policy framework outlining the ODA Programme's approach and objectives, policy statements defining key thematic and sectoral priorities, a strategic plan guiding implementation, and country programme strategies. Together these would provide focus regarding priority countries and sectors, key funding mechanisms to be used, and guidelines for specific approaches in different countries or regions. The TEMR vision stipulated that an excellent ODA Programme has a learning culture, integrates best practice (such as participatory approaches and gender mainstreaming), prioritises relationships, and incorporates rigorous evaluative processes into its work. The TEMR team argued an ODA Programme requires a supportive institution that is staffed with development professionals and embodies a learning culture with a clear career pathway, and resources for training and analysis. They acknowledged that delivering ODA for development goals had grown into a sophisticated global industry requiring particular professional competencies and experience. Summarised, the TEMR's vision of excellence in New Zealand's ODA Programme was as follows.

> New Zealand has the opportunity to draw on the best international findings in foreign aid and its own experiences, to create an innovative aid programme that has a clear strategic direction, and is cutting-edge, impact-focused, responsive to the countries that we assist, and a learning organisation. With measurable objectives, it would be clearly accountable to all New Zealanders, to partner governments and other stakeholders for its performance. Staffed with aid professionals it could be deeply knowledgable about both the dimensions of poverty and the development parameters of our partner countries. Despite the comparatively small size of our aid programme New Zealand has the potential to have international impact as a leader in development thinking and practice. (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 25)

The ODA Programme was then assessed against this vision. The TEMR consultants concluded "that there is a substantial gulf between best practice in aid design and delivery as that is defined internationally, and what is currently happening in NZODA" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 39). While commending the ODA Programme for improvements in its policy framework over time, for a strong gender policy, a lauded 'Strategic Policy Framework for Relations with NGOs', and solid New Zealand NGO funding systems, there was little positive the reviewers found in the ODA Programme when compared with the vision of excellence. There was no clear goal, the overarching policy framework was weak, there were limited policy statements and no priority-setting guidance, there was no strategic plan, country strategies did not exist beyond four countries, there were no formal criteria for funding allocations, ODA receiving partners had limited involvement in ODA design, evaluation and learning were limited, and the institution was not supportive of good development practice. The reviewers emphasised that "[t]hese [were] not the views of a small number of disgruntled staff. There was a critical mass of opinion that formed the basis for key findings…What is described is a failure of systems to support excellence in ODA" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 91).

These findings led to fifteen recommendations. The first recommendation became the most contended: "that NZODA should be administered by an autonomous agency that has an undistracted focus on, and accountability for, the mission to eliminate poverty" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 7), with a head role that accounts directly to a minister, the ability to recruit its own staff, and a separate vote (government funding allocation) (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 7). The other key recommendation was that "NZAID should have one, unambiguous goal: the elimination of poverty" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 101).

The report echoed concerns amongst NGOs and others regarding the ODA Programme. CID members discovered during the TEMR consultation phase that "[t]here was an amazing core of consistent issues covering issues such as staff turnover, institutional memory, confusion of objectives, and the need for more emphasis on basic needs" (Council for International Development, 2001a, p. 12). Others were not so sure.

MFAT Disagrees

The TEMR report came under sustained attack from MFAT, particularly once the review was circulated amongst senior MFAT staff in May 2001. It is important to note that in this description I refer to MFAT as a homogenous entity. In reality, MFAT included the Development Cooperation Division (DEV, as it was then referred to) and other staff who may have held different views besides the official MFAT view articulated. Yet, the MFAT Secretary, Neil Walter, represented MFAT at the time, (with support from other key staff, such as Deputy-Secretary John Larkindale, and Gordon Shroff, Deputy-Secretary responsible for the South Pacific and Development Cooperation (DEV) divisions). Therefore, Secretary Walter's official position can reasonably be described as an 'MFAT' perspective. MFAT's concerns predominantly centred on the ODA Programme's organisational arrangements. Associated with this were issues with the TEMR process: a significant change such as creating a new organisational entity should be decided on the basis of the best quality evidence and judgement. MFAT did not believe the TEMR provided this. MFAT also disagreed with some of the basic premises of the TEMR in regards to the relationship between ODA and other foreign policy areas, which related to MFAT's view that ODA should not be separate from other foreign policy.

MFAT did not agree that the TEMR's recommended organisational arrangement changes were necessary. MFAT argued that the ODA Programme was a core part of the Ministry's operations, with development staff familiar with broader non-development foreign policy issues and "Ministry senior management and staff… familiar with development work" (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 3). MFAT noted the 2000 DAC Peer Review was impressed with the "very high understanding of development issues throughout the Ministry and other government agencies we deal with" (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 2). One of the reasons the TEMR consultants gave to establish an autonomous ODA Programme — improving staff international development competencies and consistency — MFAT was already addressing (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 4). MFAT also thought that New Zealand's small size and resources meant it would be too costly to establish a separate ODA agency, and that in its current form the ODA Programme could draw in the expertise it required, and utilise MFAT's operational and administrative functions without the duplication a separate agency would create (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 5). The reasons several past ODA

Programme reviews had not recommended the ODA Programme's organisational reconfiguration were "the modest size of the New Zealand aid programme, the benefits of policy coherence and integration within the wider external relations context, and the cost and administrative efficiencies that come with being a part of MFAT" (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 1). The one review that did recommend that an autonomous ODA Programme be established was the 1990 Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee Inquiry into ODA[7], which argued that an autonomous ODA Programme would reduce the use of ODA for non-development foreign policy outcomes, and improve development expertise and advice within government. The 1990 National Government did not endorse this recommendation (McKinnon, 1990, pp. 3-4).

MFAT also underscored the significant level of autonomy the ODA Programme already had, in that outputs were separately accounted for, the ODA Programme had "a substantial degree of freedom in establishing the most appropriate mix of development and rotational staff" (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 5), it managed its own training and outreach activities, including relations with civil society, and it had an associate minister (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 5). "We believe it has been possible to achieve a good balance whereby DEV [ODA Programme] is able to operate with the appropriate degree of 'autonomy' in respect of the particular nature of its work while benefiting from the policy, personnel and administrative advantages flowing from integration in the mainstream of the Ministry" (MFAT File, 21 December 2000, p. 5).

The MFAT Secretary Walter, summarised the concerns clearly.

> The establishment and running costs of a separate aid agency in New Zealand's situation would seem to me prohibitive, and I do not believe that any better result would be obtained than can be produced within the present structure. We already enjoy an excellent working relationship with the NGO community (see Annex C). Moreover to set up a separate aid agency with its own overseas network would further fragment the Public Service and involve a significant loss of policy coherence for the government. If the review produces changes in direction or emphasis in our aid programme, the first logical question is 'can we do this within the existing organisational arrangements?'. I am convinced that the answer is yes. I do not

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[7] The Inquiry report was tabled several weeks prior to the 1990 general election, at which the National Party came to power, removing the Labour Party government. The new National Party Foreign Minister was required to respond to the Inquiry report within his first few weeks in the portfolio.

however have any problem with the suggestion that we should be prepared to debate this issue with and before Ministers. (MFAT File, 6 May 2001, p. 2)

Alongside MFAT's objections to altering the ODA Programme's organisational arrangements, MFAT also took issue with the TEMR consultants and process.

> MFAT's [Secretary] at the time, Neil Walter, made no secret of his view that the team selected to undertake the review had been unbalanced and working to a specific ideological agenda under the direction of the then Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He expressed the view to Ministers that the process the review team had followed was seriously flawed; that the report it had produced was superficial and lacking in analysis; and that the consultants had painted an inaccurate and distorted picture of the current NZODA programme in order to bolster the argument for a stand-alone agency. (Neil Walter, former MFAT Secretary, Statement provided to author, December 2014)

These concerns were raised with Minister Goff early in 2001, with the Secretary receiving feedback from people the TEMR consultants interviewed that "left [him] uneasy. There are suggestions that the consultants are driving a heavy agenda (a stand-alone aid agency). It has also been reported to me [MFAT Secretary] that disparaging comments have been made about Ministry staff" (MFAT File, 8 February 2001, p. 1). MFAT was concerned about quotes in the TEMR from an external assessment of MFAT conducted by a firm called 'Advanced Dynamics'. The assessment was a frank view of MFAT, exposing some entrenched cultural issues that were hindering the agency's performance, but also highlighting strengths. This assessment was captured in a document that the TEMR consultants saw but that MFAT staff were unaware had been distributed to them. Quotes from the Advanced Dynamics document were selectively used in the TEMR report (Advanced Dynamics and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2000), contributing to MFAT concerns that the TEMR consultants were attempting to paint the ODA Programme and MFAT in a negative light.

Internal Machinations

Between the months of May and September 2001, an Inter-Departmental Working Party was established to explore the TEMR organisational arrangement recommendation's feasibility. Simultaneously, MFAT and ODA Programme staff were provided with the

remaining TEMR recommendations (2 to 15) to work through the potential implications (MFAT File, 24 May 2001, p. 2). A representative from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) – Mary-Anne Thompson – chaired the Inter-Departmental Working Party, which also involved representatives from MFAT, State Services Commission (SSC), Treasury (Cabinet Office, 2001a, p. 6), and David Shearer. The Working Party considered three organisational arrangement options: an enhanced status quo, a semi-autonomous body, and a stand-alone, fully autonomous ODA agency. Throughout these internal consultations, the drive was for a stand-alone, autonomous agency, although costs and benefits for all three options were examined (Cabinet Office, 2001c). This process allowed for input from across the central government agencies, including the Prime Minister's views, which were not supportive of a stand-alone agency.

The DPMC, MFAT, SSC and Treasury contributions were amalgamated into three papers that went to the Cabinet External Relations and Defence (ERD) Committee, which then referred the matters for decision to Cabinet. The papers were joint submissions from the Offices of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Phil Goff), and the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Matt Robson). One paper provided an overview (Cabinet Office, 2001a), the second discussed ODA's focus and direction (Cabinet Office, 2001b), and the third ODA's organisational arrangements (Cabinet Office, 2001c). Minister Goff Chaired the ERD. While the views of MFAT, SSC and Treasury would have been accounted for in the papers, ultimately the papers reflected the two Ministers' decisions about their preferred course of action, taking into account the input from the other agencies, including that the stand-alone agency was not significantly more expensive to run (Cabinet Office, 2001c, para. 49-52), and the SSC did not see significant machinery of government problems.

The MFAT Secretary requested to put MFAT's view of the TEMR recommendations to the ERD Cabinet Committee in a separate paper. This paper argued that:

> [t]he key conclusion is that continued management of NZODA by this Ministry, with a greater measure of formal autonomy being given to DEV [ODA Programme within MFAT], can achieve the changes the Government seeks provided the risk is properly managed. This approach would **allow the Government to retain the best features of the current structure for delivering ODA while making changes to give NZODA greater focus, strengthen the management of the programme and**

increase its effectiveness. It would also avoid the disruption and costs of a major restructuring exercise. (MFAT File, 8 August 2001, p. 2, bold in original)

Cabinet Decision

Monday 10 September 2001 was the day Cabinet agreed to ERD's recommendations to change ODA policy. The Cabinet papers were circulated on the Friday beforehand and political executives and their staff considered the issues over the weekend.

> On a Friday and on a Sunday afternoon or Monday morning we would highlight the things that were problematic. Clark did the same in her office – teasing out before Cabinet meeting all those things that were going to be problematic. And either taking them off the agenda or negotiating in advance language about, giving more space for work, or whatever. (David Cuthbert, Alliance Caucus Secretary and Senior Advisor, December 2014, Interview)

By this time it was clear that Prime Minister Clark would not support a stand-alone, autonomous ODA agency.

> In the end, Matt [Robson] found that he was up against a brick wall. He came to Jim [Anderton] and said, look, we're not going to get this [a stand-alone ODA agency]. Jim said, 'well, you're passionate about this, you want it'. There were some other things that Matt wanted in disarmament that he wasn't going to get. So Jim said 'look, we'll expend some political capital if this is what you want'. If Clark [Prime Minister] is totally opposed to an independent agency, then we're not going to get it, but we'll try and get as much as we can, and we'll live to fight another day'… And Matt could see how the land lied, and agreed to that, and that's how, effectively we got it through. (David Cuthbert, Alliance Caucus Secretary and Senior Advisor, December 2014, Interview)

The semi-autonomous body model was a political compromise, given the Prime Minister's opposition to any changes and her support around the Cabinet table.

> I knew what was up, and that evening got Phil's [Goff's] agreement… I had to make a strategic decision for the Alliance – take it or leave it. At that stage, thinking six years – get the first bite in there, then make it change again later [to a stand-alone agency]. This all came quickly – had to make a quick decision on this. I thought, no, I'll get this, and then make it separate later. (Hon. Matt Robson, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

If we'd gone to a vote, not sure how it would have gone. Got to a compromise – Alliance position didn't win at that time, but I took the view that to have an agency inside MFAT, I knew it was dangerous, and that it would need people there to keep on top of it, then eventually wait for the time when you could move to make it separate… That was part of the compromise that people like Cullen helped to get so they could allow it to go forward. (Hon. Matt Robson, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

In the Labour Party, several Cabinet members supported Prime Minister Clark's opposition to change, but eventually the Prime Minister and her supporters agreed to the semi-autonomous body as a compromise. The Finance Minister, Michael Cullen, and the Minister of State Services, Trevor Mallard, were key because they were in charge of two of the central government agencies. Mallard, tasked with consolidating the State Sector, required convincing (Beuselinck and Renard, 2008a, p. 14). Given the centralizing project, the SSC Minister was likely to have some reservations about creating a new agency.

Trevor Mallard was the Minister for State Services and he was the one responsible for trying to consolidate the State Sector, and so he was one that was arguing against having a separate body. So I actually got, before a caucus meeting one day, I got to see him for about ten minutes… I had in that time to say to him, 'this is why it can't stay within the Ministry and we need it to be outside', and then he agreed that it could be semi-autonomous. (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview)

Webster had also previously met with Minister Cullen. In the end, Ministers Cullen and Mallard, along with Minister Goff and the Alliance Cabinet members, convinced the Prime Minister and others that this was an acceptable approach. With little to loose politically, there was actually some political capital to gain for Labour within the Labour-Alliance coalition Cabinet.

The Cabinet decision was announced at a press conference on Tuesday 11 September. Thus began a long process of organisational and policy change, leading to the official launch of the new semi-autonomous ODA Programme, named NZAID, on 1 July 2002 (MFAT File, 15 May 2002), almost three years after the new Labour-Alliance government embarked on the process towards change.

Conclusion

This Chapter has detailed the process through which ODA policy change came about in 2001. What was achieved was a change in ODA's policy goal end and means. ODA became focused on achieving poverty elimination in recipient countries, soundly focusing it on development outcomes – a policy goal end change. To achieve this outcome, the policy goal means also changed. Now ODA policymaking and delivery were given greater autonomy and authority in relation to non-development foreign policy, and tasked with working towards implementing global good ODA standards. This was a significant departure from the status quo.

In the description above, the reader can start to discern various actors, ideas and rules involved in the process towards change. As causal process tracing dictates, in the upcoming Chapter Six I apply the analytical framework to Chapter Five's description, and in doing so properly analyse the actors, ideas and rules engaged in change, and the interactions between them that culminated in the 2001 policy goal change decision. Chapter Six will clearly answer research questions one and two, for the first case.

Chapter Six: Analysing the 2001 Case

It took almost three years to arrive at Cabinet's decision to change ODA policy in 2001. Throughout this time period various actors with particular ideas used the power the rules gave them in attempts to both achieve and prevent this final decision. Chapter Five outlined the key steps along the route towards change, consistent with the requirements of causal process tracing. Here, Chapter Six applies the analytical framework to Chapter Five's description, answering research questions one and two by showing how ideas, actors and rules came together in a dynamic relationship to progress policy change.

Before embarking on this analysis, Table Five below summarises the precise actors, ideas and rules evident in the 2001 change process, laying a foundational assessment upon which to layer the more substantive one that follows.

Table Five: Actors, Ideas and Rules in 2001 ODA Policy Goal Change

	2001
Actors	
Societal	NGOs, political parties
Governmental	Political executive (ministers and Cabinet), professional executive
Individuals	For change: Pat Webster, David Shearer, ministers Against change: MFAT Secretary, Prime Minister
Groupings	For change: CID and NGOs, political parties, government
Ideas	
Interests overseas	For change: distant interests Against change: close interests
State action and social progress	For change: social justice, collective action, state intervention
ODA's desired outcome	For change: development Against change: flexible use for all foreign policy aims, including development
Engagement with global standards	For change: Used global standards to make case for change Against change: more concerned with ability to achieve broader foreign policy aims and best way to do this
ODA's authority and autonomy in relation to other foreign policy	For change: ODA to have greater authority and autonomy Against change: ODA to have less authority and autonomy
Learning/Evidence	For change: good ODA policy global standards, TEMR Against change: action underway, efficiency arguments
Rules (formal)	
ODA Legislation	ODA legislation's absence
Electoral	Three-year government term, MMP rules
Parliamentary	Select committee rules
Intra-governmental rules	Cabinet rules, ministerial relationships, political executive-professional executive relations, professional executive Code of Conduct, central agency legislation
Access to government from external actors	Number of access points: key decision-making points over ODA policy

Below I first discuss the rules that shaped the context within which actors functioned. I then outline who was involved in the pro-change network and the ideas they shared, followed by detailing the status quo defenders and their ideas.

A Web of Rules

This section discusses the formal rules that helped or hindered those driving change. Potentially, one could explore all the rules involved in every actor's behaviour: job descriptions, organisational procedures, overarching legislation. Here I describe only the formal rules most integral to policy change. I also highlight the lack of ODA legislation, as this rule absence had an impact on the policy goal change process.

Lacking Legislation

Constitional convention in New Zealand gives Cabinet the power to take action on international treaties, including a requirement to present some treaty actions to parliament for examination, particularly those related to multilateral and significant bilateral treaties (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 103). However, there are no international treaties governing ODA. While New Zealand has signed-up to international *agreements* involving ODA, such as those that established a target for ODA quantity, these have not been translated into domestic legislation and there is no requirement to do so. At no point in New Zealand's history has legislation been past specifically regarding ODA (besides parliament's annual approval of the government's budget).

This absence of legislation meant that Cabinet was the locus of decision-making power over ODA policymaking in 2001. If there had been ODA legislation in place, particularly legislation pertaining to policy quality, the Labour-Alliance government would have had to take their change proposals to parliament. This would have made the change more difficult and time-consuming, and potentially empower change opponents through a select committee process. I discuss this further below.

Electoral Rules

Electoral rules were central to the change process, particularly the basic rule of a three-year parliamentary term. A change in government was necessary for ODA policy change. Had the National Party won the 1999 general election they would have done nothing significant to the ODA programme (Rt. Hon. Sir Don McKinnon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 2014, Interview), and while New Zealand First had a policy manifesto commitment to review ODA (New Zealand First Party, 1999), it is unlikely they would have engaged in bargaining over ODA policy had the National Party entered coalition negotiations with New Zealand First to form a government, because ODA policy was not an important electoral issue.

The MMP aspect of the electoral rules also had significance for the change, but not in the most obvious way. Some argued that the change to ODA policy was simply a coalition deal, necessary for Labour to secure the support of the smaller Alliance Party so that a government could be formed. There is little evidence to support this argument, but enough to undermine it. In terms of the coalition deal, there were no deals on policy,

only agreements on principles for working processes (Boston, 2000, pp. 255-262, Duncan, 2015, p. 228). If there had been policy substance in the coalition agreement, it is highly unlikely ODA would have been important enough to include. As Hon. Matt Robson recalls,

> on aid, it wasn't a high priority to live or die for. Didn't mean that it wasn't important but it didn't figure in how we were going to form a government. That shows — if it had been an area of division, more struggling over me getting Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Hon. Matt Robson, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

Further, it was the Labour Party with a strong ODA election manifesto, so it was the more powerful government party partner that wished to review ODA policy. Given the Alliance's policy values on ODA and foreign affairs, which were similar to Labour's, Alliance Cabinet members would have been unlikely to disagree. Yet, the Alliance Party and their power in Cabinet became important at the final decision stage, as detailed below.

Parliamentary Rules

Due to the absence of ODA legislation, the main parliamentary role in the 2001 change was to scrutinise the executive. The parliamentary mechanisms that enable this include the select committee system, and parliamentary questions. A significant rule-setting that change advocates negotiated was that surrounding what type of review would occur. Individuals such as Webster and Shearer knew that to get change, the ODA review could not be a select committee review.

> What we knew was that when we got inside we didn't want a select committee review because they had done that under Jim Anderton [and Sonja Davies] in the past and that one ended-up being a rather large report that nothing happened to, because that's what Foreign Affairs do, is that they manage it. If they'd done it [the 2000-2001 ODA review] at the select committee, Foreign Affairs would have been the managing organisation, and so it would have done everything and then it would just disappear, and so we didn't want that, and so we had to be political about it. (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview)

Officials who appear before select committees are expected "to support ministerial accountability, and their conduct must be consistent with this principle. Therefore, at a minimum, they have an obligation to manage risks and apply a 'no surprises' approach

in briefing their Minister" (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 46). A select committee review would have found it difficult to learn from MFAT their internal weaknesses. Although, the committee would have requested submissions from interested parties who could have shared differing views.

Yet, there are other problems with a select committee review, in that they are predominantly about scrutinising the political and professional executive. In contrast, the ODA policy review was about enacting a political party's election manifesto now that the party had government power, so a select committee was not a good mechanism for this. For executive scruitiny, a select committee review is produced through a consensus process across the various party representatives that sit on the committee. This means sometimes recommendations are weak, and the government of the day does not have complete control over the process. Further, select committees only meet weekly, and there is always other business to be undertaken, meaning a review would take time. For example, the 1990 Inquiry into New Zealand's ODA took over two years to complete [launched in December 1997 with the report tabled in September 1999 (Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 1990)]. These were other reasons change advocates wanted to avoid a select committee review.

Intra-Governmental Rules

Cabinet

In New Zealand Cabinet makes decisions on significant policy issues, although most issues will have been subject to discussion at the appropriate Cabinet committee prior to arriving in Cabinet for final decision (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2011, p. 27). Generally a paper will be submitted to the Cabinet committee, in this case the ERD, that has been consulted upon across key government agencies, particularly the central agencies, and well-worked through within the professional executive. The Inter-Departmental Working Party ensured this occurred for the organisational arrangement changes to ODA policy, including exploring costs for various permutations. The Cabinet committees provide an opportunity for debate about varying views amongst ministers and the senior professional executive, and for residual issues to be identified for further work or resolved prior to the committee's recommendations going to Cabinet for the final decision.

For Prime Minister Clark, in her status quo defence, the rules prescribing her power and Cabinet decision-making came to the fore. Ultimately, the prime minister holds significant power, as she recommends to the Govenor-General who can become a minister (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 19). Yet, she must also maintain the confidence of her colleagues (Prebble and Ladley, 2010) to be able to maintain her position. Regularly dictating decisions and not listening to others' arguments would quickly lead to unease within Cabinet, and make government unstable. "Prime Ministers can only govern with and through Cabinet" (McLeay, 2010, p. 202), meaning there were checks and balances on Prime Minister Clark's power.

Rules about how Cabinet functions also involve an interplay with the electoral rules. MMP created the context within which the 1999 Cabinet was formed, and therefore the ongoing balance of power between the two parties in Cabinet. While the Labour Party needed the Alliance Party to maintain government, the Alliance knew that if they brought down the government they risked loosing their ability to make policy. As Hon. Anderton reflected, "you're in the government, work away and strengthen our position there. We're getting what we want. How would we get that being in opposition protesting on the street." (Hon. Jim Anderton, former Alliance Leader and Deputy Prime Minister, December 2014, Interview). The Alliance were the smaller party in the Cabinet, so if any issue ever arrived at a vote, unless they had convinced the right people and enough people in the Labour caucus, they would not win. Again, Hon. Anderton puts it succinctly,

> I mean we couldn't get everything we wanted just because we were coalition partners… We've got four and they've got 16… The last thing you need around the Cabinet table is a bloody vote. I call for a vote and I loose it, and what then. It's gone… I don't want a vote. I want to persuade them, in the end, to agree." (Hon. Jim Anderton, former Alliance Leader and Deputy Prime Minister, December 2014, Interview)

Ultimately, for the ODA policy changes, the Alliance decided that while they could not get the separate ODA agency, they could argue for a compromise approach in the semi-autonomous body. Robson put this forward, supported by Anderton and the Alliance caucus. Although this was a compromise, they still expended some political capital to do this, given the Prime Minister's opposition. However, the Alliance would not have done this if they believed other Labour Party Cabinet members did not support them.

Labour Ministers Goff, Mallard and Cullen were supportive, and the change could not have occurred without this support. For the change to occur, both parties needed each other.

Ministers and Associates

For ministers, the rules of their roles gave them great power, but not unmitigated. Even with some MMP adatptations (Duncan, 2015, p. 229), ministers are generally subject to the fundamental Cabinet rules of collective responsibility, and accountability to parliament for their actions and their ministry's (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 20, p. 37, p. 35). This meant that Ministers Goff and Robson had to be certain the ODA policy changes they argued for in Cabinet were well-justified.

The overarching control of a portfolio is with the principal, portfolio minister, in this case Minister Goff. When an associate is appointed, their role, delegated responsibilities and working arrangements are stipulated in a letter from the principal minister, written in consultation with the prime minister. An associate ministers' role is to "assist portfolio Ministers to carry out the tasks relating to their portfolios" (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 22), and avoid taking initiatives or making public statements without the principal Minister's knowledge and approval. Associate ministers are able to submit Cabinet or Cabinet committee papers, but this must be done with the agreement of the principal minister (Cabinet Office, 2008, pp. 22-23). These rules highlight how Robson and Goff needed to work closely together on ODA policy change, and how Minister Goff's agreement was important for change to occur: Associate Robson could not have done it alone.

In terms of the actual ODA ministerial review, ministers are able to implement a non-statutory inquiry or review for specific purposes (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 60). Ministerial reviews signal a desire for action, because the highest authority responsible to parliament and Cabinet for the particular portfolio leads the review. This is in contrast with a select committee review, as detailed above. Hon. Goff outlines some of the thinking associated with the decision to undertake a Ministerial Review in 2000.

> We'd made the decision. We thought that there should be change. And the quickest and the most effective way of doing that we thought was setting up a group that was independent of MFAT so that we'd have a distinct view rather than a vested interest view, and then we could look at the recommendations… And so, the normal way that

we would do that, if we wanted to make change would be simply to do a, to set-up a ministerial review rather than one through the select committee. The select committee is a way of, 'well, we'll have a talk about this but we might or might not decide to do anything about it'. (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

Also part of the political executive, political advisors such as David Shearer have few formal rules prescribing their roles beyond their employment contract (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010, p. 116), although they are subject to the professional executive's Code of Conduct (Shaw, 2015, pp. 434-435). The New Zealand Cabinet Manual outlines political advisors' "important role in supporting Ministers to manage relationships with other political parties, to manage risk, and to negotiate support for policy and legislative initiatives" (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 40). Ministers can utilise political advisors in various work undertaken in the department, including policy development, and this is what Shearer was tasked to do. In doing so, Shearer, as a member of the political executive, also had to also be aware of the rules surrounding the relationship between the political and professional executives.

Political and Professional Executive

For all actors, but for those in government particularly, legislation set parameters for their actions, such as the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finances Act 1989. These two Acts are backbone legislation for how New Zealand government functions, and shape the roles of Treasury and the State Services Commission. These formal rules give greater power to the central SSC and Treasury, as well as their ministers around the Cabinet table. The DPMC derives power from their role serving the prime minister and Cabinet, and generally coordinating oversight for all government decision-making (McLeay, 2010, p. 201). Hence the role Ministers Cullen and Mallard, and their agencies, played in the final ODA policy change decisions, and the importance of the advice from these agencies for Ministers Goff and Robson.

The State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989 also govern the relationship between ministers and the public service, although convention plays a role too (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 37). Ministers determine and promote policy, defend policy decisions, and are answerable to the House for their department's policy and operational matters. In turn, the professional executive supports their minister in implementing their

ministerial functions, develops and implements policy and strategy, and implements the government's decisions (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 37).

The professional executive is expected to function with political neutrality, and to be fair, impartial, responsible and trustworthy (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 44). State sector employees must maintain their minister's confidence, and that of future ministers, and so must behave in a manner that ensures this, predominantly through impartial conduct. "Advice given to Ministers must be honest, impartial, and comprehensive. It must also reflect the priorities determined by the government of the day" (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 45). These are the rules that shaped MFAT's ability to act to protect the status quo in 2001, particularly Secretary Walter.

Also for a public service department's chief executive, or secretary in MFAT's case, are further rules outlining their role as the primary point of contact between their minister(s) and their department (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 37), including a performance agreement with their minister (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 38). While there is space in the rules for the relationship between the Ministers and MFAT to evolve, particularly senior MFAT staff such as Secretary Walter, (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 39`), their relationship is bound by the basic principle of 'no surprises'. This rule is in place to ensure the minister is promptly updated on significant issues, especially where these might be contentious or enter the public debate (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 39`).

As MFAT Secretary, Walter was the lead MFAT public servant, responsible for his department's activities, management, and general conduct, as well as offering advice to ministers (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 37`). His role was to support Minister Goff and Associate Robson to undertake their ministerial functions, shape and implement their policy and strategy, and implement government decisions (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 37). In doing this, the Secretary needed to provide free and frank advice to the Minister, but also "reflect the priorities determined by the government of the day" (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 45`).

In his efforts to defend the status quo, MFAT Secretary was also bound by the State Sector 'Standards of Integrity and Conduct'. These standards sitpulate that the professional executive must act fairly, impartially, responsibly and with trustworthiness (State Services Commission, 2007), "unaffected by personal beliefs" (State Services

Commission, 2007). Public servants are expected to offer stout and neutral advice, respecting the current government's authority (State Services Commission, 2007). In fact, political neutrality is the foundation of the New Zealand state sector (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 44`). Secretary Walter, and his staff, needed to behave in ways that ensured MFAT "maintain[ed] the confidence of its current Minister and of future Ministers" (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 44`).

In opposing the TEMR's organisational arrangement recommendation, Secretary Walter walked a careful line between providing neutral, free and frank advice, and opposing his Ministers' desired policy directions. Secretary Walter believed that the desire to separate out ODA from non-development foreign policy would be a mistake, and limit ministers' abilities to achieve New Zealand's interests overseas. He also had a duty to protect his staff, and to this end communicated with the State Services Commissioner about the TEMR process (MFAT File, 6 May 2001). The evidence I collected highlighted how the Secretary communicated his actions to Minister Goff, such as copying Goff in on the letter to the State Services Commissioner. Secretary Walter requested Minister Goff allow him to write a paper for ERD, outlining his argument against making the changes, and that he be able to make the final appointment decision for the new Executive Director of the semi-autonomous ODA Programme. Overall, Secretary Walter conformed to the rules, although he pushed them close to their limits.

Societal and Governmental Actors

There are few formal rules in New Zealand prescribing how societal actors engage with governmental actors, and vice versa. Due to its inclusion of actors across government and society, the pro-change network had to negotiate their relationships across societal and governmental rules. This was particularly so in relation to information-sharing: what internal government information could be shared externally, and who had the authority to do it. Overall, the various actors were well-aware of these rules, and negotiated them carefully.

> It is a matter of being savvy and respecting roles, and everyone always expected that you would do that. In fact, there was never any pressure from those outside of the system to go beyond what they [those inside the system] were comfortable with or what was appropriate. But there were ways of having conversations around bigger issues or approaches or information sharing which at the same time respected the

boundaries – that sense of the rules and the boundaries was also there. It is a delicate process and you have to respect the integrity of others and just be mindful. Because if not, then the whole dialogue could be undermined or dismissed or people's positions compromised and life becomes difficult. (Don Clarke, former NGO representative and professional executive, December 2014, Interview)

It appears that those in government were wary of the rules, and what information could be shared and what could not, while those outside respected that.

In promoting change, societal actors also had to contend with the way rules allocated power over ODA policy across government. Prior to 2001, MFAT was the sole agency responsible for ODA policy, providing one key access point for societal actors. An associate minister had taken responsibility for ODA policy in previous years and this remained the case during the change process. Yet, the minister of foreign affairs had overall responsibility. Alongside the three central agencies, this meant that there were potentially four ministers and the prime minister who had significant power over ODA policy goal decisions. CID and member NGOs, and any other societal actor wishing to influence the change process, needed to access as many of these as possible. For resource-poor organisations, that presented a challenge, ameliorated significantly by Pat Webster's involvement in the Labour Party, and the shared policy values between NGOs and the Labour-Alliance government.

Summary

What the above details is a web of rules various actors had to work amongst to advance or prevent change. Different rules shaped different actors' actions. For example, CID and NGOs had to consider where the power lay over ODA policy decisions within government, while governmental actors' behaviour was shaped by multiple formal rules. Within government, rules are situated within rules, at times melding together to mould actors' power. One such example is Prime Minister Clark's appointment of the Ministers to their portfolios, giving her great power within Cabinet. Yet the electoral rules influenced Cabinet's composition, and therefore shaped constraints upon Prime Minister Clark's power. While the rules established the context actors need to negotiate, actors were not fully constrained by rules – individuals who knew the rules also worked to avoid them, such as Pat Webster, David Shearer and the Ministers, who ensured the ODA policy review did not fall to the select committee. Both those advancing change

and defending the status quo had to work within the same overall rule set. In the next section I focus on the pro-change network of actors, describing who they were and what ideas they had.

A Pro-Change Network

Over the three years it took to achieve ODA policy change a pro-change network developed. Initially action was most evident amongst societal actors, but as the change process continued government actors took the lead. Individuals stand out as active in the change process. Without the individuals, change was unlikely. Yet, the individuals also needed the networks they were connected to.

Individuals

CID's Pat Webster was a pivotal individual in the change process, particularly early in the agenda-setting stage, although she also played a role in achieving the final decision. Webster did not join CID from a career in international development, but she had a history of working on social justice issues and she quickly learned about ODA. Webster realised it was important to focus on ODA quality, and that any work in this area would be political: campaigning on government policy was "political stuff, and unless you engage in the structural politics of it all, then you'll never get anywhere" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview). Her knowledge of how to manoeuvre in politics, and her active engagement in politics, were essential attributes.

To advance ODA policy change, Webster needed the authority her role as Executive Director of an NGO umbrella agency bestowed upon her. New Zealand international development NGOs had credibility and political power, through their long-term presence, and their financial and voluntary support from a large portion of New Zealand society. For example, in a 2002 survey, the 60 CID members who responded had 107,338 regular donors and 72 per cent of their combined NZ$88 million came from the New Zealand public (Council for International Development, 2003, pp. 10-11). Many of these NGOs also had links internationally, enabling them to learn about the latest global thinking from affiliates overseas and from programmatic learning on the ground in developing countries. Collectively organised as CID, they were an important constituency.

While Webster needed CID to advance policy change, CID needed Webster. No CID Executive Director previously had shaped such a political campaign, and had the capability and connections to advance it. "Definitely the NGOs were very much pushing for, and CID was, the head of CID, it was Pat Webster at the time. She was a member of the Labour Party so she was really behind, shepherding it through and everything" (David Shearer, former political advisor, December 2014, Interview). Webster's role in the Labour Party was also a critical part of the change process.

Although Webster had left her Labour Party leadership role when she joined CID, she remained active in the party. "So my understanding about how it got to become policy is because of Pat. Pat fought for that to go into the Labour Party policy…" (Interview 11, November 2014, private sector). "Pat Webster was a critical person in that process. She had been Executive Director of CID, and was very active in the Labour Party. She was connected and part of the policymaking machinery" (Phil Twyford, former NGO representative, April 2014, Interview).

> Key people – Pat Webster. She is probably the principal person because she was right there, as a Labour Party activist, but involved as the Executive Director of CID. I suspect that she was a key, if not *the* key figure, who was not a professional politician but saw that the way to make change was to get the party to agree to a review, and take it from there. And of course she knew enough about how the aid programme was going and if you get the right reviewer you get the result you want. And I think they started work on that in the early 1990s, but certainly by the mid-1990s they were working on that. (Peter Adams, former Executive Director NZAID, April 2014, Interview)

Webster was a pivotal individual, but was not alone. Even she acknowledges that while she "played a big role in this, others did too" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview). These other people included individuals who had been active in New Zealand's international development NGO sector for many years, some dating back to CORSO, who were informerly involved in discussions along the way. For example, Don Clarke who had formerly been head of CID and worked in the ODA Programme, and Kevin Clark and Marion Quinn who had both worked in the New Zealand international community for many years, including for the ODA Programme. Those with more formal involvement included David Cuthbert who was the Alliance

Party's senior policy advisor and caucus secretary, and Graham Kelly, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Once progress moved from the agenda-setting stage to policy formulation inside government, Webster's influence waned as a societal actor and governmental actors took over. Yet, Webster stayed with governmental actors as they progressed the case for change. "So in the end it was David Shearer, Graham Kelly, David Cuthbert and myself" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview).

Within government, David Shearer, Minister Phil Goff's political advisor, was a central individual. Shearer acted as a facilitator, supporting Associate Minister Robson, ensuring coordination between Minister Goff's and Robson's offices, and liaison with MFAT. Shearer's previous work in humanitarian situations gave him credibility, but also connections to the wider international development community. He built relationships with individuals, such as Pat Webster, and consulted them at points throughout the process. In liaison with Robson and Goff, Shearer chose the consultants and coordinated their work, and steered the TEMR report through the internal policy formulation and decision-making stages. As the decision loomed, Shearer lobbied for the changes within government and the Cabinet. "Without David we couldn't have done it" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014, Interview). "And David Shearer had a big part to play in it" (private sector, November 2014, Interview 11).

The two individuals employed to conduct the TEMR were also important individual actors, connected to this broader network. Both these individuals had a long-term engagement with international development, including with NGOs. Annette Lees had worked with NGOs the Maruia Society and Conservation International, and had sat on the ODA Programme's Voluntary Agency Support Scheme Project Selection Committee (Development Resource Centre and Council for International Development, 1997, p. 2, Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development, 1990, Appendix 4). Joseph Grossman was an economist who had worked for the ODA Programme and been involved in Oxfam New Zealand, as well as being involved with the Voluntary Agency Support Scheme. Both were firm believers in ODA's value and potential contribution to development in poorer countries. As they state in the TEMR, "New Zealand has an international obligation to contribute" due to its wealth and OECD membership (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 14). "They were highly respected in the sector and had been around for a while" (Pat Webster, former CID Executive Director, April 2014,

Interview). These two individuals made the case for change, which was used within government in policy formulation and decision-making.

Ministers Goff and Robson were key to the final decision, as without their support the changes would never have been put to the ERD and Cabinet. Ministers Cullen and Mallard, the Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister and Alliance leader, Jim Anderton, were also important individuals in the decision-making process, essentially making the final decision and agreeing to compromise. Here, Webster's influence returns, as she contributed to persuading Minister Mallard of the merits of creating a semi-autonomous body, although he was attempting to consolidate the state sector. While Associate Minister Robson wanted to make significant changes to the ODA Programme, Minister Goff vacillated at one point.

> Phil was agreed, but at the time was also weighing it up as a political exercise, because he said, you know, in a way you create an enormous amount of, enormous problem with the Ministry for not much gain in the public… So he was sort of a little bit reticent. But in the end… he saw it through. (David Shearer, former political advisor, December 2014, Interview)

Also key here was SSC's and Treasury's involvement, and advice that a semi-autonomous body would not cost a great deal more, would be more accountable, and did not have any significant machinery of government issues. This was crucial information for Ministers Goff, Cullen and Mallard. As Hon. Goff reflected, "but, you know, it wouldn't have happened if the advice from all of those agencies had been, 'this is not a good thing to do and this is going to have some pretty awful outcomes'" (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview). Collectively, these Ministers, plus Associate Robson and his Alliance Cabinet colleagues, were enough to persuade the Prime Minister Clark that a compromise was a satisfactory outcome. While all these individuals and agencies played their important roles along the way, without Pat Webster and David Shearer, the ODA change would not have made it to the Cabinet table.

More than Individuals: A Network

All these individuals were connected in a network spanning society and government. Webster, Shearer, Grossman, and Lees, as well as Cuthburt and Robson, were all associated with NGOs, and had engaged with NGOs and international development

efforts over long time periods. Webster's affiliation with the Labour Party linked her, and therefore NGOs, to Labour parliamentarians, such as Kelly, and Ministers Goff, Mallard and Cullen. With the likely exception of Treasury and the SSC, who were effectively external, objective bystanders who assessed the changes on financial and performance criteria, what held these actors together through the process of advancing policy change were shared ideas.

An Ideas-Based Network

Human Progress, Distant Interests

Policy values underpinning the pro-change network were those about social change and human progress within the nation state, and about New Zealand's interests overseas. This group of people emphasised social justice, inclusion, and human rights as the goal of efforts to progress the state of humanity, and were happy for states to act to ensure nobody was excluded from the benefits of progress. CID members prioritised "people and earth centred economic development and [were] against trade liberalisation and structural adjustment agendas which pay scant regard to human, social and environmental rights" (Council for International Development, 2001b, p. 6, item 3.4). While the Labour Party was a supporter of global free trade, it also acknowledged that a free market did not always achieve social progress, and there is a role for the state. The Labour Party viewed ODA "as a critical role in terms of international social justice. Labour is about social justice and fairness" (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview), ideas that were also shared by the Alliance. As Ministers Goff and Robson articulated in their Cabinet papers, "[t]he outcome of the review provides the opportunity to ensure that the ODA programme is reflecting the Government's values in regard to sustainable economic and social development, human rights and civil society" (Cabinet Office, 2001b, p. 4). These policy values were associated with ideas about how New Zealand should project itself on the global stage, as well as policy goal ideas about how ODA should contribute to another country's development.

The pro-change network believed that while New Zealand's close interests were legitimate, ODA should be focused on development outcomes to achieve New Zealand's distant interests. The TEMR report expresses this perspective well.

Developed countries like New Zealand benefit from a more prosperous world that overseas development assistance can assist in achieving. Equitable development is fundamental to achieving peace and security. Aid that leads to prosperity can ameliorate global issues that make all nations insecure: armed conflict, refugees, health epidemics, plant and animal diseases, international crime, and global environmental problems… This growing interdependence and interconnectedness of the modern world well illustrates issues of globalisation which in turn accentuate the need for development assistance. (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 14)

From prioritising distant interests emerge policy goal ideas about what ODA should be spent to achieve, and how.

Distinctly Development

Change proponents acknowledged a relationship between ODA and other foreign policy areas, but believed that ODA's sole focus should be on development outcomes to serve New Zealand's distant interests. They believed that the tension between New Zealand's close and distant interests meant that longer-term development outcomes gained less priority within MFAT than short-term non-development foreign policy outcomes. This meant that ODA was not always focused on the most efficient or effective development activities.

So while some progress was being made, fundamental weaknesses remained in DEV's arrangements [ODA Programme]. By this I mean DEV was a unit within foreign affairs, with very little specialist development expertise. It had little dedication to core development principles. New Zealand's aid [ODA] was politicised. It was a slush fund for diplomats. It was seen primarily as a tool of New Zealand's foreign policy to curry favour, make friends and grease the wheels of diplomacy. (Phil Twyford, former NGO representative, April 2014, Interview)

The pro-change network believed ODA should be spent only to achieve development, through poverty reduction. CID members envisaged development as action that enhanced "[t]he dignity and empowerment of poor communities everywhere through collective action by members" (Council for International Development, 1998, p. 8), and believed that "the ultimate test of development policies is their long term effect on the lives of the poorest sectors of society, especially women and children" (Council for International Development, 1998, p. 6). They argued that a focus on poverty ensured ODA assisted the most vulnerable. Human rights, gender and environmental resource

use were also important factors to consider in all ODA efforts. Development was seen as a complex activity, that required specific knowledge and skills, and preferably experience. "Development is an uncertain and complex business. It is multidimensional, interfacing with politics, trade, environment, culture, social conditions, history, geography, personalities, conflict, disasters and windfalls" (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 25).

For the pro-change network, seriously using ODA to achieve development outcomes required a commitment to using ODA well, aiming for good practice, through nurturing relationships with recipient countries, and at times having to challenge recipient governments on their human rights records (which does not necessarily advance New Zealand's close interests). Core development principles held amongst the pro-change network included viewing development as a long-term process, facilitated through participatory, partnership-based relationships, country contextual analysis, and country ownership.

As well as aiming for the best quality ODA, the pro-change network believed greater authority and autonomy for ODA policy within MFAT was necessary. They believed that under the current arrangements development outcomes from ODA were not systematically prioritised throughout MFAT. What was necessary was "a complete and utter change in culture" (David Shearer, former political advisor, December 2014, Interview), and an entity with greater autonomy "was the only way that we were going to get a change in culture" (David Shearer, former political advisor, December 2014, Interview). Some from the wider network were ambivalent or unsure about the semi-autonomous body, when the change was announced, and one questioned the basis for organisational arrangement change (McKinnon, 2002). Yet overall, change proponents wanted the ODA Programme to aim for 'best practice' in achieving development, and have the authority and autonomy to do so in relation to non-development foreign policy. Due to these requirements, the pro-change network, particularly the core circle of individuals, was supportive of a separate or semi-autonomous body for ODA's management within government.

A Role for Learning and Evidence?

Change proponents' case for change was based on evidence from past learning and evolving global ODA standards for good practice. NGOs commissioned the 'Partners in

a Common Future' research, which assessed the New Zealand ODA Programme against global learning about ODA's contribution to development and good practice standards, as did the the TEMR. This global good practice was established through the pre-eminent global international development entities, particularly the DAC, the World Bank and the United Nations. The TEMR used evidence from other donor countries to argue that stand-alone or semi-autonomous ODA agencies were not unusual, such as Australia and the United Kingdom. The Inter-Departmental Working Group on ODA's organisational arrangements took the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) as their starting point in considering new organisational arrangements for New Zealand's ODA (Cabinet Office, 2001c, p. 5). What these international ideas did was reassure decision makers that "the ideas weren't bizarre, the ideas were reasonably sound" (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview), "and that [a stand-alone or semi-autonomous ODA Programme] was, from the international perspective, was pretty standard, wasn't way off the planet" (David Cuthbert, Alliance Caucus Secretary and Senior Advisor, December 2014, Interview). As Hon. Goff stated, "what was recommended was in line with international aid principles and good practice, and you only had to look across the Tasman" (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview).

Or Was it All Just About the Money?

There are other potential arguments for why the pro-change network advanced ODA policy alterations. In particular, NGOs and individual consultants may have desired greater access to the ODA budget. Shaping ODA policy to their desires could have enhanced their access. There is little evidence to support this argument. The individual consultants involved had gained work over the course of several years, and their arguments in the TEMR to use ODA to support local capacity potentially undermined their opportunities to gain contracts (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p. 25, 35), as did their criticism of MFAT's ODA Programme, for which they had previously worked for.

For NGOs, of course gaining access to funds to do their work motivated them. Objectives in the 1997-2000 CID Strategic Plan were to advocate for New Zealand ODA to reach 0.7 percent of GNI, and also to increase ODA funding to NGOs (Council for International Development, 1998, p. 9). CID itself received a large proportion of its funding from the ODA Programme. Yet, overall, New Zealand NGOs raised a significant amount of their own funding. For example, in 1996-1997, the six largest

users of the ODA Programme Voluntary Agency Support Scheme raised NZ$40 million dollars (up from NZ$15 million in 1986-1987) (Clark et al., 1998, p. 49). Further, in relation to government funding, NGOs had received increasing amounts of funding from the ODA Programme throughout the 1990s, with the latest increase in the 1999 general election year, boosting the absolute amount New Zealand NGOs received through the Voluntary Agency Support Scheme from NZ$3.5 million in 1995-1996 to NZ$6.7 million in 1997-1998 (Clark et al., 1998, p. 53)(Nowland-Foreman et al, 1998, p. 53) to NZ$8 million in 1999-2000 (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-34). NGOs also received funds from elsewhere in the ODA Programme, and this funding had increased at an even faster rate, "represent[ing] an estimated expenditure of about $8 million (up from $3.8 million in 1993/94)" (Clark et al., 1998, p. 53) in 1998. NGOs and CID had no need to change ODA policy to receive more government funding: it was already increasing.

Who Defended the Status Quo?

MFAT was the most obvious opponent to the changes to ODA's organisational arrangements, although the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, took the same view as MFAT. Opposition political parties had paid little attention to ODA policy in their manifestos. The National Party, in opposition after nine years governing until 1999, were unlikely to view ODA policy as a policy area that would score them significant points against the new Labour-Alliance government, given ODA's low public salience. Further, former Foreign Affairs Minister Don McKinnon became Commonwealth Secretary-General in 2000, with his former Associate, Simon Upton leaving in 2001 to the OECD. Another actor grouping that could have been expected to oppose the changes was the New Zealand private sector, yet they were generally absent. I discuss this below, before turning to a discussion of the Prime Minister's and MFAT's opposition.

An Absent Private Sector

In the late 2000s, the private sector had experienced nine years of active engagement with ODA delivery and could potentially experience significant losses if ODA policy changed. For example, an MFAT study in 1995 found that for every NZ$100 spent in ODA, NZ$77 worth of business was generated for New Zealand entities (McKinnon, October 1995, p. 1) (Also see p. 117 for MFAT's estimated return to the New Zealand economy from ODA.) Yet there is no evidence to suggest the private sector acted as a

collective voice in the agenda-setting, policy formulation or decision-making elements of the ODA policy change. Several private sector actors did engage in the TEMR, submitting 11 per cent of TEMR written submissions and comprising 21 per cent of attendees at public consultations (Grossman and Lees, 2001, pp. 122-125). These efforts only involved input into the TEMR, not active engagement in the process of advancing or preventing change. It is not clear why a significant number of businesses did not engage more in the ODA change process. It is not feasible that they did not know about it — the TEMR was announced with a press release, widely discussed, took a long time, and several private sector entities made submissions. One reasonable explanation could be because the majority of businesses were simply focused on getting on with their core business, and the ODA Programme was merely another client and they had no interest in working to support or oppose policy changes. Those private sector entities that did engage were the types of firms that saw themselves as international development firms, and may have had preferences they wished to convey about the ODA Programme's policy settings.

Another explanation could be that the private sector as a whole was not particularly organised. Collective entities did exist, such as the New Zealand-Fiji Business Council, the New Zealand-Papua New Guinea Business Council, and the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, but as one interviewee stated

> it is absolute anarchy out there on the right. People don't usually want to collaborate, if collaboration occurs it normally occurs because there is either a big problem or there is a coincidence… And even something like the Chambers of Commerce or BusinessNZ is not fully representative of the New Zealand business community. (private sector representative, November 2014, Interview 15)

This fact, mixed with the probable low priority most private sector actors gave to international development, is the most plausible reason why the private sector was not organised or overly active in opposing the 2001 changes to the ODA Programme.

Opposition from the Top

Prime Minister Helen Clark opposed the organisational arrangement changes, particularly the stand-alone agency. Clark's opposition is not well-documented, although several interviewees commented on her preference for ODA to assist in achieving New Zealand's close interests. "Helen Clark was not in favour. She did not

want to have a split foreign affairs. She saw aid as being very much a tool of foreign affairs" (David Shearer, former political advisor, December 2014, Interview). Her opposition could have arisen from the Labour-Alliance government's government consolidation programme, called 'A Review of the Centre'. This stock-take aimed to build a state sector that was more cohesive and less fragmented, rather than creating new agencies (Beuselinck and Renard, 2008a, p. 14, Shaw, 2010, p. 250). The idea to establish a separate or semi-autonomous body went against this drive. However, the SSC and their Minister were convinced to put aside the consolidation process in this case. So this was a less likely reason for Clark's opposition, leaving her most likely concern as the desire to keep ODA closely integrated with non-development foreign policy. She would have been able to exert her position through the organisational arrangement Inter-Departmental Working Party process, with the DPMC representative, Mary-Anne Thompson, leading it. As discussed earlier, while the Prime Minister Clark held significant power, in this case it was counter-balanced by others in Cabinet, highlighted by the fact she eventually agreed to a compromise. There is no evidence the Prime Minister or her office worked in any coherent way with MFAT in their opposition to the organisational arrangement changes. This would have been inappropriate, overtly breaking rules at the highest government levels, and therefore very unlikely.

MFAT

MFAT opposition to the organisational arrangement changes mobilised as MFAT staff began to hear the TEMR consultants were exploring separating ODA out from MFAT. The MFAT Secretary, Neil Walter, represented the Ministry and was the key individual acting to prevent the organisational arrangement changes. He did everything within his power, and even behaved unusually by writing a letter to the editor after the decision was made (Schwass and Norman, 2006, p. 6). Secretary Walter gathered feedback from staff and used this in his paper to the ERD Cabinet Committee (MFAT File, 13 August 2001, Annex 1, pp. 1-4) presenting a different perspective from the TEMR recommendations and his Minister. When it was obvious Secretary Walter could not prevent the organisational arrangement changes, he requested to be on the interview panel for the new NZAID Executive Director and have the final say about who would run this new semi-autonomous ODA Programme. Other MFAT senior staff also supported the Secretary's efforts, such as Deputy-Secretarys John Larkindale (Schwass and Norman, 2006, p. 6) and Gordon Shroff.

Motivating Ideas: Close, Control

What MFAT fought against were the organisational arrangement changes to give ODA greater autonomy and authority in relation to non-development foreign policy. MFAT's opposition to the organisational arrangement changes centred on efficiency concerns and flaws in the TEMR approach, in that the TEMR consultants had a pre-set agenda and over-stated the negative. Yet, there may be other reasons for MFAT's opposition, which I outline below. First, I address the criticisms of the TEMR approach.

MFAT expressed concern that the TEMR methodology was flawed, including use of the Advanced Dynamics document assessing MFAT. Yet, MFAT did not dispute thirteen of the fifteen TEMR recommendations, embracing the policy recommendations. MFAT noted that "[i]n the most part, the policy recommendations reflected mainstream international development theory, drawing on discussions already underway in New Zealand, the OECD, ADB, UN and World Bank, as well as regional organisations. In this sense there were not any startling recommendations to come out of the review" (MFAT File, 26 July 2001, p. 3, para. 8). In terms of Advanced Dynamic's assessment of MFAT, the dispute was over the use of the information, not the substance of the information itself. I have found no evidence that MFAT argued against Advanced Dynamic's assessment. While the TEMR included selective, unreferenced quotes from the Advanced Dynamic's document (Advanced Dynamics and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2000, Grossman and Lees, 2001, pp. 83-84), the information did indicate that MFAT had cultural issues that required addressing, and which the TEMR consultants deemed inappropriate for an effective ODA Programme. This point was not disputed.

The selective use of Advanced Dynamic's information does give weight to the argument that the TEMR consultants were attempting to present the ODA Programme in an overly negative light, to achieve the pre-conceived end-result of a separate ODA agency. However, the Advanced Dynamic's information formed a minor part of the report. When this information is excluded, the TEMR report still paints a picture of an ODA Programme that falls short when measured against international good practice of the time. Yet, others also argued the report was overly negative (McKinnon, 2002) and did not give credit for the positive, albeit incremental, change that had occurred in the ODA Programme. It is likely that the TEMR consultants wished to provide a powerful report and stringently applied global standards to make a strong case for change.

There is the potential that the TEMR simply did not convince MFAT of the need for change. "As you know, I take the view that **the consultants have failed to make the case for changing the current arrangement**…" (MFAT File, 13 August 2001, p. 5, para. 15, bold in original). This is a plausible explanation, although that the reviewers did not make the case for change is an easy argument to make, particularly alongside expressing concerns about the TEMR consultants' approach. Further, many others were convinced by the report, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Ideas about power and control over ODA may well have sat beneath the other ideas MFAT put forward against the changes, linked to policy values and goal ideas about New Zealand's interests overseas and ODA's role in achieving them. The ODA Programme comprised a large portion of MFAT's budget, and MFAT staff were used to being able to use it to serve New Zealand's interests flexibly. There was a perspective that "aid was a tool for foreign policy and aid monies should be available for things like sweetening trade agreements, and so on" (Peter Adams, former Executive Director NZAID, April 2014, Interview). This was what the TEMR took issue with, and why it recommended greater authority and autonomy for ODA. For MFAT to voice concerns that they wanted to maintain control over the ODA Programme to be able to use ODA as required across all foreign policy goals would have supported what the TEMR found, and what many change proponents thought, and therefore strengthened the reason for change. Therefore, if MFAT wanted to maintain control over the ODA budget to be used as the moment saw fit, MFAT could not portray these ideas clearly at the time, because the TEMR had denigrated this perspective. Evidence that this perspective may have been present in 2001 comes from the Waring Ministerial Review – a 2005 ministerial review into NZAID's progress, which included excerpts from MFAT comments submitted for the review. The extended excerpts below broadly canvass the possible concerns MFAT had in 2001 regarding the loss of control over ODA created by giving ODA greater autonomy and authority vis-à-vis other foreign policy areas.

> The creation of NZAID and the terms of its mandate have left a gap. MFAT's ability to use NZODA as one of its diplomatic tools has been made conditional on NZAID concurrence. NZAID concurrence is not always forthcoming, and nor should it be, given the terms of NZAID's mandate. (Waring, 2005, p. 63)

Turning to FTA negotiations, NZ policies which would provide balanced outcomes, but which require contributions from NZODA, are difficult to achieve. A classic option would be the provision of technical assistance to a developing country's dairy industry, in the context of seeking an FTA with improved access for New Zealand dairy products to the developing country concerned. As MFAT has no development funds under its own control, such assistance is only available if NZAID gives it priority, which so far it has not. (Waring, 2005, p.63)

NZAID involves the New Zealand private sector in NZODA activities, e.g. through consultancies. MFAT considers, nevertheless, that the extent and quality of such engagement needs further development and resolution [sic] Specifically, MFAT has suggested that NZAID should engage in regular and ongoing consultations with the NZ private sector, and the recipient country, to see where NZODA funds could be spent in such a way as to encourage enhanced NZ investment/business interest, with ultimate benefit both to the recipient country and to NZ business. NZAID, however, sees this as inappropriate and often unhelpful. It can distort private sector decisions, leading to unprofitable and hence unsustainable businesses, and the benefits can be captured by a small number of private interests. The issue is unresolved. (Waring, 2005, p. 63)

These issues relate to MFAT's emphasis on close interests, with lesser attention to distant interests, and also to policy goal ideas about what ODA should achieve and how.

Underlying MFAT's desire to use ODA flexibly to advance New Zealand's interests are ideas about what New Zealand's priority interests are overseas, which then translate into policy goal ideas. MFAT appeared to hold the perspective that it was important to have flexibility in ODA policy, so that if necessary ODA could be subject to more important, close interests, such as relationships with another country, geopolitical imperatives or trade requirements. MFAT Deputy Secretary, John Larkindale, articulated the hand-in-glove nature of development and non-development foreign policy. "'In New Zealand, where (financial) resources are scarce and you haven't got much in the way of diplomatic tools, it doesn't make sense to essentially cut off one of your arms when the potential gains don't make up for the losses'" (Schwass and Norman, 2006, p. 7). Providing ODA also boosts New Zealand's reputation as a 'good friend' to another country, one that tries to help. This can win favours in return.

It occurred to us during the last visit that it would be useful to be able to do a little more in the region than just talk, lobby and look, especially as there is much genuine goodwill in the region towards New Zealand that translates from time to time into concrete support for our positions in international fora on some issues and candidatures. In this respect a small HOMF [Head of Mission Fund, funded from ODA] would be a very useful tool for us in terms of putting a little more into the relationships and perhaps getting some public mileage as well. (MFAT File, 13 August 1999, p. 1).

These contributions are also useful in the realpolitik aspects of foreign relations, when votes or negotiating chips are required. For example, during New Zealand's temporary Security Council seat campaign

in 1993, I [Rt. Hon. Sir McKinnon] realised then that, everywhere I was going, people were saying 'well, what are you doing for us or giving us in return?', and I'd look at our aid programme and think 'hell, that looks a bit mean, you know'. Concurrently, I realised, if New Zealand is wanting to seek these international positions, which obviously later on we were, you have to have been seen to be very global in the aid programme. (Rt. Hon. Sir Don McKinnon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 2014, Interview)

A discussion on the TEMR recommendations amongst the Deputy-Director of the ODA Programme, and Divisional Directors, highlights how MFAT staff were concerned about how changes to ODA policy may impact on non-development foreign policy issues. The discussion contained a question asking if the "consultants were trying to get politics out of the aid programme" (MFAT File, 26 July 2001, p. 7, para. 24). The response was that "[t]he review had prescribed an ideal aid-delivery framework without regard for such aspects of financial constraints, political directives and the interplay of foreign policy considerations" (MFAT File, 26 July 2001, p. 7, para. 24). "It was a matter for debate whether politics could and should be taken out of international aid" (MFAT File, 26 July 2001, p. 7, para. 26).

Due to priority on non-development foreign policy goals, MFAT placed greater emphasis on 'dual-benefit' ODA. While MFAT did not prioritise establishment of clear development goals for its ODA, or invest substantially in aiming for good practice according to global standards, it still attempted to achieve development outcomes. Arguably, given the needs of recipient countries, anything New Zealand could do would

be of assistance, and if a recipient government asked for something, New Zealand should provide it. From this perspective, ODA contributes to development through a transfer of skills, knowledge and funding. This can be seen in the ODA Programme's heavy emphasis on technical assistance, including bringing people to New Zealand to study (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-13, II-16). Similarly, the absence of country strategies indicates a neglect of country contextual analysis (Development Assistance Committee, 2000, p. II-76) – a fundamental principle of good practice ODA policy.

None of this meant that MFAT staff did not wish to see positive development outcomes. MFAT staff worked to ensure good results "I think our aid officials were pretty good and there was always someone in the local high commission or embassy that was responsible for ensuring it [NZ ODA] was delivered and there was a result at the end of it" (Rt. Hon. Sir Don McKinnon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 2014, Interview). But development activities were often viewed through the lens of other foreign policy goals.

> "You couldn't get away from the fact that you had a dual interest. You couldn't get away from the fact that this was part of your foreign policy. But on the other hand you want to really make sure that it was going somewhere that was having some kind of benefit…. And then you frankly did what you can, where you could, in different parts of the world." (Rt. Hon. Sir Don McKinnon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 2014, Interview)

This is a 'dual-benefit' approach to ODA, well-captured in former Foreign Minister Don McKinnon's phrase "doing well out of our doing good" (McKinnon, October 1995, p. 1), and further elaboration:

> [o]ne of the hallmarks of New Zealand's Official Development Assistance is the way the programme combines developmental and commercial objectives. New Zealand firms have proved their ability to undertake international development work and pass on technical know-how of great benefit to our partner countries in the development process, while at the same time building a foundation for trade and commercial expansion in the future.(Development Cooperation Division, April 1992, p. 3)

The TEMR report conveyed a generalised view within MFAT that New Zealand's interests were narrower than an ODA recipient's development. For example, the TEMR

consultants discussed MFAT staff's views of ODA's purpose, and came to the conclusion that MFAT staff

…tended to describe the role or purpose of ODA in terms of foreign policy, diplomacy, trade and commercial interests. Views expressed of the role of ODA included: to build political capital; a means to achievement of New Zealand's national/self interests; for constituency building purposes; to promote commercial and trade opportunities (Grossman and Lees, 2001, p.39).

MFAT contested this perspective, arguing that the TEMR created a false dichotomy between ODA and other foreign policy goals, and that often an ODA recipient's interests coincided with New Zealand's.

I have never heard a disparaging word said about development efforts, and neither have I encountered the view that development assistance is automatically subservient to NZ's foreign policy. In fact I have not heard of any present development projects being influenced by foreign policy. On the other hand, I have witnessed, and been involved with myself, development projects in which there is a concurrence between the priorities of our development partners and NZ's foreign policy efforts. They need not, in my view, be mutually exclusive activities. (MFAT File, 2001, p. 21, comment 16)

MFAT's insistence that New Zealand's close and distant interests were identical contributed to their main argument against giving the ODA Programme greater authority and autonomy in relation to other foreign policy. Yet, this was not entirely convincing to many.

A final argument MFAT mounted was that it would be too costly to separate out the ODA Programme. Former Minister Phil Goff neatly makes and discounts the argument:

they also thought that it made sense for foreign affairs to be totally linked in with aid, development, because it's their posts on the ground that oversaw the development of it, and they saw a degree of duplication, which actually in the end, Treasury and State Services, and DPMC, didn't. They [MFAT] thought it would be more costly, more awkward. But largely it, it diminished their access to an area that magnified their ability to meet their own objectives and what they would have argued were New Zealand's objectives. (Hon. Phil Goff, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2014, Interview)

In summary, the status quo defence was comprised of two powerful actors – MFAT and the Prime Minister. There was no wider network involved, although there potentially could have been. In the end, despite the power of the two actors, they were over-ridden by a broader network for change, although the Prime Minister did win a compromise regarding the ODA Programme's degree of autonomy. The two sets of actors advanced two opposing ideational schema. The pro-change network believed ODA was best used to advance New Zealand's distant interests, with equal priority given to achieving recipients' development outcomes alongside New Zealand's other foreign policy aims. Those defending the status quo believed flexibility was paramount, enabling ODA to be used to advance the priority foreign policy goals of the moment, and of the government's direction. This could include development, but also strategic or economic aims – New Zealand's close interests.

Conclusion

This Chapter outlines a response to the first two research questions guiding this thesis, for the 2001 ODA policy goal case. The upcoming Chapters do so for the second case, and Chapter Nine brings the two cases together into a final answer to research questions one and two (further summarised in Chapter Ten). While no doubt there was some serendipity involved, the 2001 ODA policy goal change was achieved through the informed, concerted and consistent effort of several actors across society and government. The process involved three years of engagement, and included building a robust argument about the problem at hand, and the best ways to ameliorate it. Individuals in the pro-change network vigilently thought-through the process, knew the system and manoeuvred through it adeptly, and used their relationships and negotiating skills to promote change. Yet one factor that was not carefully considered was how to ensure the change remained in place, particularly when the government changed again. One aspect that made the 2001 change process simpler was the lack of ODA legislation, and change advocates did not consider this as a potential option to embed their changes. Arguably, the change process sowed tiny seeds of discontent amongst those who viewed the change as a mistake, setting the scene for subsequent change in 2009.

Chapter Seven: Back to the Future – 2009 Change Story

Continuing with the causal process tracing pattern established with Chapters Five and Six, in this Chapter I detail the milestones in the process leading up to the Cabinet's ODA policy goal change decision in April 2009. This 'story' provides the foundations on which I subsequently build the case analysis in Chapter Eight. In these two upcoming Chapters, I respond to the first two questions guiding this research for the second ODA policy goal change case in 2009.

While the 2001 ODA policy goal change decision culminated from a long, often public, process, the 2009 change appeared rapid. This caught off-guard key actors in the New Zealand international development world. Yet opposition parliamentarians had begun thinking about the policy change long before the 2009 election. The National Party parliamentarians involved in foreign affairs made good use of their nine years in opposition to evolve their foreign affairs manifesto, including ODA. Once they entered government, within six months the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully, instigated ODA policy goal change. First, he requested the SSC, Treasury, MFAT and NZAID to compile Cabinet papers justifying removing the semi-autonomous status of NZAID and bringing the ODA Programme fully back into MFAT (a policy goal means change), and focusing it on economic development (a policy goal ends change). Once NGOs and opposition parliamentarians learned about these plans, they mobilised, hosting a 'Summit on the Future of NZ's Aid' and launching a 'Don't Corrupt Aid' campaign. This was to no effect. Before recounting these occurrences in full, I first set the scene for the change, summarising NZAID's (the ODA Programme's) situation between the years of 2005 and 2007.

NZAID: An "Impressive" Renewal?

Following its launch in 2002, by 2005 the ODA Programme – NZAID – had built a clear strategic framework and policy suite to steer ODA delivery, including guidance on human rights, trade, education and health. 'Towards a Safe and Just World Free of Poverty', the overarching policy document, set-out the strategic outcomes the ODA Programme aimed to achieve in the countries it worked: basic needs fulfilment,

sustainable livelihoods, sustainable and equitable development, and safe, just and inclusive societies (NZAID, 2002, p. 7). According to the 2005 OECD DAC Peer Review, the ODA Programme had established "a competent and dedicated team of development specialists with extensive expertise and experience able to have significant impact" (Development Assistance Committee, 2005, p. 10), and had "the capacity to deliver state-of-the-art programmes, working with the priorities and the decision-making processes in place in developing country partners" (Development Assistance Committee, 2005, p. 10). Overall, the DAC assessed "the reorientation of New Zealand's development co-operation [as] impressive" (Development Assistance Committee, 2005, p. 10). Another far-reaching review, the 2005 Waring Ministerial Review, found the ODA Programme was focused on poverty (Waring, 2005, p. 9) and that the semi-autonomous body "had been satisfactorily established and [was] working well" (Waring, 2005, p. 46).

Both the DAC Peer Review and Waring Ministerial Review did indicate areas for improvement. I summarise these here, as they relate to the subsequent changes. A concern within the wider MFAT regarded capabilities and resources at overseas posts, which the Waring Ministerial Review found illustrated the cultural differences between MFAT and NZAID, and a disadvantage of not establishing an entirely separate ODA Programme in 2001 (Waring, 2005, p. 54-55). Policy coherence across government for development outcomes was identified as a significant issue, including the tensions between NZAID's poverty focus and New Zealand's close interests (such as trade objectives) (Waring, 2005, p. 9, 60), although the DAC Peer Review noted progress in the trade area (Development Assistance Committee, 2005, pp. 17-18). Whole of government coordination issues were also noted in the Waring Ministerial Review. "Its [sic] not quite a mess, but it's verging on one" (Waring, 2005, p. 70), leading to recommendations to develop a coherent whole-of-government approach to New Zealand's relationship with the Pacific, with NZAID as the standard-maintainer and coordinating point for all New Zealand government activity that impacted on a Pacific recipients' development.

Further, while the Waring Ministerial Review found the semi-autonomous body model was working well, it did point out some potential issues.

> Theoretically SABs do not exist. There is no legislation that covers SABs. A SAB is
> not specified by any Act or other form of agency, no new institution has been created

— just an aspect of an existing one, with a different form to make it work. In practice however, SABs perform important functions. They are useful if they have clear reporting lines, goal setting and performance management lines. Therefore they are entirely sensible vehicles for NZAID. (Waring, 2005, p. 44)

The semi-autonomous body model created accountability tensions, which the 2001 Cabinet had recognised and required a series of documents detailing procedures for smooth functioning across MFAT and NZAID, especially between the MFAT Secretary and NZAID Executive Director. Overall, the Waring Ministerial Review states:

> [w]hile the Reviewer has noticed some blips on the radar, the general finding is in agreement with that of SSC. 'Our impression is that the whole process is much better than the mandarins thought it would be. It's a good example of where government was clear what it wanted. MFAT NZAID [sic] have very professional relations and good systems in place.' However [sic] any government format which relies entirely on goodwill between individuals is inherently unsound. (Waring, 2005, p. 52)

This led to Waring's recommendation that the SSC investigate a legislative amendment to improve government's use of semi-autonomous bodies as a delivery mechanism.

For those who saw ODA's purpose as solely for international development goals, and who believed New Zealand's distant interests were as important as its close interests, NZAID was a model ODA Programme. The ODA Programme had expanded its relationships, particularly with NGOs (Development Assistance Committee, 2005, p. 56). There had also been outreach to the private sector.

> In fact we were also stepping-up in the final couple of years or so, NZAID stepping-up our outreach to the private sector. I went to a meeting in Auckland, for example, it was a private sector meeting, quite a large meeting, to explain the NZAID approach to the world, policies and priorities and procurement processes, and what we were looking for. The main message was there were no favours, it was about skills for achieving results, in line with our aid policies of the New Zealand government. (Don Clarke, former NGO representative and professional executive, December 2014, Interview)

Overall, as an NGO noted for the Waring Ministerial Review, "'[t]he whole feeling and environment has changed. These are committed people [ODA Programme staff] with experience who understand development'. (NGO)" (Waring, 2005, p. 48).

Yet, some were not pleased with the ODA Programme and their concerns had grown as NZAID did. NZAID's altered focus and ways of working did "not always find favour with New Zealand contractors who see market potential particularly in the Pacific" (Waring, 2005, p. 57). A private consultant informed the Waring Ministerial Review that "'[a] lot of people feel that areas they want to work in and people they want to work with are excluded'" (Waring, 2005, p. 19). The emphasis on good international development practice created challenges for some domestic actors, such as the Ministry of Education.

> "'Major ideological changes have impacted on the way we [Ministry of Education] can work with them [the ODA Programme]. It was easy in the old days when ODA was about economic and political strategies. This development ideology is an overlay that has impacted negatively.'" (Waring, 2005, p. 76)

Meanwhile, others were concerned with the focus on poverty. Some argued that poverty (at least income poverty) did not exist in the Pacific, and believed that focusing on poverty when the ODA Programme's core geographic focus was the Pacific was "'inconsistent and idiosyncratic'" (Waring, 2005, p. 11, quoting a private sector consultant).

The close relationships between the ODA Programme and NGOs, and the focus on poverty and good practice for international development, created a perception that NGOs had captured the ODA Programme and it had become ideologically driven. As one interviewee stated, "the NGOs were in there donkey-deep, in fact they were being funded by the aid programme to be able to participate in the consultative process" (private sector representative, November 2015, Interview 15). The idea that NGOs, or at least NGO-thinking, had permeated the ODA Programme became a dominant narrative, particularly amongst the private sector. One interviewee described the (inaccurate) belief that almost the entire ODA budget was spent by NGOs (private sector representative, February 2015, Interview 50). Linked with this, the view developed that the ODA Programme approached the world in a particular way, lacking understanding of the importance of economic growth, and the private sector's role in stimulating growth, and therefore excluding the private sector.

> To be quite frank, our engagement with them [the ODA Programme] was quite mixed. They were hard to deal with. They didn't take kindly to suggestions for improvement from industry. They seemed to have developed an internal culture

whereby if you didn't have a degree which had development studies in it, you didn't know how the world operated. To be honest, there was a high level of arrogance which many of us found very challenging to deal with. (private sector representative, February 2015, Interview 49)

I think it was ideological. I would say that it became increasingly ideological over time. Attracted a certain type of person who I think quite genuinely believed that they were there to do good, but they didn't understand the importance of creating sustainable economies, and to have a sustainable economy you need to have a sustainable business community, and so you can't solve poverty in the long-term without having a properly functioning government, a properly functioning economy. (private sector representative, December 2014, Interview 15)

Business believed it was excluded.

So, NZAID, I think it was called at that stage, had basically zero relationships with the business community. And my impression of them was that they were quite suspicious of the business community. They were very much of an aid, an aid mentality that said, you give money to NGOs and you give money to local communities direct and you really don't think too much… you really don't think through how you got economic growth going. In other words, growth was something that they didn't think about so much… They really weren't engaging the private sector very much in all of this. So this, as I say, they probably would have pooh-poohed the private sector and sent them away. (private sector representative, March 2015, Interview 51)

But also the emphasis was on the 'wrong' set of interests: too much distant to the potential damage of the close.

And, there was in fact now a double-track of foreign and trade policy pursued by the MFAT, and there was another one being run by the staff of the aid programme, who seemed to be taking a lot of advice from a number of NGOs who had a very different view of trade and foreign policy to the wider Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (private sector representative, December 2014, Interview 15)

Evolving Thinking

Meanwhile, opposition parliamentarians were developing their thinking on foreign affairs issues. After loosing the 2005 general election, the National Party entered their third term in opposition. Murray McCully was appointed the National Party's spokesperson on foreign affairs and trade, and new parliamentarian and former diplomat of 30 years (Thompson, 23 Sept 2005), John Hayes, was the associate foreign affairs spokesperson, with responsibility for the Pacific and ODA. Also working closely with them was Tim Groser, another former diplomat. In early 2006 McCully signalled a desire to "consult widely in my party, the defence and foreign affairs community, and interested groups and individuals generally in the preparation of the National Party's policy for the next election" (McCully, February 2006). Part of crafting the National Party's policy over the next three years included "having a careful look at how New Zealand might, both through its own policies and in the context of the Pacific Plan,[8] play a more constructive role amongst the Pacific states, focused particularly on the need to create sustainable economies" (McCully, February 2006, footnote added). Along with Tim Groser as asssociate spokesperson for trade, and John Hayes, McCully was "intent upon using our time in opposition well, to build the relationships and the knowledge, here and abroad, that will enable us to provide good leadership in the foreign affairs and related fields after the next election" (McCully, February 2006).

Contributing to this pledge, in 2006, the foreign affairs committee launched an Inquiry into New Zealand's Relationships with South Pacific Countries. McCully, Groser, Hayes and Georgina te Heu Heu were the National Party members on the committee (New Zealand Parliament, no date-b). The Inquiry's focus was "to investigate the role New Zealand plays and can play in assisting Pacific Island Forum nations (excluding Australia) to develop sustainable economies" (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee, 2010, p. 9). Launched when Diane Yates was committee chair, under the minority Labour-Progressive coalition government, the Inquiry took four years to complete and involved travel to Pacific Island Countries and receipt of 184 submissions (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee, 2010, p. 83-84, New Zealand Parliament, no date-b, Haas, 2005). An interim report was tabled in September 2008, prior to the November 2008 general election. The Inquiry was subsequently

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[8] A Pacific regional document developed by the Pacific Island Forum to guide regional development activities across the Pacific.

recommenced under the National Party minority government, and the final report tabled in December 2010. While the report had little traction at the time of its release in 2010, and by then the ODA policy changes had occurred, it is likely the Inquiry process in the lead-up to the 2008 election influenced National Party parliamentarians' thinking and deepened their concerns about the ODA Programme's work in the Pacific. The Inquiry's overarching conclusion was:

> New Zealand's development efforts have yielded disappointing results. In the 20 years since relationships with Pacific countries were last reviewed, conditions in many Pacific islands have deteriorated. (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee, 2010, p. 9)

The Labour Party, the Green Party and The Māori Party all communicated significant caveats to the Inquiry report's strong focus on economic development as the ultimate end of development (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee, 2010, p. 79-80).

Another way National Party opposition parliamentarians gained information was through travel to the Pacific region, and discussion amongst their networks. New Zealand has six Business Councils with bilateral relations with specific Pacific Island Countries. The Councils engage with government, including parliamentarians, and some arrange regular missions to various Pacific Island countries. Parliamentarians and ministers are sometimes invited to participate in these, including Murray McCully (private sector representative, February 2015, Interview 50). Further, the minister of foreign affairs undertakes an annual trip to approximately three Pacific Island countries, on which the minister invites parliamentarians, media, business people, and, historically, NGO representatives. Parliamentarians also have opportunities to attend events and activities through parliamentary friendship groups, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.

Throughout this period, observers gained an idea of the views National Party parliamentarians were developing.

> So I noticed that in the 2005 to 2008 period, that McCully and Groser were becoming increasingly vocal and increasingly frustrated and hostile to what they saw as being a radicalisation of the Aid [ODA] Programme and they didn't like the separation that had occurred between MFAT and the Aid Programme. (private sector representative, December 2014, Interview 15)

Well, it was apparent that the National Party and McCully and later on Hayes didn't really like the NZAID's left-of-centre genesis. And at the [Foreign Affairs] Select Committee questions every year on the estimates you could sense that they were not really very pro. (Peter Adams, former Executive Director NZAID, April 2014, Interview)

The National Party's evolving thinking was best described in their 2007 'Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Discussion Paper: Focusing our Core Strengths and Capabilities'. Murray McCully, Tim Groser, John Hayes and Wayne Mapp (defence spokesperson) authored the Discussion Paper (McCully et al., 2007), and established exports as an overarching priority, outlining the "aspirational goal of increasing the ratio of our [New Zealand] exports as a percentage of GDP from the current level of around 30%, to 40% by 2020" (McCully et al., 2007, p. 6). They argued that a much greater coordinated effort across government was required to achieve this, involving MFAT and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (the government's international business development agency). Overseas posts would be set the single priority of helping support New Zealand exporters (McCully et al., 2007, p. 18) (p. 18). The Discussion Paper asserts that New Zealand is "a small, isolated and trade-dependent country" (McCully et al., 2007, p. 2) that requires a stable world to allow New Zealand to export and prosper. New Zealand's security interests were defined as stability in the Pacific, as well as contributing "to an open and secure world where trade and commerce can be freely undertaken" (McCully et al., 2007, p. 11).

The Discussion Paper outlined a desire to deepen ODA's focus on the Pacific region, and reduce ODA expenditure in countries where New Zealand had no interests or capability to contribute (McCully et al., 2007, p. 8). Security and governance issues were highlighted as problems in the Pacific, and a call was made for a more effective ODA Programme. China was alluded to in a reference to "[c]hequebook diplomacy" in the Pacific (McCully et al., 2007, p. 8), and the need for this behaviour to be countered. This was an apprehension also echoed in some quarters of the private sector, with concern expressed that New Zealand wasn't using it's

aid monies at all efficiently or well, at the time, in particular, because the Chinese were moving in there [the Pacific] with their aid money and were buying things and were getting certain favours with contracts and all sorts of things and we weren't

being particularly competitive. (private sector representative, February 2015, Interview 56)

Overall, the National Party believed that

"[f]resh thinking is required on development assistance strategy... Political failure is now possible in a number of these countries after 30 to 40 years of independence. The way ahead is not obvious but it does not lie in replicating failure. (McCully et al., 2007, p. 8)

Audits

While the National Party were firming-up their foreign affairs policies, the ODA Programme was given a poor audit rating in mid-2007. Routine Audit New Zealand, and Office of the Controller and Auditor-General (OAG), audits highlighted significant concerns. While the ODA Programme was assessed as 'good' between 2002 and 2006, in 2007 Audit New Zealand found the ODA Programme's practices were "poor and requiring immediate and substantial improvement" (NZAID, 2009, pp. 5-6). Further, the OAG audit declared "[a] lack of comprehensive, clear, and accessible processes and procedures for putting in place and monitoring funding arrangements for delivering aid programmes was an area of particular concern during the audit" (Controller and Auditor-General, 2008, p. 2). The ODA Programme reacted swiftly, instituting a 'Control Environment Strengthening Programme' to run from August 2007 to August 2009, with annual audits to 2010 (NZAID, 2009, p. 13). Meanwhile, key actors expressed their disquiet. Parliamentarians on the Foreign Affairs Committee planned to monitor the ODA Programme quarterly due to the audit reports. According to a journalist, Committee members from all parties were equally disturbed about upcoming ODA increases and the ability of the ODA Programme to appropriately manage the funding (Young, 18 February 2008).

By November 2008, Audit New Zealand saw "'a noticeable improvement'", stating that "'NZAID have done well to get to where they are in less than a year. To do this both in Wellington and the challenging environment in overseas posts is commendable'" (NZAID, 2009, p. 17, quoting Audit New Zealand). Verifying this progress, the Controller and Auditor-General made specific note of NZAID's work in a routine, generic performance report: "based on our analysis and the work done as part of our

2007/08 and 2008/09 annual audits of NZAID, we consider that NZAID responded positively and comprehensively to our recommendations" (Auditor-General, 2010, p. 25). Regardless, the taint of the poor audits lingered in peoples' minds. As one interviewee stated:

> "and that, for whatever reason, NZAID had just allowed itself to get in a position that was completely unacceptable… And I think a lot of people, particularly in the private sector were utterly appalled… That gave everyone a wake-up call." (private sector representative, December 2014, Interview 26)

2008 Final Election Manifesto

The audit reports were highlighted in the final National Party's 2008 Foreign Affairs Policy election manifesto. This document was brief, sharpening key points from the earlier Discussion Paper. The Foreign Affairs Policy criticised the increase of unsustainable ODA "political structures and bureaucracy" (The National Party, 2008, p. 3), arguing that "the major problems identified in the 2005 report by Professor Marilyn Waring had been left unattended, but two additional and more recent reports from the Auditor-General similarly raise serious concerns about the process by which aid funding is currently distributed, and thus aid effectiveness" (The National Party, 2008, p. 4). If in government, the National Party would:

- "maintain current aid levels as set out in the 2008 Budget. This will see New Zealand's expenditure on ODA reach $600 million by 2010" (The National Party, 2008, p. 3)
- "[r]eview the operation of NZAid [sic] to ensure aid expenditure is effective, and to make sure problems identified in recent reports are rectified" (The National Party, 2008, p. 4)
- "[r]equire an even greater focus of our aid effort on the South Pacific" (The National Party, 2008, p. 4), while recognising that the Pacific was "already the main target area for" ODA (The National Party, 2008, p. 4).

Just seven months out from the general election, National Party Leader, John Key, outlined two priorities for New Zealand's foreign policy, which shaped the broader context for National's ODA election policy commitments. The first priority was lifting New Zealand's economic growth through leveraging relationships across Asia, as "the powerhouse for the world economy" (Key, April 2008). This effort would require

all the energy and resources we can muster, including drawing on the efforts of research institutes, universities and business. It will be a long, daunting task that can be achieved only by a co-ordinated 'New Zealand Inc.' co-operative partnership. (Key, April 2008)

The second priority was a simultaneous effort to provide "leadership, support, and friendship to the nations in the Pacific, whose citizens comprise an increasing proportion of our own population. In this respect we have some special obligations, and also a unique capacity to make a difference" (Key, April 2008). Prime Minister Key identified political instability and unsustainable economies as key issues in many Pacific Island countries, arguing that given the 270,000 New Zealanders of Pacific descent, "New Zealand is, in a sense, part of the fabric of the Pacific. Our size and our own Pasifika composition uniquely equip us to show a sense of empathy and a level of engagement and leadership in this region" (Key, April 2008). He reflected the same concerns as outlined in his party's 2008 Foreign Affairs Policy, stating poverty elimination was an inappropriate focus for the ODA Programme, and questioned "whether we have been too focused on hand-out as opposed to hand-up strategies and whether our aid dollars can be spent in ways that will better contribute to sustainable economic activity" (Key, April 2008). After several years of consideration, the National Party had a coherent plan of action for ODA policy, assuming they won the right to form government in the November 2008 general election.

Neither Key's speech nor the manifesto alerted actors to the changes that were to come. While expressing concerns about the ODA Programme,

> at the same time, they didn't say 'we're going to get rid of you' or anything like that… [In his foreign policy speech] Key said something like, you know, we will continue the aid programme growth and will look at the agency arrangements but the tone of it was that things would continue as they were, with a bit of a check. So that gave us some confidence. Their election manifesto was pretty much down that track too. It did not say that they would eliminate the semi-autonomous agency, fold the programme back into, it didn't say anything like that… So we thought we might be alright. But McCully had a hidden agenda. (Peter Adams, former Executive Director NZAID, April 2014, Interview)

National Ends Nine Years of Opposition

"A seismic shift in public opinion would have been necessary for a change of government not to have resulted in [November] 2008" (Aimer, 2014, p. 10). Following the 2008 general election the National Party gained 45 per cent of the party vote, positioning it to form a single-party minority government (Levine and Roberts, 2010, p. 346). The National Party achieved a parliamentary majority through three supply and confidence agreements with the ACT party, United Future and the Māori Party (Levine and Roberts, 2010, p. 349). National Party parliamentarians filled all 20 Cabinet seats (Levine and Roberts, 2010, p. 349).

Murray McCully became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Unlike previous governments, this one did not assign ODA to an associate minister.

> I have retained direct responsibility for New Zealand's Official Development Assistance budget and for NZAID, rather than delegating that role to an associate minister. That was a deliberate decision that reflects both the importance that this government attaches to our role in this region, and our determination to lift the outcomes we achieve. (McCully, February 2009)

Tim Groser became the Minister of Trade. John Hayes became the Foreign Affairs Committee Chair from Dec 2008 to October 2011, (and again until August 2014) (New Zealand Parliament, 2014). The minority National Party government exclusively comprised Cabinet, and so confidence and supply parties' had scant opportunity to engage on ODA policy decisions, even if they wished to. Only United Future's Peter Dunne had shown any engagement with ODA policy, in the past arguing for increased ODA quantity. Yet due to ODA's low public salience, it is unlikely he viewed ODA policy as important enough to expend political capital attempting to influence Cabinet from his ministerial position outside.

Minister McCully quickly enacted the National Party's plan for ODA policy.

> He had already asked the SSC, just before Christmas, to bring forth proposals to eliminate the SAB [semi-autonomous body] status of NZAID and by the end of January [2009] we were into a Cabinet paper development process to achieve that, which happened in May. (Peter Adams, former Executive Director NZAID, April 2014, Interview)

Building the Case for Change: Cabinet Paper Production

The new Foreign Affairs Minister McCully first spoke publicly about his plans in a 20 February speech to the New Zealand-Pacific Business Council.

> Another shift we clearly signalled was a move away from the old mantra of poverty alleviation in favour of a clear focus on sustainable economic development…. The new government has also made it clear that we want to see a much closer alignment between our aid and development activities and our overall foreign policy goals. That will mean both structural and cultural changes within MFAT and NZAID, and I will have more to say about this in the coming weeks. (McCully, February 2009)

Meanwhile, government agencies were working on the required Cabinet papers to enact the National Party election manifesto and Minister McCully's directives. Three papers were under preparation for the Cabinet ERD: one overview paper arguing for an economic development focus for ODA in the Pacific (Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Office of the Minister of Trade, 2009), a second on ODA's organisational arrangements (Office of the Minister of State Services and Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009), and a third on NZAID's purpose and directions (Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

The SSC led on the organisational arrangement paper, stating they had "been asked orally by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to develop advice, jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, including NZAID, about a way to ensure greater integration of NZAID within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade" (Quilter, 20 March 2009, p. 1). The final Cabinet paper contained no exploration of any option other than rescinding the semi-autonomous body status for the ODA Programme, highlighting that the SSC were either directed to focus on this or believed this was the only option to consider. The SSC viewed the change to NZAID's status as predominantly a technical change: "[t]he proposed change would normalise institutional arrangements within MFAT by bringing NZAID into line with standard management and accountability arrangements for Public Service departments" (Office of the Minister of State Services and Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 1). The rationale for change was to eliminate transaction costs and accountability risks, predominantly stemming from the fact that semi-autonomous entities rely on good internal relationship management. While noting that NZAID had evolved practices that effectively managed the potential

risks, the SSC recommended rescinding NZAID's semi-autonomous status (Office of the Minister of State Services and Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 6). Overall, the SSC advice took a machinery of government approach, with no examination of how the organisational arrangements might impact upon policy outcomes.

NZAID and Treasury comments in the SSC paper differed from the SSC position, and also reflected findings in the 2005 Waring Ministerial Review.

> It is NZAID's view that the semi-autonomy status has, and is, working to deliver a well-directed and managed aid programme. The accountability risks and transaction costs that are deemed inherent in the SAB model have been managed and mitigated in the MFAT/NZAID context. Transactions [sic] costs would rise in any arrangements with less clarity around policy and resourcing. The requirement of the Government for close alignment between ODA and foreign policy goals can, and has, been met, under Ministerial direction. (Office of the Minister of State Services and Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 8)

NZAID highlighted risks in rescinding NZAID's semi-autonomous status, as did Treasury. "The Treasury does not see a strong case for removal of the SAB, since it thinks the risks highlighted in the NZAID comment could outweigh the benefits of clearer accountabilities and reduced transaction costs" (Office of the Minister of State Services and Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 9).

The third Cabinet paper, on NZAID's purpose and directions, was a statement of what was required to adjust the ODA Programme's purpose (or policy goal ends) to fit with the priorities established in the National Party's 2008 election foreign policy manifesto. The changes were to focus the ODA Programme on economic development, increase ODA expenditure in the Pacific, and "give greater priority to interventions that have self-sustaining measurable impacts with demonstrable value for *both* recipient *and donor*" (Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 1, italics added). A comprehensive Annex included advice from NZAID on several issues under consideration, including consistency between ODA and other foreign policy areas, ODA's core policy focus, the Pacific focus, cross-cutting issues, effectiveness, and accountability (Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009, Annex 1, p. 1).

It is worth noting Treasury's apprehensions with the change process. Treasury indicated early on that they did

> not have any specific information of *what* Hon [sic] McCully's concerns are. However, our best guess is a combination of: a desire for greater weight on foreign policy objectives in delivery of aid; a concern that the separation is creating unnecessary additional 'back office' costs; and a desire to ensure that NZAID funding is being well managed. (New Zealand Treasury, 2009c, p. 1, italics in original)

Treasury saw risks in changing ODA's objectives towards greater weight on broader foreign policy goals, including "loss of clarity of purpose, loss of transparency, more difficulty in evaluating effectiveness, loss of human resource capability, and transition costs" (New Zealand Treasury, 2009c, p. 1). Treasury also conveyed concern regarding the internal process, particularly "the narrow scope and fast speed" (New Zealand Treasury, 2009b, p. 2). On the 7 April 2009, Treasury gave their Minister advice in consideration of the three Cabinet papers that were to go do the ERD on Thursday 9 April. Along with advising their Minister not to support the organisational arrangement changes (New Zealand Treasury, 2009a, pp. 1-2), Treasury expressed reservations that the Cabinet paper on ODA's policy mandate and direction was vague about what practical difference foreign policy alignment and an economic development focus would bring, and stated their belief that the analysis underpinning the paper was incomplete. Treasury recommended that their Minister defer the three papers' consideration at the ERD to allow time for greater analysis, but if the decision was to go ahead on the 9 April, Treasury recommended their Minister support the mandate and policy direction changes (New Zealand Treasury, 2009a, pp. 1-2). Treasury also noted:

> Substantive changes to NZAID's policy, mandate, and institutional settings would ideally be accompanied by thorough analysis, articulating the rationale, options considered and pros and cons of each, and risks of change, which could be made publicly available once decisions are made. We do not consider that this suite of Cabinet papers meets such a test. (New Zealand Treasury, 2009a, p. 2)

Opposition

As government departments were drawing-up the Cabinet papers and internally negotiating concerns, opposition to the changes was mobilising externally. The Labour

Party opposition Associate Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, Phil Twyford, argued the proposed changes represented significant policy change, and that "[i]f the Minister wants change, he should be transparent about it, seek advice from development experts, consult the public, and allow sufficient time for proper deliberation" (Twyford, 3 March 2009). NGOs also voiced their objections. "Oxfam and the other 93 agencies that are members of the Council for International Development are calling on the minister to recognise the seriousness of this decision" (Coates, 13 March 2009), expressing concern that "the reviews will be quick and without public consultation or parliamentary debate" (Coates, 13 March 2009). In a rare media cameo for ODA a New Zealand Herald editorial argued that the reintegration of the semi-autonomous NZAID into MFAT "should be rejected, as should any linking of aid to this country's political ambitions" (The Editor, 3 March 2009).

On 27 March, the Labour Party, the Progressive Party and United Future [the latter a government confidence and supply partner (Levine and Roberts, 2010, p. 349)] co-hosted a Summit on the Future of NZ's Aid, attended by "120 representatives of the aid and development community, and businesses" (Joint Media Statement, 2009). This Summit called for Prime Minister Key to establish public consultation mechanisms and multi-party talks on NZAID's future. Also contained in the Summit's Communiqué were statements regarding ODA's purpose, arguing for maintenance of ODA's currently clear purpose and organisational arrangements. The Communique asserted "that putting aid into Foreign Affairs creates a 'conflict of goals'. It is not possible to reduce poverty, create diplomatic ties and trade at the same time" (Joint Media Statement, 2009). Those at the Summit were in agreement that a "sole focus on economic development does nothing to improve governance. A focus on poverty reduction does" (Joint Media Statement, 2009).

CID spoke out against the changes. In a press release, David Culverhouse, Executive Director, argued

> [e]mbarking on a needless reorganisation, with no evidence that this will increase aid effectiveness or deliver better value for money, hardly squares with the present government's cost cutting agenda… New Zealanders footing the bill for our development assistance expect to see it helping the poor, not being used as a political football. (Council for International Development, March 2009, p. 4)

The CID Board (comprised of CID NGO member representatives) met with Minister McCully twice and expressed their concerns about the proposed changes (Challis et al., 2011, p. 16). At this time, the ODA Programme provided 95 per cent of CID's budget, acting as a brake on how active CID could be in speaking out on member NGOs' behalf (Challis et al., 2011, p. 16).

CID also tried to gain more information, sending several Official Information Act requests to the SSC, MFAT and Treasury throughout March and April 2009. Letters were sent to Minister of Finance Bill English, and Prime Minister John Key. Both individuals responded using replica paragraphs Foreign Minister McCully provided to them, assuring CID "that the points raised by you and the NGO community at large will be given careful consideration before any final decisions are made" (Office of Minister of Finance Bill English, 16 March 2009, p. 1, Office of the Prime Minister John Key, 19 March 2009, p. 1).

Individually, 12 NGOs issued press releases and spoke against the proposed changes (Challis et al., 2011, p. 16). Several faith-based NGOs also expressed their concerns through the Micah Challenge, an international Christian campaign against poverty (Challis et al., 2011). The opaque change process troubled NGOs. Both the proposed organisational arrangement changes and the removal of poverty elimination as ODA's focus were problematic for NGOs committed to international development, given the risk of tying ODA to support New Zealand business interests and divergence from good practice (Challis et al., 2011, pp. 16-17).

After the Summit on the Future of NZ's Aid, a 'Don't Corrupt Aid' campaign was launched, encouraging the public to take action to prevent the changes (TearFund on behalf of NZ NGOs, 9 March 2009). It appears the campaign was an informal network amongst approximately 23 organisations that shared concerns about the Government's signalled ODA changes (Challis et al., 2011, p. 16). CID endorsed the campaign and was involved to some degree, but did not overtly lead the campaign. A Don't Corrupt Aid website was established, with 18 organisational logos on the site (dontcorruptaid, 2009). CID's logo was not present, although a press release from the CID Executive Director was on the website and contained strong arguments against Minister McCully's plans. The Don't Corrupt Aid campaign did not gain significant momentum over the two months of its existence, and faded away once the ODA policy changes were made.

Gauged by Prime Minister Key's earlier foreign policy speech, and Key's and Finance Minister English's responses to CID's letters, deferring to Minister McCully for their responses, it appeared Cabinet decision on the changes would likely be a straightforward process. Due to time, information and resource constraints, compounded by fear (about funding) and general uncertainty within the community, the campaign had little effect.

Cabinet Decision

Cabinet considered the ODA policy changes on 20 April 2009, on reference from the ERD Committee, agreeing, among other things, that:

- "the SAB [semi-autonomous body] status of NZAID be removed, and that NZAID be brought into line with the standard management and accountability arrangements for MFAT" (Cabinet Office, 2009a, p. 2, para 91)

- "New Zealand's ODA outcomes should be consistent with, and support, New Zealand's foreign policy and external relations outcomes under the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs" (Cabinet Office, 2009b, p. 1, para 4)

- "New Zealand's ODA have the support of broad-based sustainable economic development as its central focus" (Cabinet Office, 2009b, p. 1, para 5)

- "the mission statement for New Zealand's ODA be to 'support sustainable development in developing countries, in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world'[9]; within this, the core focus be on sustainable economic development" (Cabinet Office, 2009b, p. 1, para 6)

- "a separate Vote for New Zealand ODA be retained" (Cabinet Office, 2009a, p. 2, para 91)

- "the Pacific remain the core focus, and receive an increased portion of, New Zealand's ODA" (Cabinet Office, 2009b, p. 1, para 7).

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[9] Intriguingly, this was precisely the same mission as the Canadian International Development Agency in 2009, as listed in the Cabinet Paper on ODA's mandate and policy settings Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 2009. New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID): Mandate and Policy Settings, Paper for Cabinet. Wellington: New Zealand Government..

An overall growth path for absolute ODA levels was also confirmed to 2012/2013 (Cabinet Office, 2009b, para 9), up to NZ$600 million by the 2012/2013 financial year (McCully, May 2009).

The Minister publicly announced these decisions at a 1 May 2009 speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, and received both praise and reproach. The latter was most apparent through student protests outside the speech venue. Public praise came from the Wellington Chambers of Commerce: "'[t]he changes to NZAID announced today, particularly the shift in focus toward delivering sustainable growth away from poverty alleviation, are most welcome,' said Charles Finny, Chamber CEO" (Wellington Chamber of Commerce, 2009). The announced changes were in line with the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce 2008 election policy manifesto, which had articulated a desire to remove the policy elimination focus of NZAID.

Minister McCully used the media to explain and justify the 2009 ODA changes, such as in The New Zealand Herald: "Murray McCully: Aid Overhaul Essential to Ensure Our Dollars Reach Those in Need"(McCully, 5 May 2009). Meanwhile, journalists offered some in-depth analysis, including Gordon Campbell's article on Scoop "McCully's Attack on New Zealand's Aid Programme" (Campbell, 9 March 2009), and The Dominion Post's Nick Venter exploring the changes in "Why McCully is Reining in NZAID" (Venter, 8 May 2009).

Change Continues

Subsequent to the Cabinet decisions, all NZAID's policies were discarded (Spratt, 2011) but it took until March 2011 to devise a new, overarching policy document entitled the 'International Development Policy Statement: Supporting Sustainable Development', in which economic development dominated. In terms of ODA's autonomy and authority vis-à-vis non-development foreign policy, the re-integration into MFAT was the subject of ongoing review and consultation, and changes continued through to late 2016.

The 2010 ODA Programme's DAC Peer Review gave a mediocre assessment of the changes, highlighting the opportunities to promote development goals across diplomacy and trade activities with the ODA Programme's organisational arrangement changes, while cautioning the MFAT to maintain NZAID's development expertise and good

practice experience (Development Assistance Committee, 2011, p. 11). The DAC suggested New Zealand needed to elucidate its strategic vision and ensure adequate attention was given to the social and environmental pillars of sustainable development, not only the economic pillar (Development Assistance Committee, 2011, p. 11). They also highlighted the need for greater clarity for capacity development, strategic private sector engagement, and engagement with NGOs to ameliorate any damage done during the period of change (Development Assistance Committee, 2011, pp. 17-19).

Conclusion

What happened in 2009 was essentially a return to the past – taking the ODA Programme 'back to the future'. The 2001 change was undone. ODA policy's goal end became about achieving economic development, and simultaneously advancing New Zealand's economic and strategic interests while also attempting to achieve recipient's development outcomes (dual benefit ODA). The policy goal means was altered to remove ODA's greater authority and autonomy in relation to non-development foreign policy, rescinding the semi-autonomous NZAID. Attention moved away from striving towards achieving good global ODA standards. Arguably, the ODA Programme was now in the situation it would have been had incremental change occurred since 1997. This raises questions about what 2001 change proponents could have done to make NZAID 'stick', which I return to in Chapters Nine and Ten. First, in the upcoming Chapter Eight, I apply my analytical framework to the change process traced above, and outline my answer to research questions one and two for the second case.

Chapter Eight: 2009 Change Analysis

Change in 2009 took six short months. The proposal for change came as a shock to international development NGOs and the ODA Programme itself. Some alterations were anticipated with a new government, but the complete dismantling of the significant policy goal changes achieved in 2001 was not imagined. Chapter Seven traced the milestones in the 2009 change process. Here, Chapter Eight applies the analytical framework to that description, to articulate the best possible explanation and canvass potential alternatives to answer research questions one and two for the 2009 case: who was involved, what ideas they had, how the rules helped or hindered them, and what interactions existed between these three components Before embarking on this analysis, in Table Six below I preview the actors, ideas and rules involved in the 2009 change. This provides a summary from which to expand in the forthcoming pages.

Table Six: Actors, Ideas and Rules in 2009 ODA Policy Goal Change

	2009
Actors	
Societal	Individuals, particularly former diplomats and private sector participants, NGOs and CID, political parties, scant media
Governmental	Parliament, political executive (ministers and Cabinet), professional executive (SSC, Treasury, MFAT)
Individuals	For change: Minister McCully, John Hayes Against change: Phil Twyford
Groupings	For change: Minister McCully, National Party parliamentarians, private sector individuals Against change: NGOs, opposition parliamentarians, and one government confidence and supply minister
Ideas	
Interests overseas	For change: close interests, with some distant Against change: distant interests
State action and social progress	For change: economic development and growth through a thriving private sector Against change: collective action, social justice conception of human progress and what it requires
ODA's desired outcome	For change: dual benefit ODA, New Zealand's economic goals Against change: recipient's development outcomes, poverty reduction
Engagement with global standards	For change: little attention to good practice Against: emphasise good practice
ODA's autonomy and authority in relation to other foreign policy	For change: ODA to have no autonomy and authority in relation to other foreign policy Against change: ODA to have autonomy and greater authority in relation to other foreign policy
Learning/Evidence	For change: data selectively used to bolster argument Against change: global ODA standards, DAC Peer Review
Rules	
ODA Legislation	Absence of legislation
Electoral	Government term
Parliamentary	Select committee rules
Intra-governmental	Cabinet rules, ministerial rules, rules prescribing power across political and professional executive, central agency legislation, professional executive Code of Conduct
Access to government by external actors	The number of access points

Below I commence with an examination of the change advocates and their ideas. Driving change was the powerful Murray McCully, who worked in opposition to devise his policy ideas and moved swiftly once a minister to enact them. His network was loose, comprised of established relationships amongst the private sector, with support from ex-diplomats. I then detail the change resisters and what ideas motivated them. Resisting the 2009 change were NGOs, particularly CID, and left-leaning opposition parliamentarians. This was a similar network to that which advanced change in 2001, and where necessary to avoid repetition, I refer the reader back to Chapters Five and Six.

The Chapter ends with a discussion of the rule environment and its impact on actors. Various actors negotiated the rules in different ways, depending upon the power the rules gave them. Again, the rule-setting in 2009 was similar to that of 2001, and the rich detail captured in Chapter Six is not repeated here.

Change Advocate(s)

A Powerful Individual

The key protagonist and decision-maker for the 2009 policy goal changes was the man who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully. Although, he could not act totally alone. His ideas were developed with others, and he needed support in parliament and Cabinet to enact his desired changes. However, it was Minister McCully who articulated the changes and systematically worked to get them into policy. He was very nearly sufficient for the changes: without Minister McCully the change would not have occurred, particularly the removal of ODA's autonomy and authority.

Minister McCully has a long career in politics, beginning in the early 1970s with the Young Nationals, which he eventually chaired (Hagar, 2006, p. 149). He trained in law and worked for the National Party as communications director, before establishing his own public relations company, Allan Fenwick McCully (Smeele, 22 April 1999, p. 12). McCully was elected into parliament in 1987 as the member for East Coast Bays (New Zealand Parliament, no date-a, Hagar, 2006, p. 149) and he self-styled himself as a "backroom operator" (Smeele, 22 April 1999, p. 12), heavily involved in election strategy and party communications. Minister McCully was first appointed a minister in 1991, and has since held several portfolios, including for customs, housing, tourism and the Accident Compensation Corporation (New Zealand Parliament, no date-a).

A veteran National Party strategist, Minister McCully's own colleagues call him the 'Dark Prince' (The Dominion Post, 29 November 2008) or the 'Minister of Politics' (Hagar, 2006, p. 149). "Opinions of Murray McCully always fall at two extremes — either he is an admirable battler of the bureaucrats, or a dogmatic and power-obsessed meddler who throws his weight around where he shouldn't" (Smeele, 22 April 1999, p. 12). McCully's approach has spilled over into scandal several times throughout his political career, including an Auditor General 'Inquiry into Certain Events Concerning

the New Zealand Tourism Board' (MacDonald, 1999). This affair led to McCully's eventual resignation as Minister of Tourism. After assisting John Key to replace Don Brash as National Party leader (Hagar, 2006, p. 273, 276), McCully became foreign affairs spokesperson in approximately 2006. In 2009, speaking of his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Mr McCully admit[ed] his new job was probably cause for a few quiet toasts within National's ranks. 'The prospect of me travelling overseas a great deal is very reassuring for many of my colleagues'" (The Dominion Post, 29 November 2008).

Even more than the National Party's generally negative perspective of government bureaucrats, Minister McCully does not trust public servants. For example, in 2009 Minister McCully

> took a swipe at NZAID, the public aid agency that doles out some half a billion dollars of taxpayers' money to needy nations. McCully all but accused the department of pocketing the money, grumbling about 'faceless bureaucrats' wasting aid money on administration while NGOs had their fingers in the till… for on top of National's ideological mistrust of officials one can add McCully's own personal antipathy. He has been known to dismiss them more than once as cardigan-wearing chin-strokers, and in his eyes, the fewer on the public payroll the better. (Espinar, 2009)

McCully's view sits alongside his general impatience to get things done. In a renewed ODA Programme, the Minister aimed to create a "fizz-boat" from a "supertanker" (McCully, February 2011). Audrey Young of the New Zealand Herald puts it bluntly: "McCully is not only outspoken and impatient, if the ministry isn't doing what he wants he will sometimes resort to doing it himself" (Young, 2011).

It is not only the professional executive Minister McCully views with suspicion. He has also derided specialist development knowledge such as "so-called 'development specialists' who are beings of superior intellect, attested to by development degrees from Massey University" (McCully, 31 May 2011), and also the various New Zealand NGOs that receive ODA funds. Quoted in a newspaper article, the Minister argued that "'[t]here is a view held by some of the desk jockeys from aid bureaucracies… that it is all about them, about funding large aid organisations and having large numbers of aid bureaucrats'" (Field, 3 September 2010).

Despite these characteristics, Minister McCully is concerned about Pacific development (as illustrated in Chapter Seven), and wishes to contribute productively to the foreign affairs portfolio. McCully states himself: "'I make no secret about the fact that I'm keen to play a role in a major portfolio… the opportunity to do something substantial and stand on my own feet is something I'm really looking forward to'" (The Dominion Post, 29 November 2008). Several interviewees commented on his intelligence, his ability to solidly grasp diverse and detailed aspects of various foreign affairs issues, and his commitment to hard work:

> He's like the energizer bunny. Just keeps going. Incredibly hardworking and diligent Minister, across his portfolio very much. Very surprising when he is caught out or caught short or caught wanting for having the right answer. (private sector representative, February 2015, Interview 49)

Alongside his own personal ambitions, as a long-time, loyal National Party parliamentarian it is also reasonable to assume McCully will have wished to advance the National Party's values and goals in government, particularly a focus on economic growth and the private sector, as a means to a thriving society.

With Connections

Although the 2009 ODA policy changes were unlikely to have occurred without McCully, he could not act completely alone. He needed support in parliament and Cabinet, as well as a broader network to gain ideas from. A key parliamentary ally for Minister McCully was John Hayes. Prior to entering parliament in 2005, Hayes had a long career in MFAT, including representational roles as High Commissioner in Papua New Guinea and Pakistan. Hayes was private secretary to Mike Moore when he was Minister of Overseas Trade and Marketing. With his wealth of MFAT experience and knowledge of the Pacific, Hayes contributed to developing the National Party's 2007 foreign policy Discussion Paper, and likely Minister McCully's views. When the National Party entered government in 2008, Hayes was given the Foreign Affairs Committee Chair [and later a parliamentary private secretary role (New Zealand Parliament, 2014)]. As the Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, Hayes and colleagues denied the opposition's request for Minister McCully to attend the committee to explain his ODA policy changes in 2009, which I discuss further below.

Once the ODA change proposals reached Cabinet, Minister McCully needed support from colleagues. It is unlikely he encountered any significant Cabinet opposition to the proposed changes, and therefore would not have had to work hard to gain Cabinet agreement. There were some in Cabinet who may have been unenthusiastic about the changes. It is not clear the Prime Minister was initially of the view that significant changes were necessary. As Treasury noted in March 2009, "[i]n a press conference yesterday the Prime Minister answered a question about NZAID's institutional status by saying that, 'we needed to ensure value for money, [but] whether changes were necessary shouldn't be predetermined'" (New Zealand Treasury, 2009b). There may also have been some opposition from the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister – Bill English – given that Treasury advised him not to support the organisational arrangement proposals, and his probable dislike for Minister McCully. In 2005 Bill English was warning the then National Party leader, Don Brash, that "'the experienced people you have will NOT work in a government run by McCully. I and others will not tolerate him exercising the same influence he does now'" (Hagar, 2006, p. 147, capitals in original).

Yet, after over two decades as a National Party politician Minister McCully had a reasonable amount of power within Cabinet. He had supported some of its members, such as Judith Collins, when they were new parliamentarians (Hagar, 2006, pp. 146-149), and assisted John Key in his bid for a leadership takeover in early 2006 (Hagar, 2006, p. 273, 276). On ODA policy, Minister McCully had worked with Groser and Mapp in developing the National Party's foreign policy. Mapp had become Minister of Defence, and would have given his support. Minister of Trade Groser co-authored one of the Cabinet papers about the ODA policy change. State Services Minister Tony Ryall signed-off another Cabinet paper. This meant three senior ministers, one from a central agency, would have overtly supported the changes.

Despite the possible luke-warm perspectives of the Prime Minister and his Deputy, there is no evidence of any dispute within Cabinet over the changes. After nine years in opposition, it is unlikely alterations to ODA policy would have been an issue that animated Cabinet, given ODA's low public salience. Further, the changes were in line with the government's overall priority to expand New Zealand exports, boost economic growth and sell 'NZ Inc' (see below). The changes did not appear radical, simply 'tidying-up' machinery of government issues in removing the ODA Programme's

autonomy and authority in relation to other foreign policy, and creating greater coherence within foreign policy. Had Minister McCully been proposing something less consistent with National Party ideas and policy, there is the potential he would have had more opposition within his own Cabinet. However, given the low attention voters pay to ODA policy, the perceived technicality of the proposed changes, Minister McCully's personal power within the Cabinet, and the numerous other priorities the government wished to focus on after nine years in opposition, it was likely that Minister McCully's proposal went through Cabinet unopposed.

However, even before the final decision, Minister McCully needed others to help him develop his policy ideas and provide wider support for them. This is when a broader network was important.

Private Sector Engagement

Minister McCully has an established network amongst the private sector. He used this network to develop ideas about ODA policy. It is also likely individuals from the private sector also used their connections with National Party members, such as McCully, to advance their views of the ODA Programme, although I could find no evidence of this. The only private sector entity that publicly stated concerns about the ODA Programme prior to the 2008 general election was the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce. While the Chambers of Commerce represent thousands of New Zealand businesses, it is likely their statements did not signify a concerted effort across the private sector to alter ODA policy.

In the lead-up to the 2008 General Election, the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce produced a policy manifesto that represented 30 chambers of commerce and 24,000 New Zealand businesses (New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, 2008b). The manifesto's overarching concern was improving productivity and growing the New Zealand economy, including the importance of New Zealand companies expanding their business into the international sphere. "With a country of only 4.3 million people it is critical for the growth of the economy that as many New Zealand companies as possible increase their level of international engagement" (New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, 2008b, p. 13). "Decisions to expand offshore should obviously be business-led, but government's role in removing barriers and smoothing the way is welcome" (New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, 2008b, p. 15).

ODA is discussed in the 'International Economic Activity' section, under the heading 'Foreign Relations'.

> With regard to New Zealand's overseas development assistance programme, we believe there is scope for a formal partnership between business and NZAID (New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency) to be established. The role of the New Zealand development assistance programme and its relationship with New Zealand business needs to be reviewed. The appropriateness of the focus on poverty alleviation is also an important issue that needs review. (New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, 2008b, p. 17)

The Chambers of Commerce manifesto stated that supporting New Zealand business should be a major component of MFAT Heads of Missions' performance assessments, removing a Head of Mission who could not demonstrate their ability to do so (New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, 2008b, p. 17).

The 2008 Manifesto was authored in Wellington, based

> largely upon a number of policy positions that had already been taken by the organisation. There wasn't that much that was new to the organisation, there wasn't too much policy that hadn't already been worked through usual processes… And if anything didn't have widespread support it wasn't included… And the case of the aid references, they were the direct result of the dealings that we had had with the Aid Programme over the proceeding few years. (Charles Finny, private sector representative, November 2014, Interview)

The ODA references were proposed by the Wellington Chamber of Commerce, and tested out on their membership. Following the 2009 change, the Wellington Chamber of Commerce released a press statement, welcoming the move away from a poverty alleviation purpose to one of "sustainable growth", as well as the organisational arrangement changes because they would provide "greater accountability to Ministers and taxpayers" (Wellington Chamber of Commerce, 2009) The Chamber CEO, Charles Finny, pointed out that "'[t]oday's policy announcement is very much in line with the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce's policy manifesto prepared prior to the election" (Wellington Chamber of Commerce, 2009). No other Chamber press statement has been found.

Of note, Charles Finny was the Director of the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce in 2008 and announced the release of their 2008 Election Manifesto (New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, 2008a). He is also an ex-diplomat: "raised the son of a diplomat and became one himself until 2004" (Young, 2011), when Finny joined the Wellington Chamber of Commerce as CEO. Finny's career focused on international trade, both in New Zealand and overseas with MFAT, as well as time spent working in the Department of Trade and Industry, and DPMC (Harvey, 13 December 2010). He had concerns about New Zealand's foreign policy directions: "[i]n the area of aid, says Finny, two sets of foreign policy were developing, those of MFat [sic] and those of NZ Aid [sic]" (Young, 2011).

Overall, it appears likely that the Chambers of Commerce 2008 election manifesto recommendations on ODA policy emerged from Charles Finny at the Wellington Chamber of Commerce. The recommendations would have encountered little opposition amongst Chamber members, given the fact that few New Zealanders, including in the private sector, pay little attention to ODA policy, and the policy demands could do no harm to private sector interests. The Chambers' manifesto is not evidence of a collective drive amongst New Zealand businesses to alter ODA policy, but it does emphasise the ideas about ODA that former trade diplomats, such as Hayes and Finny, shared with Minister McCully. It also reflects the general perception that had developed about NZAID – that the private sector were excluded.

There is no solid evidence of a collective private sector agenda-setting drive for ODA policy change. Yet, besides parliamentary colleagues and ex-diplomats, McCully got his ideas from somewhere. Due to the dissatisfaction expressed in the Waring Ministerial Review, and interviews for this research, it is likely private sector individuals voiced their concerns to Minister McCully through his established networks.

Minister McCully came from the private sector before entering parliament, and generally shared a world with the private sector, particularly key individuals. Minister McCully listens to "Trevor Janes and Peter Kiely. A few other people around him. A network of people who he listens to, primarily those associated with the National Party. And business people who bend his ear" (former NGO representative, April 2014, Interview 6).

Examining whom Minister McCully appointed to the various incarnations of an ODA Programme 'advisory' board gives some evidence for this claim. Initially called the Advisory Board, then the External Selection Panel, and later the International Development Advisory and Selection Panel, the 'group' is intended to give advice to the minister and select projects from various New Zealand entities to receive ODA funding. Alongside prominent New Zealand businessmen, Stephen Tindall and Gareth Morgan, early appointments were Peter Kiely and Trevor Janes. Kiely is a long-time friend of Minister McCully's, a National Party member and sometimes-lawyer for the National Party (Radio New Zealand, 8 April 2011, Rutherford, 6 December 2012). He also has established ties with various organisations throughout the Pacific, including being a founding member of the Papua New Guinea-New Zealand Business Council, a member of the Advisory Committee for External Aid and Development (ACEAD) from 1996 to 2001, and involvement with the Pacific Forum Line, the Pacific Cooperation Fund, and the Pacific Development and Conservation Trust (Pacific Cooperation Foundation, 2016, Council for International Development, no date). Trevor Janes is a professional company director with a career in financial analysis and investment banking (Osman, 2015). Subsequent appointments to the International Development Advisory and Selection Panel include Therese Walshe who was the Chief Operating Officer for Rugby New Zealand 2011 (Council for International Development, no date), (Minister McCully was also Minister for the Rugby World Cup), and Bob Major from the dairy industry and agribusiness (Council for International Development, no date).

Minister McCully's engagement with the private sector is also exhibited in whom he chooses to engage with publicly. For example, during 2009, Minister McCully spoke to the New Zealand-Pacific Business Council in February (McCully, February 2009), and later to their conference (McCully, June 2009), and the New Zealand-Fiji Business Council (McCully, September 2009). Yet the Minister sent John Hayes to speak at a major academic and NGO Millennium Development Goal Symposium in March 2009 (Hayes, March 2009).

As one private sector interviewee stated,

> McCully will pick up the phone and ring us up and say, 'have you guys got half an hour to have a talk about something over a cup of coffee or glass of wine?'. He'll rock up here in the ministerial car, and he'll come and say 'I've got this issue here, what do you think I should do about it?'. It is not just us that he samples opinion

from. He samples opinion from across industry. And he listens to industry. (private sector representative, February 2015, Interview 49)

Yet, this network was not broad-based across the private sector. As one interviewee stated, the

[a]id thing was a government-out process. Thinking was coming from Murray McCully. The first time we heard about it as the business community was when all of that was presented to us, publicly and in meetings and so on. (private sector representative, Interview 51, March 2015, Interview)

Ultimately, a loose network existed, but it was comprised of a small number of individuals from specific private sector pockets and former trade diplomats. It was essentially Minister McCully's network, and he listened to these people who he trusted and believed had credibility to shape his views. What also brought these people together where their shared policy values. What were the ideas informing the ODA policy changes?

Motivating Ideas

The ideas motivating the 2009 changes were mixed and at times unclear. They involved ideas about New Zealand's interests overseas, including the best way to 'brand' the country in foreign markets. Alongside this were fundamental right-leaning political ideas about the primacy of economic growth and development, through a burgeoning private sector. Also important, particularly for Minister McCully, was the notion of control: he wanted complete control over his ministry to ease his ability to direct it. The variety of reasons put forward for change, and the selective use of information, hints that there may have been an underlying personal agenda at play. I touch on this possibility at the end of this section, alongside examining concern about the Chinese in the Pacific and Pacific Island New Zealanders' votes.

Keeping it Close

The National Party's core values include emphasis on competitive enterprise, limited government in favour of the market, and individual responsibilities (The National Party, no date). These policy values shape their conceptions of New Zealand's interests

overseas. The new National Party Government in 2008 saw New Zealand's close interest — growing the economy — as the priority interest overseas: the

> [e]conomic growth rate is the single most important priority of this Government. Faster export growth, given its close link with higher productivity, is essential – we have set a target of increasing the ratio of our exports from 30% to 40% of GDP by 2025. (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 1, para 1)

This overarching priority shaped the new Government's foreign policy priorities, with its first MFAT Statement of Intent reflecting

> the Government's view that foreign and trade policy is essential to achieving its overall goal – growing the economy in order to deliver greater prosperity, security, and opportunities for all New Zealanders. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009, p. 5)

Although present, the National Party's distant interests are articulated in terms of how they contribute to New Zealand's economy, with no discussion of human welfare or human rights. "In a globalised world, New Zealand's prosperity depends on the prosperity of the global markets in which we trade. But the prosperity of those markets depends in turn on their security, a stable external environment, and the rule of law" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009, p. 13). Overall, it is New Zealand's close interests that gain highest priority. In its Annual Report for 2009-2010, MFAT stated that "through its political, economic, multilateral and developmental diplomacy, [MFAT] focused resolutely on the Government's top priority of increasing New Zealand's prosperity to provide better opportunities and security to all New Zealanders" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010, p. 4).

Selling New Zealand: 'NZ Inc.'

Related to the emphasis on close, predominantly economic interests, were ideas about a coherent New Zealand 'brand' outside of the country's borders. How well New Zealand's external agencies are coordinated and functioning, and areas for improvement, were viewed as fundamentally important questions for a "small trading nation, looking to manage offshore developments to achieve its security, and its trade and economic interests" (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 7, para 34).

When deciding upon the 2009 changes to ODA Policy, the Cabinet also directed the MFAT Secretary to submit to the ERD Committee a paper "on new arrangements for the operation of 'NZ Inc.' onshore and offshore" (Cabinet Office, 2009a). Historically, 'NZ Inc.' was an informal concept applied to various components of the government's engagement offshore and the different government agencies involved. The idea behind 'NZ Inc.' was that there was, or should be, an unified approach to New Zealand agencies' overseas engagement. The 2010 'NZ Inc.' review stated that ten agencies were central, including MFAT, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, Tourism New Zealand, New Zealand Customs, Immigration New Zealand, with smaller roles for Treasury, MORST, Education, Agriculture, Economic Development and Food Safety (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 7, para 31). Defence and security agencies, such as the New Zealand Defence Force and Police, played an important role offshore but were not a focus in the 'NZ Inc.' review Cabinet requested because the review was about trade and the economy (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 7, para 32).

The Government, and Ministers involved in offshore activities, were concerned about the lack of coherence projected overseas. As one interviewee explained:

> those of us who were in the Pacific regularly, recently, just found out how disjointed New Zealand was in the Pacific. Best [example] in the Pacific was Tarawa [main Kiribati atoll]. Whereby the most important New Zealand official was the head of New Zealand Immigration, second was NZAID, third was the High Commissioner… So in 2008, you had a completely dysfunctional, particularly in the Pacific, New Zealand Incorporated. (private sector representative, November 2014, Interview 26)

The National government wished to improve offshore coordination to achieve improved results, and had "already implemented an obvious first step – integrating NZ aid [sic] into MFAT to ensure internal coherence" (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 5, para 18). "Within the Pacific region, we now need to see the greater efficiency between diplomatic and development assistance functions that the reintegration of NZAID makes possible" (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 9, para 42). The reduction of the ODA Programme's autonomy and authority in relation to non-development foreign policy was directly connected with the desire to sell New Zealand abroad, and the policy value that New Zealand's primary interest overseas is export expansion to grow the New Zealand economy. These close interest priorities are linked with a particular conception of ODA's preferred outcomes.

Hand in Glove: Economic Development and Dual Benefit ODA

Minister McCully stated he saw "stewardship of the substantial overseas aid budget as a key part of the Foreign Affairs portfolio, which needs to be aligned, so far as possible, with the management of New Zealand's wider foreign policy interests" (McCully, May 2009). Underpinning ideas about ODA and other foreign policy coherence is a belief either that ODA is a tool for non-development foreign policy, or that spending ODA can achieve both development outcomes and other foreign policy interests — 'dual benefit' ODA.

Evidence exists that ODA was viewed as subservient to the foreign policy goal of export expansion, particularly in Asia, which was seen as "the powerhouse for the world economy for as far ahead as we can reasonably see" (The National Party, 2008, p. 3). For example, the ODA Programme prioritised four 'flagship' areas in its relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. These were Agricultural Diplomacy, New Zealand-ASEAN Scholars, Young Business Leaders' Initiative, and Disaster Risk Reduction (New Zealand Aid Programme, no date-b). The purpose of the 'Agricultural Diplomacy' flagship was stated to

> support agricultural growth and development in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines and Viet Nam by increasing their access to relevant New Zealand agricultural expertise. Towards this end, it will help increase linkages between agricultural agencies, organisations and agribusiness in New Zealand and ASEAN. (New Zealand Aid Programme, no date-a)

While it is probable these countries would benefit from agricultural development assistance, there is no evidence of contextual needs analysis, based on the diverse recipient country needs. The decision to focus on agriculture was made in New Zealand, predicated on the technical expertise New Zealand could use and showcase in ODA activities, to contribute to building overseas markets for New Zealand exports.

This is exhibited in the terms of reference for a dairy project design activity in Myanmar/Burma. One of the specifications of the design was that it should create "opportunities for utilising New Zealand expertise in the implementation of the activity and to leverage future commercial opportunities for New Zealand stakeholders" (New Zealand Aid Programme, September 2012, p. 2). The initial scoping mission identified fruit and vegetable supply chains as potentially having greater development outcomes

than dairy, yet because New Zealand had less technical expertise to offer in these areas, the dairy project was selected (New Zealand Aid Programme, July 2012, pp. 2-3) (Another reason given for focusing on dairy was because the Government of Myanmar also prioritised it.) Similarly, the New Zealand-ASEAN Scholars flagship simply provided scholarships to people from ASEAN states to study in New Zealand. Separate from country development plans and consideration of country needs, these scholarships are a way of advertising New Zealand educational institutes overseas, and building relationships with future leaders and business people in ASEAN countries. Finally, and in the same vein, the Young Business Leaders flagship aimed to "support the establishment of lasting and progressive trade and business relationships with New Zealand that advance the future of ASEAN-New Zealand relations" (New Zealand Aid Programme, no date-c). The overarching aim was not only to gain access to markets but to also build relationships that were favourable to New Zealand businesses. "We need to prioritise, far more sharply and above all other policy objectives, economic and trade work against the backdrop of a sophisticated appreciation that such work frequently rests on a platform of excellent political relationships" (Office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 4, para 17).

Each of these areas prioritises New Zealand's economic or political needs above the recipient country's development needs, indicating ODA's use to achieve non-development foreign policy goals. Further, as shown above, the National government had placed improving exports as a key priority, and identified Asia as an important market for New Zealand goods and services. Ministers McCully and Groser stated that "trade policy starts by putting the interests of New Zealand exporters first and aggressively so" (Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Office of the Minister of Trade, 2009, p. 3). This provides some evidence that ODA would be spent to advance trade opportunities.

Yet, development in the Pacific was also a concern, emphasised in the National Party's various speeches and policy documents leading up to the election and after. Speaking to the New Zealand-Pacific Business Council in February 2009, Minister McCully voiced an aspiration to increase Pacific imports into New Zealand, to contribute to Pacific economies (McCully, February 2009). Elsewhere, in discussing immigration quotas, McCully conveyed his desire for Pacific Island countries to have a "long-term sustainable economic base" (McCully, 29 November 2002). The National government

stated that "New Zealand's extensive representation in the South Pacific (only three per cent of New Zealand's exports) is motivated by different considerations" to export growth (Cabinet Office, 2010, p. 1`).

This evidence indicates that outside of the Pacific, the National Party-led government would prioritise New Zealand's economic growth in all foreign policy areas, while in the Pacific, equal priority would be given to both Pacific Island Country development and New Zealand's economy. What would bind these two key interests overseas together was the focus on economic development: New Zealand's economic development and economic development in the Pacific.

> With the prospect of a prolonged economic slow-down, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and partner government agencies will need to focus on implementing initiatives that help our economy… In practice it will mean putting support for exporters as the top priority for most of our overseas posts. It will also mean a heightened focus on our near neighbourhood and giving priority to assisting the economic development of our Pacific Island partners. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009, p. 5)

This approach to Pacific ODA saw the desired policy goal ends as *both* New Zealand's and the Pacific's economic development. MFAT's 'International Development Policy Statement' outlined New Zealand's 'comparative advantage' — strengths — in delivering ODA. New Zealand's strengths were defined as: "fisheries, agriculture, renewable energy, tourism, education, law and justice, including policing" (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2010, p. 12). These strengths are predominantly in areas where New Zealand has private sector experience to showcase, or where opportunities exist to export or integrate New Zealand firms or products into global supply chains. The decisions about New Zealand's strengths were part of internal, informal discussions on how to implement the 2009 policy changes (Williams, 5 June 2012). These strengths were narrower than those identified two years earlier under the Labour Party-led government, which included the quality of New Zealand's Pacific relationships, empathy with small island states, emphasis on listening to partners and policy dialogue, experience in economic and community development, trade, infrastructure, governance, justice, peace-building, gender equality, education, health, environmental management, land ownership, conservation, agriculture, fisheries and biosecurity (NZAID, 2008, pp.

31-32). This comparison highlights how the National government defined New Zealand's strengths to fit with the country's close interests, and a dual benefit approach to New Zealand's and the Pacific's economic development. Given that at least for the Pacific, development outcomes were a dual priority, how did the National government view ODA as contributing to development?

Thinking about Good Practice ODA or is Growth All You Need?

There is no evidence that Minister McCully or his network engaged with international development good practice standards or knowledge. The National Party Foreign Affairs Discussion Paper and Policy, as well as the Cabinet papers, refer to unsustainable economies and population data to make the case that ODA is failing the Pacific. In some instances the data used is incorrect or applied too broadly, and the ability for ODA to actually impact on these factors was not considered. The Discussion Paper and Policy also vaguely referred to 'problems' identified in the Waring Ministerial Review. Yet this Review supported NZAID's poverty elimination focus and organisational arrangements. What the National Party enacted was almost the complete opposite from what the Waring Ministerial Review recommended.

Rather than a concern for 'doing' ODA well, what drove the changes were National party policy values about how social progress occurs: the pathway to development is through economic development and growth, driven by the private sector. Therefore, this should be the core focus for the ODA Programme. Minister McCully summarised the situation in his speech announcing the 2009 policy changes:

> the overall picture in our Pacific neighbourhood is unacceptable. Our aid dollars have done little to build sustainable economies providing employment prospects and the promise of a brighter future. Depopulation has continued at an alarming rate in parts of Polynesia. Our billion-dollar export trade into the Pacific has been reciprocated by imports from Pacific nations so miserly that they should be a source of national embarrassment. Air and shipping services – the arteries for trade and tourism – are under threat and in decline. Substantial sums of aid monies are fed into unproductive bureaucracies – a classic example of mistaking activity for achievement. (McCully, May 2009)

This concern of ineffectiveness also relates to the idea that NGOs and NGO thinking had captured the ODA Programme. The key problem here was the focus on poverty elimination as the ODA Programme's sole purpose. "Poverty alleviation is too lazy and

incoherent a guide"(McCully, May 2009) for the ODA Programme. Instead, Minister McCully argued trade and tourism statistics are better progress indicators.

What this highlights is that those who drove the 2009 policy changes placed economic growth and development at the centre of how a country develops. As one interviewee put it: "You'll have a thriving business sector and that then leads to a better economy and jobs, and everyone is richer. I don't think it is particularly complicated. It is a classic economic growth, trickle-down kind of thing" (former NGO representative, April 2014, Interview 6). Minister McCully stated, "We have a clear sense that in a region that is as resource rich as the Pacific, we must be able to create sustainable economic activity much more successfully than has been the case to date… If we can't maintain the essential services that make trade and tourism possible, the rest of the debate is futile" (McCully, February 2009).

Central to this thinking about development is the role of the private sector in creating jobs, which provide employment and therefore household income, and also potentially greater tax income to the government that can then be channelled into public service provision. Therefore, the key to developing a country is boosting the private sector. Alongside this perspective sits the idea that government bureaucracies draw talent from the private sector and stifle entrepreneurial activity, while perpetuating ineffective government activity. Minister McCully expressed his "grave concern about the extent to which monies intended to benefit some of the poorest people on our planet are siphoned off by a range of government and other bureaucracies along the way" (McCully, May 2009). Based on these policy values, changing ODA's purpose to economic development is sensible. Also, there is a logical harmony, at least rhetorically, between the ideas that ODA's development efforts should be on economic growth and that New Zealand's foreign policy priority was export expansion. To achieve greater alignment between the two, centralised control was important.

Command and Control

A major reason given for removing the ODA Programme's authority and autonomy in relation to non-development foreign policy was the idea that bringing it back in to MFAT as a 'group' would contribute to greater policy coherence, and a coherent offshore New Zealand 'brand'. This relates to the underlying wish to focus New Zealand's foreign policy on the close interests of economic growth, albeit with some

dual benefit nuances. Arguably, organisational arrangement changes were not necessary to achieve this, but doing so made it easier and relates to Minister McCully's desire for close control, which I discuss below. First, I consider another reason put forward for the organisational arrangement changes.

Minister McCully expressed concern about accountability issues, justifying the decision to remove NZAID as "driven directly by the need to establish proper accountability mechanisms" (McCully, May 2009). Minister McCully argued that his "political opponents and… some self-interested individuals from within the aid community" (McCully, May 2009) thought

> that New Zealand's aid budget is some kind of sacred cow that should be placed above and beyond the stewardship of the government of the day, and subject only to the attentions of so-called 'development experts' who might bring their superior intellects and sensibilities to this task…. The idea promoted by some that aid money should be beyond the reach of the government of the day is fundamentally undemocratic… Its expenditure should be overseen by elected office-holders able to be held to account at the ballot box – not by faceless, unelected, unaccountable, aid bureaucrats. (McCully, May 2009)

This argument was inaccurate: as a semi-autonomous body, the Executive Director of NZAID (the ODA Programme) reported directly to the minister, and there were also arrangements to ensure the MFAT Secretary was able to maintain the Secretary's overall responsibility for the semi-autonomous ODA Programme alongside the rest of MFAT. It is likely Minister McCully knew these facts, particularly given he had motivated the establishment of the semi-autonomous 'Office of Tourism and Sport' when he was Minister of Tourism (MacDonald, 1999, pp. 112-113). Framing the argument as an accountability argument was useful, however, and obscured deeper ideas about power and control.

As outlined above, Minister McCully is a particular personality — a person who is impatient, does not trust the professional executive and who is not averse to reaching beyond his governance role into operations. A semi-autonomous body structure was not the norm under legislation, and did alter the chain of command within MFAT. Removing the semi-autonomous body would mean that MFAT's Secretary reported directly to Minister McCully, without the ability for the head of the ODA Programme to

also report to the minister. Given the tensions between ODA's development purpose and other foreign policy areas, contestable advice such as this would have been valuable for a minister concerned with achieving development outcomes. Yet, in this case, the demand for a clear chain of command and direct control appears to have overridden this concern. Minister McCully wished to directly "hold the chief executive [Secretary] of the Ministry to account" (McCully, May 2009). It also meant the Minister could govern over a single individual, rather than two.

Similarly, under NZAID as a semi-autonomous body, NZAID staff at New Zealand posts overseas were accountable back to NZAID in Wellington, as well as the Head of Mission. Removing the ODA Programme's semi-autonomous status meant that all post staff reported directly and only to the Head of Mission, who was then held accountable to their superior back in Wellington, and ultimately to the MFAT Secretary and the minister. This vertical clarity enabled greater control over individuals within MFAT, with a clear line of direction the minister could exert downwards. This also removed the potential for a semi-autonomous professional executive focused on development outcomes to present policy arguments at odds with non-development foreign policy outcomes. Instead, these differences would be settled at lower levels within MFAT and would be subject to the minister's overall directives about what overseas interests and foreign policy outcomes were paramount. It gave Minister McCully greater control over a simpler organisational arrangement, and removed 'untidy' reporting lines within the MFAT. An interviewee said it well.

> [Minister McCully] thought it was a nonsense from day one. He was just restoring the status quo ante. He was concerned that New Zealand's foreign policy would have unified focus and command… it [NZAID] was administratively untidy… National is a party of small government… and having an additional agency expands government, so bringing it back under MFAT is more tidy. It, the chain of command, is much more clear. (academic, December 2014, Interview 11)

Other Potential Ideas

There remain other potential ideas underlying those detailed above, although there is less evidence for their force in motivating ODA policy goal change. In terms of close interests, concerns about China's influence in the Pacific region were hinted at in the National Party foreign affairs Discussion Paper. This could have been an additional motivator for New Zealand to ensure it contributes actively in Pacific economies to

counter China's power in the region. In his April 2008 foreign policy speech, the Prime Minister referred to the number of Pacific Island voters in New Zealand, indicating there may also have been a desire to please potential New Zealand voters through supporting development in Pacific Island Countries they had connections with. These two ideas may have played a role, but they do not appear to have been significant.

Consistent with policy values regarding small government, change advocates also expressed efficiency concerns.

> When you're thinking about taxpayer benefit, one of the issues is, what's your administration costing. You can probably download the figures from somewhere and I think you'll find that the cost of administering our Aid Programme really went through the roof, with two different administrations. (former political executive, December 2014, Interview 32)

Minister McCully believed that "the aid budget is subjected to an unacceptable level of ticket-clipping on the way to its intended destination", dismayed that "approximately eight per cent of the entire aid budget is spent on NZAID overheads - including a staff of 281" (McCully, May 2009). The belief was that an ODA Programme with autonomy costs more. However, this is unlikely to have been a major reason for change, overshadowed by the larger concerns detailed above. Yet, efficiency issues provide a useful way of framing change, particularly in an environment of economic strain.

Finally, some interviewees believed Minister McCully simply had a personal desire to undo what the Labour Party had created. Given the Minister's particular personality, this is possible. However, I found no evidence of this beyond the multiple and mixed ideas provided as justification for the changes, and selective use of information to frame particular arguments for change.

Ideas Summarised

What these ideas highlight is Minister McCully's and the National Party's strong focus on a coherent New Zealand 'brand' overseas, centred around the drive to increase New Zealand exports. While the emphasis on the Pacific included an aspiration for economic development outcomes and improved Pacific exports, this was accompanied by a desire to expand New Zealand relationships in the region as part of boosting opportunities for New Zealand traders. Weighing-up the mixed ideas, New Zealand's close interests dominate heavily. For the Pacific, dual benefit development ideas are present. Outside

of the Pacific, overall, New Zealand's close interests take precedence, and change proponents can reasonably be said to view ODA as one 'tool in the tool box' to advance New Zealand's economy. To do this, Minister McCully wanted strong control over a unified ministry.

The 2009 Change Resistance

Actors resisting ODA policy goal change did not mobilise until approximately two months after internal government policy formulation began. Predominantly, this resistance came from the 2001 pro-change network. Similar to the 2001 change proponents, the 2009 change resisters cut across government and societal actors, involving primarily NGOs and left-leaning parliamentarians. As described in Chapter Seven, a Summit was held to bring these actors together, attract the media, and strategise. In attempts to mobilise the public or rouse the attention of government parliamentarians, NGOs launched the Don't Corrupt Aid campaign and engaged with the media. They were joined by particular individuals within the New Zealand parliament, particularly Phil Twyford, the Labour Party opposition Associate Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, responsible for ODA (who had also been involved in agenda-setting for the 2001 change).

The ideas these 2009 change resisters promoted are canvassed in Chapter Six, given that the actors are the same and they were essentially defending the change they had created in 2001. Overall, 2009 change resisters believed New Zealand's distant and close interests were equally important, but that ODA was a tool to advance New Zealand's distant interests. The National Party government's articulation that Pacific Island Country development was in New Zealand's interests was something change opponents were in agreement with. Yet, a dominant focus on economic development and New Zealand's economic interests overseas were areas of deep disagreement.

While many of those who resisted the 2009 changes agreed New Zealand should focus on the Pacific region, they argued ODA's development efforts are broader than this, also including multilateralism, humanitarian funding, and engagements with other parts of the world where poverty levels are high. In terms of how development occurred, NZAID's (the ODA Programme's) focus on poverty elimination satisfied most, as it forced NZAID to examine the impacts of ODA expenditure, considering questions, such

as: who benefitted and how?; were the most needy targeted — both amongst countries and within countries?; and was New Zealand's ODA contributing to a tide of social progress that lifted all boats? The end goal sought after was well-being and opportunity for all people. While some 2009 change resisters rallied against the concept of economic growth, particularly capitalist — arguing it was leading to environmental catastrophe and human inequality — others argued economic development/growth was a necessary but not sufficient part of development efforts, one of several key means to achieve human well-being, not an end in itself. These policy values and goal ideas were embedded in NZAID's policy goal end and means, and change resisters wanted this to remain so.

Overall, the 2009 change resisters were not prepared for the 2008 election. A change in government was clearly predicted and Minister McCully had openly called for consultation in developing foreign affairs policy in 2007. If NGOs had been paying attention, they may have been able to engage in policy discussions earlier on, and protected some of what they advocated for in 2001.

> But the NGO community was caught on the hop. The analytical response or in-depth policy response was not there, which I think the Ministry would have heard and responded to, and the Minister would have too. He is always open to a discussion in the right environment and approached in the right way. (Don Clarke, former NGO representative and professional executive, December 2014, Interview)

NGOs did encounter a dilemma in attempts to resist change, given several of them received 50 per cent and more of their funding from the ODA Programme, including CID's receipt of 95 per cent of its income from ODA (Challis et al., 2011, p. 8, 16). However, some NGOs received proportionally little New Zealand government funding and could have been more vocal in resisting the changes. They were not. The rules also constrained their actions.

Playing the Rules?

Unlike the 2001 change, actors from within government drove the 2009 change, making the most important rules involved those that shaped parliamentary and government power. Chapter Six examines pertinent governmental rules in detail, and I do not repeat this here. As in 2001, the absence of ODA-specific legislation meant that Cabinet was

the decision-making point for the 2009 ODA policy goal change, avoiding parliament and simplifying the process. For rules that did exist, the electoral rule of a three-year parliamentary term was a crucial rule that affected policy change in 2009. Parliamentary, Cabinet and ministerial rules shaped the context within which Minister McCully, the main change driver, acted, while actors resisting change had to contend with the rules allocating power over the change decisions.

Winning the Election

Minister McCully had attended to the fundamental rule of New Zealand politics: the three-year parliamentary term. He knew that eventually the National Party would gain power and used the time in opposition to purposefully shape a foreign policy agenda. There were risks in this: although he was spokesperson, he may not have got the foreign affairs portfolio when National made it into government. There was the possibility it might have gone to Winston Peters as part of a coalition agreement, particularly given Peters was in the role from 2005-2008 (The Dominion Post, 29 November 2008). This did not eventuate, and McCully's diligent preparation enabled him to exploit government power as soon as he obtained it.

Parliamentary Scrutiny

While MMP was supposed to see greater equity across parties in allocating select committee chairpersonships, in practice, this does not occur (Miller, 2015, p. 68). The key mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of ODA policy was the Foreign Affairs Committee, which John Hayes chaired. Committee membership is proportional to parliament's party membership, as far as practicable (New Zealand House of Representatives, 2011, p. 60), meaning that in 2008 there were more government members on the Committee than not. Committee chairs have the authority to request any individual to appear before the committee to give evidence, and also request relevant documents (New Zealand House of Representatives, 2011, p. 64). In early 2009, both Labour and Green Party committee members attempted to have Minister McCully appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee, yet Chair Hayes and government colleagues prevented this.

> McCully has chosen not to front up to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade select committee to advise them of his plans for the aid programme. Also, government members on the committee last week voted down a request by Labour and Green

members for a briefing by the Minister about his intentions. Amid this lack of transparency, actions are already being taken. (Campbell, 9 March 2009)

The committee has the authority and mandate to scrutinise government, yet in this case it did not occur as government members and a key ally to Minister McCully – John Hayes – acted to avoid scrutiny.

Opposition parliamentarians attempted other scrutinising avenues. Phil Twyford made good use of written parliamentary questions to gain insights into what the government were implementing in terms of the change to ODA policy. He began asking questions in December 2008, with specific questions regarding the review of New Zealand ODA submitted in February 2009. [For examples, see (Twyford and McCully, 2008a, Twyford and McCully, 2009b, Twyford and McCully, 2009c)]. Yet, while eliciting basic information, it was simple for Minister McCully to evade the questions or avoid providing a detailed answer. [For example see(Twyford and McCully, 2008b)]. Oral parliamentary questions are another mechanism for parliament to scrutinise the executive. Given the short time available for these in parliamentary business, oral questions need to be deemed to have enough significance to put forward. Twyford asked Minister McCully an oral question in the House on 26 March 2009, with no obvious consequences (Twyford and McCully, 2009a). Overall, while ministers are accountable to parliament for their actions, actually holding ministers to account can be challenging in a system where the government is formed from the parliament, and in the low priority ODA policy domain.

Cabinet Consent

As outlined above, Minister McCully had a significant amount of power in Cabinet. Although the eventual government was comprised of a series of confidence and supply arrangements with the ACT party, United Future and the Māori Party, none of these parties gained any seats in Cabinet (instead being allocated five ministerial positions external to Cabinet), so the perspectives of other parties were irrelevant. Even if these parties had gained a seat in Cabinet, the only one that had any concern for ODA policy was United Future, and this was historically about the quantity of ODA. Further, it is possible to speculate that no junior coalition party was going to fight Minister McCully over ODA policy, at least not if they wished to achieve any other policy reforms. Minister McCully had been the spokesperson for foreign affairs, had assisted Key to

gain the party leadership position, and was a loyal, senior National Party member and experienced parliamentarian. While Minister English of Finance – a central agency Minister and Deputy Prime Minister – may have opposed the changes, it is not likely he would have argued against them in Cabinet because ODA policy, with its low public salience, would not have been worth fighting Minister McCully for. While the evidence is not available to strongly claim nobody opposed Minister McCully, it is likely that Minister McCully had the power to enact the changes he wished, including power within Cabinet to gain support for his changes.

Professional and Political Executive

Given Minister McCully's reputation regarding the professional executive, it is possible to surmise that it was likely MFAT and NZAID (ODA Programme) staff were more careful than usual regarding how they responded to the Minister's change directions. As discussed in Chapter Six, the professional executive must maintain their minister's confidence, impartially implement the minister's directions, and provide free and frank advice. This placed NZAID, the agency best-equipped to provide free and frank advice on the potential development impacts of the changes, in a challenging position. The key source of information available about the approach the professional executive took to the 2009 ODA policy changes is the papers prepared for Cabinet, which included SSC's, Treasury's and NZAID/MFAT's internal assessment. In these papers, NZAID did state its belief that the organisational changes were not necessary, but the NZAID Executive Director was constrained in stating too firmly any opposition to the changes, by the inherent tensions of being non-partisan in a partisan environment. Compounding this was the recognition that the professional executive would have to work with Minister McCully for the foreseeable future. Had the agency given the 'freest and frankest' policy advice at that particular time, its future ability to give good quality advice, and have the Minister trust that advice, would have been impeded. This is particularly so given Minister McCully's known attitudes towards the professional executive. If NZAID had given advice strongly contrary to the Ministers' desired policy change, it was likely to entrench his position further and, given his propensity to micro-manage when he does not think things are going his way, increase the potential he would exert high levels of control over the ODA Programme in the future.

External Avenues for Influence

The CID Board attempted to use their credibility and reputation to access the Minister for discussions. They did meet twice, but to no effect: Minister McCully's anti-NGO views would also have formed a natural barrier to listening. NGOs and CID could have accessed other ministers, particularly those from the central agencies. Yet, CID's attempts at writing to Minister English and the Prime Minister indicated they would defer to Minister McCully, so those access points were also closed.

Mobilising the voting public was another avenue attempted to raise attention to the ODA policy changes, based on the rule that governments are elected by the voters, and if enough voters express their disapproval of a particular policy, perhaps the government will change tack. External strategies such as this are useful when access to government is challenging (Lundsgaarde, 2013). While there was a media moment in the New Zealand Herald editorial, and student protests when Minister McCully announced his changes, efforts to mobilise the public had little effect. After nine years of a Labour Party-led government, the new National Party government was at the beginning of its 'honeymoon'. There was little chance that the parliamentary opposition was going to gain a great deal of public traction on ODA policy in the public's eye. Political parties who are not in government attempt to gain power by exposing the mistakes of the government of the day (as viewed from the opposition's perspective). This contributes to accountability and transparency of government policy, and is a centrepiece of New Zealand democracy (Prebble, 2010). Yet, the greatest power comes through the voting public. In the absence of public information and wider discussion (due to the ODA policy feedback and accountability gaps), it is easy for the government to fend off opposition attacks. The debate over changes to ODA policy got caught-up in this. In the broader environment of global financial crisis, the rhetoric of efficiency and accountability used by Minister McCully resonated with the public and the National Party government used this to justify changes to a public that generally shows little interest in ODA policy.

Conclusion

In analysing the actors, ideas and rules involved in the 2009 ODA policy goal change, the examination above has some similarities with the 2001 case analysis in Chapter Six. Actor networks were involved in the change process, brought together primarily by

shared policy values and goal ideas. Yet the nature of the networks within and across the cases were different, as canvassed in the next Chapter. While there were several key individuals advancing the 2001 change, in 2009 Minister McCully stands out as a sole individual driving change through a system he knew well. Overall, the Minister had little opposition in his Cabinet, a constrained professional executive, and a parliament that could not scrutinise his actions, along with a disinterested public. It was a powerful minister with particular ideas that trumped rules, raising a question: was it McCully's ministerial role or his behaviour that mattered the most? In the ensuing Chapter I answer this question. Following good causal process tracing practise, Chapter Nine examines findings across both cases, enabling me to respond more fully to the second research question in drawing broader conclusions about how actors, ideas and rules interacted to achieve the 2001 and 2009 New Zealand ODA policy changes.

Chapter Nine: Discussion

As can be seen from the preceeding chapters, particular actors, ideas and rules interacted in the process towards a decision to change New Zealand's ODA policy goals. An argument has taken shape that what was evident in both cases was individual actors behaving entrepreneurially, connected to an ideas-based actor network, with the formal rules allocating power across various actors. In this Chapter I compare the two case findings against each other, and in doing so highlight the factors present in both cases, and consider differences. Through this process, the findings are elaborated and clarified in light of the existing literature, and my response to research questions one and two is completed, while research question three's answer emerges more clearly.

This Chapter begins with a summary of the actors, ideas and rules found to be involved in the two cases. I then consider how rules and actors interacted, how actors with ideas interacted, and examine particular individuals' entrepreneurial behaviour. Before concluding I return to an issue I set aside in Chapter One – the nature of policy change and associated challenges in studying it.

Particular Actors, Ideas and Rules

The analytical framework (Chapter Three) I used was broad to enable an open exploration of the actors, ideas and rules involved in the two policy goal change instances. Applying this framework to the ODA policymaking literature (Chapter Four) led to a narrowing of the framework for its use with the two empirical cases, incorporating what was already known about actors, ideas and rules in ODA policymaking. In this section I briefly summarise what I found in relation to specific actors, ideas and rules present in the two cases (research question one). I compare this with the literature, highlighting points of agreement and departure.

Actors

In terms of societal actors, as found in the literature, the public and media had little involvement in the two changes, even though in 2009 attempts were made to activate an attentive public. NGOs were central actors in the two cases. Unexpectedly, apart from the two individual consulants who conducted the TEMR, the private sector was not a

prominent, active actor in the two ODA policy goal changes, although individuals from the private sector were an important part of Minister McCully's network in 2009. In contrast, Lundsgaarde (2013) found business groups to be involved in ODA policymaking in his country cases, as did Lancaster (2007). This difference could relate to country context, particularly the size of the ODA budget and sophistication of the sector. Finally, for societal actors, political parties were central actors in both 2001 and 2009. In both cases, political parties served as incubators for policy change ideas, with individuals taking the lead to shape the party's election manifestos, ready for implementation when they next won government power. Thus far, ODA policy scholars have not explored political parties' role, confining their academic examination to how parties in government and their ideology relate to ODA's allocation. In New Zealand's two ODA policy goal changes, political parties played a significant role as a 'space' for agenda-setting, problem definition and policy formulation.

Government actors that were central to policy goal change included the professional executive, as anticipated by scholars such as Lundsgaarde (2013) and Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015). In 2001, MFAT formed the greatest opponent to the changes, while the central agencies – SSC and Treasury – provided evidence that supported the changes. In 2009, again the central agencies were important, alongside the foreign ministry and the semi-autonomous ODA Programme. To date, the ODA policymaking literature has not yet fully explored the political executive's role, and Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015, pp. 172-173) argued the political executive played a minor role in their ODA policymaking cases. While this may be the case for routine policymaking, this research finds that various actors within the political executive are central to ODA policy goal change, including political advisors, ministers, and Cabinet. Ministers are accountable for their portfolio and need to be convinced that policy change is necessary to argue for it in Cabinet. In 2009, Minister McCully led the charge for change, while in 2001 Ministers Goff and Robson realised change was necessary and worked hard to convince their Cabinet colleagues to support change. Without support from across Cabinet, the changes would not have occurred in either case, emphasising Cabinet's central role in policy goal change decision-making. Illustrating political advisors's role, in 2001 David Shearer was a crucial individual in a position that gave him the power he needed to advance ODA policy change from the agenda, through policy formulation to a final decision.

Shearer's central change role introduces the importance to New Zealand ODA policy change of individuals behaving in particular ways, what the literature broadly refers to as individual policy entrepreneurs (detailed in Chapter Three). Across both policy goal changes individuals behaving entrepreneurially were necessary for change. I discuss this further below, along with exploring how actors grouped together in their efforts to achieve policy goal change.

Ideas

Ideationally, the notions that drove actors were predominantly policy values and policy goal ideas. As the two cases show, change proponents in 2001, who became change resisters in 2009, were concerned with New Zealand's distant interests, or at least enlightened self-interests overseas, and believed ODA policy should focus solely on achieving development in recipient countries. Contributing policy values for this group of actors were also beliefs that social justice was key to human progress, and collective and state action were necessary for social progress. The 2001 status quo defenders, MFAT, were concerned primarily with New Zealand's close interests overseas and believed ODA policy should be a flexible tool to use as best fitted New Zealand's close interests at any particular moment in time. The 2009 change proponents, particularly Minister McCully, believed similarly, but also that New Zealand's interests overseas were mixed in regard to the Pacific region. Here, change proponents believed in a dual benefit approach to ODA policy – that ODA policy could both achieve New Zealand's close interests and recipient countries' development goals. Also motivating the 2009 change grouping was the policy value that private sector-led economic development was the first priority for any state: invest in a thriving private sector and all else will flow from this. Conveniently, this belief meant that New Zealand's close interests to advance its exports overseas aligned with the perceived need that ODA receiving countries needed to develop their private sector.

The ODA policymaking literature has examined the various ideational motivations for ODA's quality and geographical allocation, and similar ideas about close and distant interests have been found to permeate ODA policy decisions (see Chapter Four). Further, several scholars argue that policy values are important, such as Lancaster (2007), van der Veen (2000) and Hook (1995). What the findings from the case analyses here offer is a detailed description of the specific policy values and policy goal ideas involved in New Zealand ODA policy goal change. Given the common findings

across the extant analyses on ideas in ODA policymaking, it is likely that similar ideas will come to the fore in other countries' policy goal change experiences. For example, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015, p. 140) found what helped significant ODA policy reform in the Czech Republic was the government's interests overseas, particularly the desire to 'do' development responsibly, to then boost the Czech Republic's prestige and reputation overseas – an enlightened self-interest approach to ODA policy.

Learning and scientific evidence played different roles across each case. In 2001, the NGO campaign Aid Works was based on research that used international good practice standards about what quality ODA policy was – essentially standards developed through ongoing global learning and evidence about what works. The TEMR consultants also used these international standards to construct a framework against which to assess the ODA Programme. Other countries' experiences were referred to in policy formulation in the 2001 changes, particularly to show that ideas about what to change were not entirely novel or untested elsewhere. In the 2001 case, learning and scientific evidence formed the base for the argument for change. Yet, the policy values of the people involved also influenced the use of ideas from learning. Had a diplomat been part of the TEMR team, different learning and evidence may have been seen as valuable and also used as part of the argument, which may have softened the push for change. This point indicates that individuals' policy values influenced the use of learning and evidence, which is what policy scholars such as Weible (2009), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), and Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993) argue.

This phenomena was prominent in the 2009 case, where facts about the Pacific situation and the ODA Programme were selectively chosen and used to shore-up the case for change. What was driving the desire for change in 2009 were policy values and policy goal end ideas, not learning about what works in ODA policy or the situation in developing countries and New Zealand's contribution to it. For example, facts about depopulation and economic stagnation in some of New Zealand's key partner recipient states were used to argue New Zealand's ODA policy was not working. Yet, ODA has limited direct influence on people's movement or the economic growth of any particular country (Wood, 2010, Berthélemy et al., 2009), highlighting the scant engagement with learning and evidence that 2009 change proponents had. Also used were arguments about accountability, which did not withstand closer scrutiny. In part, the use of information and accountability arguments were used to obscure the fact that what was

predominantly motivating change were policy values prioritising New Zealand's close interests.

Rules

As I argued in Chapter Three, while policy change theorists attend to rules, they do not give them equal weighting alongside actors and ideas. Meanwhile, ODA policymaking scholars' findings indicate rules are important in ODA policymaking (Lundsgaarde, 2013, Lancaster, 2007). What I found in the two cases is that rules may not be the hero in policy change, but they play a significant role in that they shape the context within which actors act, both constraining and helping them. The rules prescribe actors' power (resources, access and authority), and therefore what they can and cannot do, and achieve. Yet, some rules are stronger or less ambiguous than others. This gives actors leeway to interpret and avoid formal rules, as I outline below. Also, the lack of particular rules has an impact on the change process and where decision-making power lies. Important formal rules that did exist in the two ODA policy change cases were electoral rules, parliamentary rules, intra-governmental rules, (such as those governing Cabinet, and relations between the professional and political executives), and rules establishing the number of governmental access points for societal actors attempting to engage on ODA policy change. I discuss these further below.

Together, For and Against ODA Policy Goal Change

What emerged in both cases were two actor networks, one that advanced change while one opposed. (I use the term 'networks' generically.) Bringing and holding actors together in each network were shared ideas about New Zealand's interests overseas, how social progress occurred, whether ODA should be spent for development or non-development foreign policy purposes, and how much autonomy and authority ODA policy should have to pursue good practice. Connected with either pro-change or pro-status quo ideas-based networks were individuals who were in positions of power, but who behaved entrepreneurially in those positions. The rules both shaped actors' ability to advance change, as well as being interpreted by actors, particularly policy entrepreneurs. Therefore, it is difficult to meaningfully discuss rules without also considering actors.

Rules and Actors

Legislation's Absence

As outlined above, the absence of legislation for ODA's quality had an impact on both the actors involved, as well as the rule settings the actors needed to negotiate. In these two cases, the absence of ODA legislation meant that decision-making power sat with Cabinet and parliament was not actively engaged. This reduced the number of veto-points for actors to negotiate, because if legislation had existed the changes would have impacted upon it, therefore requiring parliament's involvement. Further, the lack of legislation meant that the process was simpler, needing to only convince Cabinet of policy goal changes, rather than a parliamentary select committee, parliament, and potentially an attentive public.

Electoral Rules

Electoral rules were fundamental to the two ODA policy goal changes, specifically the three-year parliamentary term. In both policy change instances a government change was necessary to get ODA policy change on to the government's agenda, and individuals who wanted change prepared for the election well-ahead of time. This rule creates the regular potential for a predictable window opening in Kingdon's (2011, p. 174, 186) political stream – a change in government. As discussed later, actors, particularly those behaving entrepreneurially, prepare for this opportunity.

Some argued the MMP electoral rules led to ODA policy change being placed on the government agenda in 1999 as part of the coalition agreement. This is based on the associated Cabinet rule that Cabinet must retain the support of parliament (McLeay, 2010, pp. 190-195), and so the party with the largest party vote will form stable agreements with other parties (if necessary) to have support from a parliamentary majority. Arguably, this provides bargaining space for smaller parties that could offer a larger party supply and confidence, enabling a smaller party to put ODA policy on the government agenda in return for their support. Lancaster (2007) also argued this point. There is no evidence for this in the 2001 case, as outlined in Chapter Six. Besides this, ODA policy review was in the Labour Party election manifesto. However, MMP electoral rules did shape Cabinet, and the Alliance Party's Cabinet presence was central to the final ODA policy goal change decision. If Associate Minister Robson had not fought for a stand-alone agency and been willing to compromise with a semi-autonomous body in the face of Prime Ministerial opposition Labour Party Cabinet

members may have agreed to less substantial changes. In 2009, no potential coalition party had any interest in ODA policy, and the National Party exclusively comprised Cabinet.

Parliamentary Rules

Parliamentary rules played a passive role in both ODA policy changes, in that they were avoided or ignored. The rules give parliament the power to scrutinise government, but in both cases specific actors knew the rules and worked around them, or interpreted ambiguous rules to their advantage. In the 2001 case, change proponents did not want the review to be a parliamentary select committee review. A ministerial review was the desired outcome because it had power, and because if a minister called for a review the minister was likely to implement the recommendations. In this case, actors manoeuvred to avoid exposing their change agenda to a select committee, instead ensuring ministers decided to lead the review.

In 2009, the parliamentary rule that parliament scrutinises the political executive was in tension with the rule that the political executive is drawn from a parliament in which it dominates. Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, John Hayes, was able to exploit the gap between these two rules to protect Minister McCully from parliamentary scrutiny. This highlights how actors can interpret ambiguous rules to their advantage.

Intra-Governmental Rules

As Lundsgaarde (2013, pp. 34-38) found, how the rules allocate power across government plays an important role in routine ODA policymaking. The findings from the two New Zealand cases support Lunsgaard's. In both policy goal changes, the legislation governing the state services and government finances gave greater power to the central agencies. Along with the DPMC these three agencies are responsible for the efficient and effective running of the entire government. The requirement for central agencies to be involved must be adhered to – an unambiguous rule. As the 2001 change required establishing a new government entity, albeit attached to an existing one, central agency advice about this entity's functions and costs was crucial in the case for change, and they explored various options. In 2009, Minister McCully did not request an in-depth examination of all options, simply asking the central agencies to prepare papers for the removal of NZAID's (ODA Programme's) semi-autonomous status and a change in policy goal end. This left little space for broader analysis that would undermine the case for Minister McCully's desired changes. Although, Treasury did initially advise

their Minister not to support the organisational arrangement changes (New Zealand Treasury, 2009d). Again, this illustrates how individuals can act to mimise the impact of quite strong rules, in that Minister McCully set review parameters that mitigated the wide-reaching potential power of the central agencies.

While the central agencies have significant power, MFAT is the pre-eminent government entity tasked with advancing New Zealand's interests overseas and so has authority over this policymaking area, including ODA policy. In enacting the 2001 changes, it was MFAT's dominance that change advocates were attempting to diffuse, through giving ODA policy greater authority and autonomy. Although powerful, MFAT was unable to counter the Ministers' and central agencies' support for change – further emphasising how the rules prescribe greater power to ministers and central agencies vis-à-vis MFAT, at least for ODA policy goal change. In 2009, although it was the only government entity able to provide quality advice on ODA policy, NZAID's voice was muted within the Cabinet papers. MFAT was still the more powerful government entity, and now MFAT had greater traction with a Minister sympathetic to diplomats who prioritised New Zealand's close interests. NZAID did find support from Treasury, although this was not strongly expressed. Ultimately, ministers have power over their agencies and do not have to take the professional executive's advice.

Cabinet holds great power in New Zealand, drawn from a parliament where the government has a majority for confidence and supply. Cabinet rules dictate collective Cabinet responsibility for decisions made (with specific MMP exceptions (Duncan, 2015, p. 229)), individual ministerial responsibility for their portfolio (and their professional executive), and collective decision-making (McLeay, 2010, pp. 190-195). Also influencing the power balance in Cabinet are the electoral rules, which can lead to different parties in Cabinet. In 2001, Ministers Goff and Robson had to fight in Cabinet for their desired policy goal change, and only won ultimately because they agreed to compromise on a semi-autonomous body rather than a stand-alone agency. This compromise came predominantly from Associate Minister Robson, with Minister Goff's agreement. The support of the Finance and State Services Ministers was also crucial, due to their agencies' power.

New Zealand's Cabinet is notable for its long-standing convention of collegial and collective decision-making (McLeay, 2010, p. 187). For the Alliance, consensual

decision-making was a necessity, because they were four individuals and Labour had 16: the Alliance would likely loose if a vote was ever necessary. In this situation, the mutual agreement on the policy change that Goff and Robson had also helped achieve the change. In fact, this agreement had been necessary all along given Goff held primary responsibility as the principal Minister for foreign affairs. For this reason and for the power-balance in Cabinet, if it had only been Robson driving change it was unlikely to have occurred. Yet, Goff also needed Robson and the Alliance, as they gave added weight in Cabinet against the Prime Minister's opposition.

In 2009, after nine years in opposition, ODA policy was not a policy area the first-term National Cabinet had prioritised. Also, National Party parliamentarians exclusively comprised Cabinet, so coalition partners' views were irrelevant. This, along with Minister McCully's personal power in the National Party, likely meant that it would not have taken much for Cabinet to agree with his desired policy changes. Also, Minister McCully had retained sole responsibility over ODA policy, so had no associate minister to work with. Yet, he still needed support from some Cabinet members, such as Groser (Minister of Trade) and Ryall (Minister of State Services), and at least not outright opposition from English (Minister of Finance). Overall, the subtle power balance in Cabinet favoured McCully, combined with the low public salience of ODA policy.

Finally, the rules between political and professional executives also allocate power over ODA policy across government. These rules were pertinent for the 2001 MFAT Secretary, Neil Walter, whose efforts were hindered by the rules, because he could not risk loosing the confidence of his Minister. This is one potential reason why he did not act to mobilise potential societal change opponents. Further, there was no way he could coordinate with the Prime Minister's opposition to change, even if he had been inclined to. Yet, Walter's behaviour did traverse a fine line along the rules, as outlined in Chapter Six. While there was some room for Secretary Walter to interpret the rules, they were clear enough to prevent Walter from doing everything he could to prevent change, because doing so would have undermined his position and made it difficult for him to continue in the role under Minister Goff. NZAID and MFAT faced a similar quandry in 2009, whereby they could not give their free and frank advice for risk of undermining Minister McCully's confidence in them, right at the beginning of a new government. Ultimately, the rules provide the minister with greater power than their professional executive, and also over their associate minister, when there is one.

Access for External Actors

In terms of how government and society interact, New Zealand government is relatively open, and its citizens enjoy "a degree of intimacy" (Miller, 2015, p. 24) with parliamentarians and the executive. The fact that MFAT or NZAID, while it existed, oversaw delivery of almost all of New Zealand's ODA meant that there was only one agency for societal actors to engage with to influence ODA policy. A history of an associate minister of foreign affairs responsible for ODA, or simply the minister of foreign affairs retaining this responsibility, presents up to two central authority figures to access. However, for the ODA policy goal changes, the three central agencies became additional points for societal actors to engage with. This brought the total agencies with power over ODA policy to a maximum of five, and their corresponding ministers (one of whom was the Prime Minister). In 2001, Webster's seniority in the Labour Party enabled her access to the SSC and Finance Ministers, but she could not access the Prime Minister. Even if Webster had not been involved, given the Labour Party shared similar policy values with the NGOs driving policy change, ministers were likely to meet with NGOs or at least have a sympathetic ear. This indicates that even if there are several access points, when they are open it is easier for societal actors to influence them, as Lundsgaarde (2013, pp. 32-36) found. Yet, when access points are closed, even if there is only one, this presents a significant hurdle for societal actors. In 2009, Minister McCully did meet with CID's Board, twice, likely because they were a powerful actor in the international development community – highlighting how the resources of societal actors can gain them access. Yet the Finance Minister and Prime Minister both referred CID back to Minister McCully when CID attempted to engage with them over the ODA policy goal changes. This closed other potential influencing channels, leaving only Minister McCully. CID also used 'outsider' strategies, such as mobilising the public (Lundsgaarde, 2013, p. 33), which may have been in response to having limited access to decision-makers.

What Does This Tell Us About Rules and Actors in ODA Policy Change?

The rules create the context – essentially a web of power – that actors have to negotiate to advance policy goal change. Using a broad analytical framework to explore formal rules helped to focus in detail on this web, and pull-out specific 'threads', how they were connected to others, and how actors navigated amongst them.

These findings reflect what was already known in the literature: that rules can be ambiguous, leaving space for actors to interpret, manipulate, avoid or negotiate them. Although, some rules are less equivocal than others. For example, the Electoral Act 1993, the State Services Act 1988 and Public Finances Act 1989 created strong rules that actors had to abide by, even if they could act to diminish some rules' power. Meanwhile, the parliamentary select committee rule that the committee can call the minister to account is easy to avoid for a political executive that has majority support in parliament, or for actors able to influence ministers' decisions. The lack of ODA legislation set the broader arena for where the decision-making was made, creating Cabinet as the key decision point.

These points highlight the concept of rule-nesting (Ostrom, 2007), as discussed in Chapter Three. Constitutional rules set the context for policymaking, and policymaking rules do so for operational rules. Yet, even within each of these three levels there are rule-sets, with some rules stronger than others. For example, the electoral rules are constitutional rules, enshrined in legislation and requiring a significant amount of parliamentary scrutiny and power to overturn. In contrast, the House of Representatives Standing Orders are also constitutional rules (Duncan, 2015, p. 217), yet contain rules that actors can work around, such as a select committee's ability to scrutinise the executive. Further, powerful actors can 'layer' (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010b, p. 15) a policymaking rule upon a constitutional rule. For example NZAID was established at the policymaking rule level through a Cabinet decision – a decision that conflicted in some ways with the State Sector Act 1988. This policymaking rule ran alongside the legislation and required specific procedures to manage. It also meant that in 2009, it was easy to undo this decision, only requiring a Cabinet decision. If legislation related to the ODA policy goal change had been passed in 2001, the 2009 changes would have had to involve parliament to a greater degree, and possibly mitigated Minister McCully's power. While the three rule nestings involve stronger and less ambigous rules at the constitutional level compared to the operational level, what the cases examined here show is that within each level there are different types of rules with varying ambiguity.

In ODA-specific legislation's absence, ministers and Cabinet hold the greatest power in making ODA policy goal change decisions,. Within this, the central agencies and their ministers have slightly more power than other ministers, although the minister of foreign affairs also weilds extra power as the individual responsible for that portfolio. In

turn, Cabinet has to maintain the confidence of parliament, which is achieved through negotiating coalition government, or confidence and supply, agreements. The requirement for these emerge from the electoral rules, which also specify the most important rule shaping the context that all actors have to adhere to: the three-year parliamentary term.

What this all indicates is a delicate interplay between the existing rules prescribing actors' power, and how actors interpret and engage with these rules to utilise and expand their power. In this analysis I have begun to pull apart the web of rules, helping to understand the complex process of ODA policy goal change, and the role formal rules, or their absence, play in helping or hindering action towards policy goal change. While rules are central to the change process, it is particular actors with specific ideas that actively drive policy goal change.

Idea-Based Networks

In both policy goal change instances, actors were situated as either for or against change, and grouped together into relationship networks. The exception here is in 2001, when the status quo defenders were unrelated – MFAT and the Prime Minister – although there was the potential for more actors to have been activated. In 2009, the actors resisting change were the actors that drove change in 2001. In 2009, the pro-change network was a loose group of individuals without the same degree of integration as the change resisters, and were essentially grouped around Murray McCully. What brought and held actors together into networks were shared policy values and policy goal ideas, effectively comprising ideas-based networks.

2001 Change Proponents and Status Quo Defenders
The creation of NZAID and its focus on poverty elimination in 2001 was a policy goal change achieved through the collective efforts of societal and governmental actors. These actors' policy values and goals have been well-articulated by this point, revolving around priority for New Zealand's distant interests overseas.

CID, NGOs' umbrella agency, was a formalised mechanism facilitating NGO collective action. As stated in Chapter One, CID's NGO members paid a fee to belong, and were required to agree to basic international development principles. CID members all shared similar policy values and policy goal end ideas, and endorsed the 1999 Aid Works

campaign. CID's members also contributed financially and in-kind to the Aid Works campaign, particularly the 'Partners as a Common Future' research. Although NGOs shared resources and were collectively coordinated, what linked them and the other actors into this particular pro-change network was not resources or power, but shared ideas.

CID's advancement of specific ODA policy goal ideas filtered through to like-minded political parties as they developed their election policies, particularly the Labour Party, predominantly due to Webster's involvement. The Alliance and Green Party also had similar perspectives on ODA policy, and were sympathetic to CID's ideas. Once ODA policy change was on the new Labour-Alliance government agenda, governmental actors took over, led by Ministers Goff and Robson, and David Shearer. Also part of this actor grouping were others, such as former and current ODA Programme staff, select committee Chair Graham Kelly, and the Alliance Caucus Secretary and Senior Advisor David Cuthbert. Further, the two TEMR consultants also had affiliations with NGOs and had worked closely with the NGO community. Throughout the entire process, a small group kept in touch, predominantly comprised of Webster, Shearer, Cuthbert and Kelly. These individuals were in senior positions across society and government, and helped to advance the change agenda forward.

In contrast to the pro-change grouping, the 2001 opposition was limited to the Prime Minister and MFAT. While MFAT were tasked with supporting the TEMR consultants to conduct the review (and funding it), MFAT had little involvement in the process besides having its staff interviewed. It was not until the TEMR team were conducting public consultations, and the submission of the draft report, that the MFAT Secretary leapt into action to defend the status quo, supported by other senior staff and reflecting the views of many diplomats. There is no evidence DPMC and MFAT collaborated to undermine the Foreign Affairs Minister and his Associate, and this would have broken formal rules about interaction between the professional and political executives. Potentially, there were other actors who may have opposed the policy changes, such as former diplomats, private sector entities and recipient governments. There is no evidence that the MFAT Secretary acted to mobilise these actors (and they did not mobilise of their own accord). Ultimately, although MFAT was a powerful government actor, the arguments for maintaining the status quo failed to gain wider support, most importantly, with the responsible Ministers and the central agencies. The Prime

Minister's opposition to a stand-alone ODA Programme was also overcome by these Ministers, and an agreement to compromise. In the end, there was no network defending the status quo. Arguably, if there had been a network including societal actors, such as the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs or the Chambers of Commerce, change would have been much harder for the pro-change network to advance. More actors would have needed to have been convinced to support change, and ministers would then have had to deal with a powerful societal constituency potentially arguing against change.

2009 Change Advocates and Resisters

In 2009, there was a small and loose pro-change network, involving a variety of individual actors. These actors tended to hold policy values from the right of the political spectrum, and emphasised ODA's use to advance New Zealand's close interests, or dual benefit ODA outcomes.

Minister McCully was the change-leader, with support in parliament from former diplomats Groser and Hayes. These individuals set the agenda for change while in parliamentary opposition, and then drove change through when they gained political power, with other Cabinet members' support. Minister McCully had also used his established networks, predominantly to inform his thinking. Prominent in this network were individuals, such as Peter Kiely and Trevor Janes. As discussed in Chapter Eight Minister McCully also sought and valued broader private sector views. While there is no evidence that Minister McCully engaged proactively with the Chambers of Commerce or Charles Finny, he would have noted the policy recommendations in the Chambers' 2008 election manifesto and viewed this as further support for his preferred policy change. Unlike the 2001 change proponents, this ideas-based network was not formally organised and did not share financial resources.

Those resisting change in 2009 were those who argued for change in 2001: NGOs, the Labour Party and other left-leaning parties in opposition in 2009. In fact, Phil Twyford, the 2009 Labour Party's spokesperson on ODA was a member of CID's Aid Works campaign committee in 1997-1998, when he was head of Oxfam New Zealand. This network was not as activated as it had been to advance change in 2001, because it was reacting to prevent a proposed change, rather than preparing to make change. Further, these change resisters only learned about the potential changes in February 2009, and

the changes were decided in Cabinet in April – giving opponents only three months to mobilise. Yet, CID's existence did enable a relatively quick response amongst NGOs and associates. They pooled resources for the Summit on the Future of NZ's Aid and Don't Corrupt Aid campaign. However, within CID there were difficulties in agreeing how to respond to Minister McCully – to oppose his perspective or to try to engage proactively, partially underpinned by concerns about government funding. Along with time and information constraints, these disagreements limited the change resisters' ability to engage in collective opposition to the changes. These sorts of struggles were also found in Lundsgaarde's (2013, pp. 193-194) work, indicating that to be effective in ODA policymaking NGOs need to overcome these dilemmas and disagreements. It is not enough to simply have an established collective presence.

What Does This Tell Us About Actors and Ideas in ODA Policy Change?

I explored how actors grouped together based on their membership, the degree of integration, their collective possession of power, and their shared beliefs (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992, Marsh and Smith, 2000, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The two cases confirmed that actors are brought and held together through their shared beliefs, particularly their shared policy values and policy goal ideas. This is what the Advocacy Coalition Framework emphasises. Yet counter to this Framework, two or more distinct, coherent actor groupings did not develop in each of the two cases. In both cases, there was one strong coalition – that of societal and governmental actors who drove the 2001 change and resisted the 2009 change. In contrast, in 2001, two unconnected, albeit powerful, actors defended the status quo. While in 2009, one powerful actor drove change, connected to a loose network of individuals cutting across society and government. Neither of these comprised a strongly connected grouping, such as a coalition, indicating the presence of at least two coalitions was not a feature in the policy goal changes examined.

Further, while Rhodes' and Marsh's (1992) broad 'policy networks' continuum provided useful criteria, alongside shared beliefs, with which to assess actor-groupings, the findings here undermine their definition of an 'issue network'. Examining the actor-interactions for their membership, degree of integration and command of resources highlighted that the 2001 change network and 2009 change resisters involved CID's membership, which required reasonable integration and resource sharing amongst NGOs (giving them collective power). Other individuals – some of whom were in

powerful positions – had been part of CID and/or their member NGOs in the past. While to some degree these actors cohered into a policy community, what brought them together was more than their professional interests, as Rhodes and Marsh (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992) suggest, but their shared policy values. In contrast, the 2009 pro-change network was loose and unformalised in any way, but not conforming to the characteristics of Rhodes and Marsh's (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992) 'issue network': actors were not in conflict with one another and a zero-sum game was not present. The dominant characteristics cohering the 2009 pro-change network were shared policy value and goal ideas, and Minister McCully. Therefore, while Rhodes and Marsh's criteria are useful in assessing how actors come together, in these cases, their policy community-policy networks continuum does not quite fit with the findings.

A conclusion here may be that if there is no powerful individual behaving entrepreneurially, such as Minister McCully, a wider, more cohesive actor network is necessary to advance change. The lack of any organised network opposing change in 2001 may also have contributed to the change proponent's success, and underscores the power such a network can bring to change processes. Alternatively, if a powerful actor is present, even a cohesive network protecting the status quo may struggle to do so, such as in 2009. As well as the importance of some sort of actor network, as discussed above, my findings show how significant individuals were to change, and these individuals played a role in connecting actors, while simultaneously emerging from ideas-based networks.

Individuals and Entrepreneurial Behaviour

As noted above, individuals were central actors in the two changes. In 2001, several individuals were important, yet some more than others. In 2009, Minister McCully of Foreign Affairs stands out as the key individual leading the pro-change agenda. In both 2001 and 2009, what made particular individuals significant to the change decision was their behaviour: they exhibted aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour.

A Series of Entrepreneurial Efforts: 2001
In 2001, Pat Webster of CID and Minister Goff's political advisor, David Shearer, behaved entrepreneurially. Other actors also contributed in important ways, such as the TEMR consultants and the Ministers, but their potentially entrepreneurial behaviour is less clear.

Webster behaved in a way no previous CID Executive Director had. New to CID, she discovered that one thing the NGO members could agree on was the need for ODA quality to improve. Webster understood that to get a significant change, you had to be able to 'work' the political system: it was about politics. Showing persistence over time, she formed an opinion about ODA policy and how it could be improved, and worked with CID members to build the Aid Works campaign for the election. Through this campaign, Webster began to set the agenda for ODA policy change. Simultaneously, Webster worked with the Labour Party's ODA opposition spokesperson, Graham Kelly, to develop the Labour Party's ODA election manifesto.

Webster's established, senior Labour Party membership, and her CID Executive Director role, gave her a claim to be heard, and credibility and trustworthiness amongst Labour Party parliamentarians, some of who became ministers after the election. Even though Webster's ability to advance change waned once ODA policy change was on the government's agenda, she remained involved, working to build and maintain relationships with individuals in government, such as David Shearer. Through these relationships Webster had input into the decision for a ministerial review, and the TEMR consultant selection. Still persisting even though no longer with CID, at the final decision stage, Webster used her senior role in the Labour Party to engage with important ministers to help persuade them to agree to change.

Another individual who behaved entrepreneurially to advance change was David Shearer. Shearer may not have entered his political advisory role with a strong view about New Zealand's ODA policy, having recently returned from overseas. Yet, he soon realised that the ODA Programme required an entire culture change, and he formed relationships with others who agreed, such as Webster. Shearer benefitted from these individuals' informed opinions on the process, including the type, breadth and scope of the review, and the consultants' suitability. Shearer was crucial because he could see what was required, and was informed by external individuals, but worked the internal government processes to facilitate the TEMR and guide its recommendations through to a decision. Shearer wrote the final Cabinet papers and negotiated with other government agencies to advance change. If there had not been such an individual within government, it is possible the review would have been a select committee review. As discussed in Chapter Five, Minister Robson had initially considered the select committee as a

potential venue for the review. Similarly, the review could have had a more limited scope, as the first draft Terms of Reference were narrow (also discussed in Chapter Five). MFAT also put forward the of potential consultants, and it was possible that without Shearer, other consultants could have been selected. Finally, without Shearer convinced of the need for change, the final recommendation could have been diluted in the face of MFAT opposition. The Minister and Associate Minister were too busy to focus on the details of the process, and left it to Shearer, who they trusted, particularly given Shearer's background in international humanitarian and development work. Without an active, politically aware individual in this role, the review could have languished and faded into memory.

Webster and Shearer became they key custodians of the change process. While each had to be in their particular position to be able to advance change, others in their positions had not advanced such change previously, highlighting that Webster and Shearer exhibited particular behaviour. This behaviour included: networking with like-minded individuals; ensuring the review was a ministerial one, not a select committee inquiry; getting the right people to conduct the review; and persuading people across government to support the changes. They did not break the rules, but they knew what the important rules were, and how to work within them to advance change. Webster and Shearer were necessary to the ODA policy change. Remove either of these individuals from the process and the change may not have got on the government agenda and moved through to final Cabinet decision.

Yet, other individuals were also important in change. MFAT accused the Ministerial Review team – Grossman and Lees –of writing an overly negative report to achieve a pre-conceived outcome. This hints at the potential the TEMR consultants behaved entrepreneurially in advancing their preferred policy solution. The TEMR did selectively use negative quotes from an MFAT review, giving some credence to the argument the reviewers were attempting to be as negative as possible to force the Ministers' hands. Comments MFAT staff provided on the final TEMR report also indicated the TEMR consultants may have under-emphasised the positive work MFAT had done with ODA. Reading across the report, the consultants established an evidence-base for what was an 'excellent' ODA Programme, based on global standards, and assessed the ODA Programme against this. This was a reasonable approach to take and one most analysts would use. Yet, had the consultants had a different set of policy

values and policy goal ideas, they may have been less likely to draw on global international development thinking, and more likely to take a non-development foreign policy perspective of ODA. This could have resulted in more incremental TEMR recommendations, and potentially the absence of the recommendation to give the ODA Programme greater authority and autonomy. Overall, although any professional consultant would have used a similar analytical approach, the reference point would have been different, so the choice of the two consultants was important, particularly in that they shared the same policy values as the NGOs and many (but not all) in the Labour Party. But, once chosen, did the TEMR consultants behave entrepreneurially to advance a pre-set policy agenda? As written, the report gave the Ministers their substantive arguments to push forward change, without which it would have been difficult to achieve a change decision in Cabinet, particularly with Prime Ministerial opposition. Weighting up all the available evidence, it is not possible to state definitively whether or not the consultants behaved entreprenurially to advance their preferred policy change.

Finally, for the 2001 case, Ministers Goff and Robson were central individuals, given that they made the decision to conduct the Ministerial Review, and ultimately had to argue for the change in Cabinet. Because the ODA commitments were in the Labour Party's election manifesto, to some degree it did not matter who from the Labour Party gained the ministerial positions for foreign affairs and ODA, as implementing the manifesto commitments would be an expectation of any minister. Yet, different ministers may have had less prior knowledge and different opinions about what was required, meaning they may have been less likely to support a significant review or the recommendations afterwards, particularly if the report did not convince them. Associate Minister Robson in particular had strong prior views about the adequacy of ODA, while Goff was convinced by the TEMR report. It was also important to have Finance Minister Michael Cullen and State Services Minister Trevor Mallard in support of the change. Without these two Ministers, other Cabinet members would have been more reluctant to enact machinery of government changes.

However, the fact that these Ministers argued for, and supported, change, does not mean they were behaving entrepreneurially. In the case of Cullen and Mallard, it appears they were convinced by the arguments for change, and their ministries' advice that change would not be costly or present cross-government coordination problems, and therefore

supported change because it would provide the most effective and efficient ODA policy outcomes. Arguably, Minister Goff was similar: while he argued for change he did vacillate at one point, considering whether the damage to MFAT relationships was worth the change. In the end, he decided better quality ODA policy was more important. While Minister Goff fought for change, he was not entrepreneurial, simply arguing for what he believed to be the best policy approach for effective and efficient ODA.

The only Minister who exhibted entrepreneurial behaviour was Associate Minister Robson. Prior to entering parliament he had worked with international development NGOs and held a perspective about MFAT that the TEMR report reinforced. When it was obvious he was not going to achieve a fully separate ODA Programme, Robson conceeded to a semi-autonomous body – an entrepreneurial strategy (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016) – that expended some of the Alliance's political capital in Cabinet, given they were four of twenty Cabinet members. Goff agreed with Robson's suggestion. This behaviour ensured Cabinet agreed to ODA policy goal change.

The Lone Entrepreneur

In 2009, the pivotal individual driving change was Minister McCully, coming close to being all that was required for the change to occur. Minister McCully had power in Cabinet, partly through being feared, as well as being a long-term, loyal National Party member. He shared the National Party's policy values. He had credibility, having worked on foreign policy since 2006. He had established particular policy preferences. He knew how to work the system to his advantage, and how to 'spin' the changes with the public (if there was any public engagement). He used his existing personal network to inform his views, and expanded this network to others he trusted and from whom he needed support. He developed a plan during opposition, and then once in power rapidly enacted it. It is not inevitable that a minister behaves this way: neither Minister in the 2001 change did. Minister McCully behaved entrepreneurially in formulating and driving his preferred policy change through to a final decision. Some interviewees argued Minister McCully had a personal agenda to dismantle anything the Labour Party had created – I did not find evidence of this, but given his particular personal style, it is possible. This only reinforces the argument he behaved as an entrepreneur, as having a personal agenda is a characteristic of policy entrepreneurs noted in the literature.

Not Quite Entrepreneurial?

A final note is due to 2001 MFAT Secretary Neil Walter and 2009 opposition ODA spokesperson Phil Twyford. Both individuals' behaviour in attempting to prevent change stands out. Constrained by only learning about the changes during the policy formulation stage, both behaved in ways others may not have behaved in their roles. This behaviour verged on entrepreneurial behaviour, but in the final analysis, neither quite managed to advance their arguments beyond their close circle within their roles. Perhaps time worked aainst them and they would have been more successful if they had been able to engage during agenda-setting. Perhaps they were simply exceptional at their jobs, but this does not equate with being entrepreneurial. These issues raise questions about entrepreneurial behaviour: can those defending change behave entrepreneurially?; precisely where does entrepreneurial behaviour begin and end?; and are there degrees of entrepreneurial behaviour? I revisit these questions below.

What Does This Tell Us About Entrepreneurialism in ODA Policy Change?

These findings elaborate on those of Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015) and Breuning(2013), all of whom found individuals, potentially behaving entrepreneurially, were involved in substantial ODA policy change. In contrast to ODA policymaking scholars, policy researchers have a more extensive understanding of policy entreprenerialism, as introduced in Chapter Three. Applying this knowledge to the two New Zealand cases offers further insights into entrepreneurialism in ODA policy change, and raises questions about entrepreneurialism in policy change that require futher consideration.

One type of entrepreneurial behaviour exhibited strongly in the two cases is that of knowing the system and steering through it to advance policy change. As Mintrom (2000, pp. 282-283) states,

> [o]ften, those who are most able to realize success have first spent a great deal of time learning the 'rules of the game' with respect to the policymaking process. Knowing these rules – both formal rules and informal norms of behaviour – policy entrepreneurs can then seek to use them to their own advantage.

Webster, Shearer, and McCully knew the rules that shaped the system they were working within for ODA policy change, and took action to pro-actively avoid or mitigate rules that would undermine their drive for change. For example, preparing for the election and possible government change, avoiding a select committee review in

2001, undermining the select committee rule in 2009, and mitigating the impact central agency analyses may have on the case for change in 2009.

In each of the two New Zealand ODA policy goal change cases different entrepreneurial behaviour was exhibited by different actors. In the 2001 case, several individuals behaving entrepreneurially were necessary to advance policy change: Webster from society, Shearer from within government, and Associate Minister Robson in Cabinet. Compared with the 2009 change, it was predominantly Minister McCully who conceived of, moulded and enacted change. This relates to the type of change that actors aimed to achieve – a point I cover in detail below. It also highlights how the existing context matters (Mintrom, 2013, p. 444): the actors, ideas and rules in place at the time a drive for change commences has an impact on the type of entrepreneurial behaviour requried, and by whom.

What this different entrepreneurial behaviour from different actors also indicates is an interplay between the rules prescribing power, and actors' behaviour. Entrepreneurial individuals possess skills and attributes that enable them to exert greater agency than others (Mintrom, 2000, p. 282), yet in the two cases only individuals in particular roles could actually achieve impact from this greater agency. For example, if Webster had been a CID policy analyst (for example) rather than the Executive Director, her position would not have allowed her to engage in entrepreneurial behaviour, or at least behaviour that would have had significant impact on policy. While skills are important, so are roles and their rules.

Also related to the rules are the questions I posed earlier regarding Walter's and Twyford's status quo defence activities. Often, analysts of policy entrepreneurialism assert that entrepreneurs aim to change the status quo (Mintrom, 2013, Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Yet, it is possible that entrepreneurialism also occurs to prevent change (Ackrill and Kay, 2011, p. 78). For Twyford and Walter, was it the rules prescribing their roles that prevented them from being more entrepreneurial, or were they simply not good entrepreneurs? Temporal issues are also raised here: does effective entrepreneurial behaviour require action during agenda-setting, rather than during policy formulation, as occurred for Twyford and Walter? These questions indicate a need to more clearly theorise entrepreneurial behaviour, a point I emphasise below.

In Chapter Three I relay Mintrom and Norman's (Mintrom and Norman, 2009) archetypal policy entrepreneur as an individual who practises social acuity, frames problems, builds teams, and leads by example. These scholars, along with others (Mintrom, 2013, Mintrom, 2000, Mintrom and Vergari, 1996,p. 424{Mintrom, 2009 #603)}, ascribe high levels of agency, calculation, and focused and deliberate engagement by policy entrepreneurs over long time periods, including actively building diverse coalitions when necessary.

Findings in the cases examined here do not strictly conform to this archetypal policy entrepreneur definition. Webster, Shearer and Minister McCully all engaged with others, and defined the problem associated with their preferred policy change. Yet, they did not do so to the extent implied in the archetypal definition. While they did work to expand their networks as they needed, Webster, Shearer and McCully emerged from existing networks, linked to these through their policy values and goal ideas. These networks were not diverse, in terms of spanning across the left-right political spectrum, but clearly demarcated by the policy values and goal ideas holding their network together. Those behaving entrepreneurially in the cases here framed the problem and desired policy goal change according to their ideational underpinnings. They did not attempt to frame the problem differently to win over opponents. Instead they used their power to work the system, effectively over-powering their opponents. Further, they did not instigate and foster wide-reaching networks or coalitions to achieve change, relying on their existing networks and the influence they could exert within these, and on their margins. None of those behaving entrepreneurially in these cases led by example. While the individuals exhibited entrepreneurial behaviour in defining the problem, building relationships, and working the system to advance their change, they did not do so to the same depth and extent as the archetypal policy entrepreneur definition implies. As noted in Chapter Three, Mintrom and Norman (2009) concede that perhaps different contexts dictate different behaviour than what they describe. Yet, if the definition constantly changes according to the context, this undermines clear theorising about what constitutes entrepreneurial behaviour in policy change. There is another way to approach this diversity of entrepreneurial behaviour, and advance thinking about entrepreneurialism in policy change.

As noted in Chapter Three, Ackrill and Kay (2011, p. 78) argue policy entrepreneurialism is "a general label for a set of behaviours in the policy process, rather than a permanent characteristic of a particular individual or role". What this shows is that individuals can choose to behave in certain ways to achieve policy change, rather than necessarily 'being' a policy entrepreneur at all times. The findings above indicate that some people tend towards entrepreneurialism to a greater extent than others: compare Webster or McCully to Robson. The former two individuals engaged in a protracted process of entrepreneurialism, repetitively behaving entrepreneurially, whereas Robson engaged in entrepreneurialism once or twice throughout the process.

One way of approaching this diversity in entrepreneurial behaviour is to propose a continuum of entrepreneurialism in policy change. At one end are one-off instances of entrepreneurial behaviour, such as Robson's concession leading to a compromise decision or Walter's request to present his argument to the Cabinet ERD. At the other end is an amalgam of entrepreneurial behaviour, such as Minister McCully's actions throughout his push for change. This end of the continuum would involve an individual exhibiting a collection of behaviours close to the archetypal definition of a policy entrepreneur (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Alternatively, a typology of behaviour could be developed, potentially linked with particular contexts, to start to articulate what sort of entrepreneurial behaviour is required to achieve change in particular rule and idea settings. What this sort of analysis would bring is subtlety to the exploration of entrepreneurialism in policy change, enabling academics and practitioners to understand what degree of behaviour is necessary to advance change, in what contexts.

These findings reinforce calls to robustly theorise entrepreneurial behaviour in policy change (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 44, Ackrill and Kay, 2011, Mintrom and Norman, 2009). The analysis here supports the separation of role and behaviour (Ackrill and Kay, 2011), but also highlights the interplay between the two – emphasising the need to examine rule and behaviour interactions more closely. The different degree of entrepreneurial behaviour individuals exhibited in the two New Zealand cases suggests a fruitful starting point may be creating a typology or continuum of entrepreneurial behaviours, and the context that they occur in. Also, there is a need to explore failure or 'almost entrepreneurialism' to contrast and refine definitions of entrepreneurial behaviour, aiming to specify when entrepreneurialism begins and where it ends.

Summary: Jointly towards Change

Overall, to achieve ODA policy goal change, individuals were important, particularly individuals in positions of power behaving entrepreneurially. Yet, individuals could not effect change all alone. Shared policy values and policy goal ideas provided cohesion and coherence for actor networks – ideas-based networks. The absence or presence of rules mattered, in that they shaped the broader context for, and gave power to, individuals and their ideas. But when the rules were ambiguous or allowed room for interpretation, actors manoeuvred around the rules – particularly individuals behaving entrepreneurially. The one rule that was paramount was the electoral term – for policy goal change to occur, a change in government was necessary. This change in government offered a predicatable potential window, opening in the political stream. The predictability of the opening enabled actors to prepare for it, particularly in defining a problem. Then when the political opening occurred, actors had already set the agenda for change. Once inside government, individual entrepreneurs, linked with their ideas-based networks, drove change through to the final decision.

Nature of Change

I now return to the issue I put aside in Chapter One – the nature of policy goal change. While both the 2001 and 2009 policy changes involved altered policy goal ends and means, the changes' natures were not the same. The 2001 change was a significant departure from the long-term status quo. Never before had the New Zealand ODA Programme focused solely on poverty elimination or functioned with semi-autonomy from MFAT, with authority for its own human resources and policy advice to ministers. Examined up to 2005, the 2001 change could be labelled as a 'classic paradigmatic' policy change involving a whole-scale shift in policy ideas (Cashore and Howlett, 2007), particularly policy values and goal ideas. The change in 2009 was in the opposite direction to the 2001 change – focusing ODA's outcomes on dual benefit or New Zealand's economy, and removing the ODA Programme's autonomy and authority in relation to non-development foreign policy. Again, examined alone, this could be called a classic paradigmatic change. However, if one inspects the two changes together, across a longer time period – from 1997 to 2011 – the starting point in 1997 looks much the same as the end point in 2011. Over this time period the change looks like a 'faux paradigmatic' change (Cashore and Howlett, 2007), where a quick change was made

(depending on what one defines as 'quick'), but within eight years returned to the status quo.

For policy change analysis, this point emphasises the methodological challenges associated with studying change. The different nature of the 2001 and 2009 changes highlights how methodological choices influence policy research findings (Knill and Tosun, 2012, Capano, 2009). Temporality matters: the findings here further reinforce the notion that it is best to examine policy change and policymaking over long time periods to ensure holistic results. Analytical method matters: policy change analyses also need to delve into the detail over time. If a scholar examined New Zealand ODA policy in 1997, and then again in 2011, they would argue no change had occurred in policy goals, and likely see incremental change in objectives and settings. Yet this would be inaccurate, highlighting that to fully understand policy change analytical methods such as causal process tracing are most useful.

Viewing the 2001 change as a significant departure from the status quo, and 2009 as a return, hints at the potential that the nature of change may impact on the actors, ideas and rules involved in achieving that change. The 2001 change required significant effort across society and government to achieve, while a powerful Minister almost enacted the 2009 change single-handedly. What was it that made the 2009 change relatively easy compared to 2001? Was it Minister McCully's power in 2009, or the nature of the change, or both?

To deepen this exploration, it is useful to ask whether, with the 2001 Cabinet, Minister McCully, or a minister with his power, personal characteristics, and degree of entrepreneurial behaviour, could have achieved the 2001 change in the same manner he achieved the 2009 change. Given the 2001 change was a significant departure from the status quo, it is unlikely Minister McCully could simply have authored an election manifesto, received central agency input, then put a paper to the Cabinet ERD and expect his colleagues to agree, as occurred in 2009. In 2001, the Minister needed to overcome MFAT's arguments against change, Prime Ministerial and Cabinet colleague opposition to change, and the government's desire to centralise government agencies. He would have also needed his associate minister to support change, which was present in 2001. Diligent Cabinet colleagues would have asked questions about where the idea for change came from: what the problem was, why the changes were necessary to solve

the problem, and whether alternatives had been considered. To answer these questions and overcome opposition, the Minister needed to have a clearly defined problem and evidence that this was a problem that others involved in ODA policy saw too. A ministerial review would have assisted in this or good evidence from societal actors with similar policy values. Support from at least some Cabinet members would also have been necessary. At a minimum, the Minister and Cabinet colleagues would have required robust central agency analysis to ensure there were no machinery of government or cost implications to establishing a semi-autonomous body. Anticipating the requirement for robust justification and support, the astute minister would have canvassed societal perspectives and/or worked within his party to build the policy goal change ideas prior to introducing them to Cabinet (ie: in the lead-up to the 1999 election). This way he would already have colleague and/or societal support. The development of political party election manifestos would have been the logical process through which to do this.

Overall, for such a significant change as the one in 2001, even a powerful, entrepreneurial minister such as Murray McCully would have required a strong argument for change, with evidence of societal support, to overcome opposition. A Minister McCully-type figure in 2001 would not have found it as easy to make change as Minister McCully did in 2009. Even if the Cabinet in 2001 was the same as the Cabinet in 2009, a stronger argument than what Minister McCully put forward in 2009 would have been necessary, particularly from the central agencies. What this shows is that the nature of the change in 2001 – a significant status quo departure – meant it was a more difficult change to achieve. In 2001, the suggested new policy goals were uncertain and untried in New Zealand, while the 2009 change was merely a return to goals that had been implemented before. As a consequence, change in 2001 took approximately three years and involved a cohesive network of concerted action across society and government. Even if an entrepreneurial minister had driven change, a broader and stronger argument was required, compared with that furnished in 2009.

It is safe to assume that the 2001 actors were not aiming for a 'faux paradigmatic' change. They wanted their change to stand the test of time. What was it that prevented the 2001 change from 'sticking' and enabled a return to the pre-2001 status quo after only eight years? Obviously, once change had occurred, the 2001 change proponents were unable to build support for the changes across the political spectrum. This may not

have been possible, given that policy values and policy goal ideas were embodied in the changes, and these ideas are resistant to change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Yet, evidence from the United Kingdom, where a conservative government maintained their ODA Programme's poverty focus and stand-alone status, shows that it can occur. In New Zealand, the lack of public engagement may also have made it easier in 2008 to undo the 2001 changes. ODA policy is not a vote-winning issue so politicians have greater leeway to do as they wish with ODA policy. Although, there is the potential to mobilise an attentive public, but this sort of support would have required long-term cultivation over the years 2001 to 2008, particularly by NGOs and the ODA Programme. This did not occur, leaving the 2001 changes vulnerable. Further, the TEMR process and report alienated some MFAT staff, and throughout NZAID's existence a narrative developed in the private sector that the ODA Programme was NGO-captured and ignored economic growth. These factors meant there were individuals in the broad New Zealand foreign policy community who shared their views with National Party members, particularly Minister McCully, contributing to the idea that NZAID was not functioning effectively.

Some of these factors could have been forseen, yet the 2001 change proponents did not appear to consider how to make their change withstand future government change. The initial change proposal was to create a stand-alone agency, which if achieved, could have created an organisational entity that was harder to dismantle. The Cabinet-prescribed establishment of NZAID (ODA Programme) as a semi-autonomous body was not as powerful as legislation, and also required specific arrangements to ensure NZAID's functions did not clash with the State Sector Act 1988. A separate agency would have required specific legislation. If legislation had been passed in 2001, this would have forced 2009 change advocates to take change proposals to parliament, and therefore required them to work harder and slower to achieve change, potentially with public engagement. Associate Minister Robson was aware that the semi-autonomous ODA Programme was not as robust as a stand-alone agency, but decided to take the compromise in 2001 and subsequently work to entrench the changes further. Yet, ensuing political events meant Robson was not in Cabinet after the 2002 election. Both Shearer and Webster had also left their previous roles. However, there were individuals on the ODA Programme's new advisory board – the International Development Advisory Committee – who had been part of achieving the 2001 change, such as Webster and Phil Twyford. Despite this, the focus appeared to be on getting the new

semi-autonomous NZAID up and running, rather than thinking about how to protect it when the government inevitably changed in the future. Arguably, the early stages of NZAID's life was the time to establish rules that would have made it harder for the future government to make the changes they did in 2009, such as legislation for ODA's purpose, or a robust, independent advisory board, or other veto points that could have been activated to prevent change in the future. It is not clear why this did not occur, but potential reasons include a lack of leadership from outside the professional executive, including from NGOs and the political executive.

Conclusion

Policy change is a slippery subject to study. To explore and analyse policy change the scholar needs to decide on ways to define and dissect it. Yet, as the study evolves, so does the scholar's understanding of what the change comprises, knowledge that would have led to different decisions at the start of the study. A benefit in this research was the use of a broad analytical framework, enabling me to begin with a broad exploration of the components of policy change – actors, ideas and rules – before discovering more specific actors, ideas and rules in the two cases. What this exposed was a complicated dynamic between the three components, albeit with greater specificity about which particular actors, ideas and rules interacted in two policy goal changes. By comparing across the two cases I have been able to lift the analysis to a higher degree of abstraction, and pull out some commonalities across the two policy goal change instances. This has enabled me to answer the original research questions I set out to respond to. In the next, and last, chapter, I summarise these answers.

Chapter Ten: Conclusions

A question about one New Zealand ODA policy change instance inspired this research, and led to a broader question: how does ODA policy change? To begin to find answers to these questions, I explored and analysed two New Zealand ODA policy goal change instances from agenda-setting through to decision-making. I used insights from policy studies, particularly from scholars who study policy change, to create an analytical framework (Chapter Three), which I used to explore and analyse the two cases. In Chapter Four, I first used the analytical framework to examine scholarly work on ODA policy, to uncover what the existing ODA literature tells us about ODA policy change, and the actors, ideas and rules involved. Subsequently, I applied the framework to each New Zealand ODA policy goal change case, exploring and evaluating the actors, ideas and rules involved in change, and their interactions (Chapters Five to Eight). In doing this, I united ODA policy analyses with the substantial knowledge from the policy studies discipline. This scholarly marriage produced the findings discussed in Chapter Nine, and summarised here in this concluding chapter.

In what follows, I return to the questions guiding this research and summarise answers for each. In doing so, I also revisit the challenges of studying policy change that were set aside in Chapters One and Three, and reopened in the previous chapter. One of the motivations for this research was the fact that diverse organisations spend precious resources attempting to alter ODA policy. For actors engaged in influencing ODA policy, I offer insights from this research that may be useful in their policy-influencing efforts. Like all complex topics, this policy change study raises further questions worthy of investigation. Therefore, I provide suggestions for future research, before tendering final reflections on ODA policy change.

Questions and Answers

Actors, Ideas and Rules in New Zealand ODA Policy Change

The first question this research considered was what actors, ideas and rules were involved in 2001 and 2009 New Zealand ODA policy goal changes, from agenda-setting through to decision-making? This thesis has comprehensively replied. The actors involved in ODA policy goal change cut across society and government. Specifically,

central actors were NGOs, political parties, and the political executive, particularly ministers. In the 2001 change, a ministerial advisor was also key. Surprisingly, the private sector played little active role in either change, although in the 2009 change private sector individuals were part of a loose network that informed the changes. Specific types of actors were important, particularly individuals behaving entrepreneurially. Further, as discussed below, no actor could drive a change decision alone. In Chapters Three and Four, I argued that international actors, while important, only play a role in domestic ODA policymaking if domestic actors take-up ideas from international actors, and neither case presented evidence to the contrary.

Ideas played a pivotal role in each of the ODA policy goal changes analysed, with domestic actors utilising some ideas from the international realm. In Chapter Four I articulated ODA-specific ideas attached to policy goals, objectives and settings, underpinned by 'policy values'. Policy values are the foundational ideas that guide individuals in their everyday interactions with the world – their world views, beliefs and core values. In the two cases, policy values were important to change. In fact, the changes essentially involved a competition between two opposing ideational sets. Those advancing change in 2001, who subsequently resisted change in 2009, held policy values that prioritised New Zealand's distant interests and collective action for human well-being, and policy goal ideas that ODA should be used to achieve recipients' development goals, aim for global good practice standards, and have autonomy and authority in relation to non-development foreign policy goals. In contrast, those defending the status quo in 2001, and those advocating change in 2009, emphasised New Zealand's close interests. In 2009, change advocates also held a strong policy value regarding the primacy of private sector-led economic growth as the means to human progress. These actors thought ODA should be used to flexibly achieve New Zealand's non-development foreign policy goals, or where possible non-development foreign policy goals *and* recipients' development goals – what I label 'dual benefit' ODA. Their engagement with global good practice ODA standards was limited, and they did not think ODA policy should have autonomy or authority in relation to other foreign policy.

In terms of the ideas emerging from scientific knowledge and learning, actors used these ideas in different ways. In 2001, the entire argument for change was based on policy values prioritising ODA for New Zealand's distant interests, which fit with the

global good ODA standards that had evolved through learning. Change advocates assessed New Zealand ODA policy against these global standards to make their argument for change. Analysing MFAT's argument's against change in 2001 (Chapter Six) shows that their actual defense was based on ther policy values prioritising close interests. Yet they could not articulate this in 2001, as it would have reinforced the change advocates' argument, so they used more technical, 'scientific' arguments about efficiency and effectiveness, and the TEMR methodology. In 2009, change proponents used a range of factual information to justify and frame their change argument, even when this information was not necessarily accurate or could not withstand close scrutiny. What was really driving change proponents in 2009 were New Zealand's close interests, and a desire for control over ODA policy and its associated budget. It appears Minister McCully judged that arguing outright for ODA's use for New Zealand's economic and strategic benefit would not win support. Further, it was necessary to paint a picture of a failing ODA Programme to make the case for change. The use of scientific information in this way gives a veneer of credibility that when examined more closely does not run deep. That Minister McCully could do this relates to ODA policy's accountability and feedback gaps, as well as his power in Cabinet and the nature of change – points I return to below.

In assessing rules, I took a narrow approach, focusing only on formal rules. The rules allocating power (authority, access and resources) across governmental actors were important in the two change cases, particularly the electoral rules – specifically the three-year government term – parliamentary rules, the rules pertaining to the political and professional executives, and the relationship between them. Also, the absence of legislative rules for ODA was notable in simplifying the process. Together, these rules set the parameters within which different actors could act. Regarding external actors' access to government, New Zealand is generally openly governed, and societal actors have few rules constraining their access to governmental actors. However, in both change cases there were several access points societal actors had to engage with to advance or resist change. This was due to the fact that policy goal changes require involvement from the central agencies, (Treasury, SSC and DPMC), and Cabinet. This means that it is not only the minister of foreign affairs and their associate that societal actors have to influence.

How does New Zealand ODA Policy Change?

We now arrive at the second question: how did actors, ideas and rules interact in the process towards New Zealand ODA policy change decisions in 2001 and 2009? What this research has done is begin to unpick the process leading-up to policy goal change in New Zealand, and identify how actors with ideas weild the power the rules give them. Yet, actors, ideas and rules are not variables or conditions in themselves, but broad categories containing a variety of potential variables or conditions. This research identifies specific actors, with specific ideas, negotiating specific rules, to achieve New Zealand ODA policy goal change.

The overarching finding from this study is that to achieve policy goal change in New Zealand what was needed was individuals behaving entrepreneurially, connected to an ideas-based network, making good use of the fundamental electoral rule of the three-year parliamentary term. The rules shape the parameters within which actors act, but actors can work the rules, in particular, actors behaving entrepreneurially. Entrepreneurial individuals were necessary to achieve policy goal change. These were individuals with credibility, who engaged politically: they knew the system and they were willing to work within the rules to advance their preferred policy goal change. Yet, this research also highlights that there were no heroic individuals. Every entrepreneurial individual needed to be part of a wider network, even if only a loose network of other individuals. This nework provided ideas and supporet in the change process. Policy goal change only occurred through joint action by individuals in various authority positions and organisations, not through the actions of only one individual. Yet, a ministers' power can create a situation whereby one individual is *almost* enough to achieve change. Minister McCully shows how much one minister can achieve.

What brought actors together to advance policy change, or defend the status quo, were shared ideas. Reflecting the findings of various policy change theorists (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Hall, 1993, Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), this change research reinforces how important shared ideas are in shaping actors' behaviour and interactions, particularly policy values. Actors tend to gravitate towards others with whom they share policy values, using them as a gauge for the trustworthiness and credibility of other actors. Through this process, relationships are crafted, which create networks – either loose, as in McCully's grouping in 2009, or tight, as in the 2001 pro-change and 2009 change resisting network.

Theory-Building or Refining Contributions

This thesis's third question brings the empirical analysis to the broader literature: drawing from the New Zealand ODA policy experience, what suggestions can be made for theory building and refinement to enhance theory's/theories' exploratory and explanatory value in ODA policy change? In answering this question I address the ODA policymaking literature and policy change literature separately.

Thinking About ODA Policymaking

This research arrives at four main contributions for theorising about ODA policymaking. These suggestions arise from the research's explicit focus on policy goal change, and its use of policy change theories to shine light on ODA policy change.

First, in terms of conducting ODA policymaking research, an issue that besets ODA scholars is a lack of specificity regarding what particular policy content or process is under examination. As policy change scholars know, it matters whether one is examining ODA policy goals, objectives or settings, or specific elements of the policy cycle, such as agenda-setting or evaluation. This research focused squarely on agenda-setting to decision-making in policy goal change. Combining this research's findings with the existing literature indicates it is likely that different actors, ideas, and rules will be more important for policy objective and setting changes compared to policy goal change. Greater specificity in examining ODA policy would enable enriched understanding of ODA policymaking, and therefore cultivate better ways to engage and improve ODA policy in all its complexity.

Second, this research contributes to the small, but growing, literature examining ODA policymaking. While Lundsgaarde (2013) looked at interest groups and rules, and Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015) theorised ODA policymaking as a bureaucratic bargaining process, I look at specific instances of policy change, beginning with a wide exploration of the ODA policy domain. This wide exploration allowed me to broadly articulate the actors, ideas and rules that are likely to be important in ODA policymaking and change. By then explicitly examining policy goal change, I show how specific actors, ideas and rules interacted at a significant point in a country's ODA policy 'lifecycle'. For example, the New Zealand experience indicates the political executive, specifically ministers, Cabinet and political advisors, are central to ODA policy goal change, and also uncovers political parties' roles. These findings, along with

others from this research, start to increase the clarity and specificity regarding ODA policy change and policymaking. As well as bringing the substantial insights from policy studies to thinking about ODA policymaking, my exposition of change builds on the work of other ODA policymaking scholars. Together these studies deepen theoretical understanding of ODA policy processes. Additionally, the findings here could become propositions for others to test out in other countries, and continue to accrete knowledge from the empirics up.

The third and fourth contributions to thinking about ODA policymaking are more specific, involving the role of entrepreneurial behaviour in ODA policy goal change, and the importance of ideas-based networks. This research confirms what other scholars have hinted at (Breuning, 2013, Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, 2015): entrepreneurial behaviour is important in ODA policy goal changes. While further analysis is required, together these studies suggest that actors trying to change ODA policy will need to engage in entrepreneurial actions to achieve their aims.

Regarding ideas-based networks, this research showcases the importance of ideas in bringing actors together for or against policy goal change. While some scholars have deeply investigated policy values in shaping ODA policy (Breuning, 1995, van der Veen, 2000, Hook, 1995), this research examines the relationship between actors and ideas. In particular, the findings here show how actors weild particular ideas about ODA policy when attempting to influence policy, and that these ideas act as the 'glue' holding actors together, even if only loosely.

Thinking About Policy Change

Policy change students have a rich literature to engage with, with several theories of policy change to use. The findings here indicate areas where greater emphasis could lie in existing theories, and offer confirmation for aspects of some theories over others. In particular, this research offers contributions about entrepreneurialism in policy change, rules, actor networks, ideas, and the challenges involved in studying ODA policy change.

As discussed in Chapter Nine, this research elaborates on the growing understanding of entrepreneurialism in policy change. I build on Ackrill and Kay's (2011) concept of entrepreneurial behaviour and suggest a continuum or typology of entrepreneurial

behaviour. This is because some of the literature describes 'heroic' entrepreneurs who conform to archetypal descriptions of policy entrepreneurs. Yet the findings in the two cases here show individuals who behaved entrepreneurially, but not all the time, in all situations. Some may argue this means they were not 'truly' entrepreneurial in their behaviour, or that they exhibited different degrees of competence in their entrepreneurialism. However, this does not give credit where due to particular types of behaviour that conform with broad entrepreneurial criteria. The findings here reinforce scholars' calls for greater theorisation of policy entrepreneurship. A suggestion I offer to this process is to develop a continuum or typology of entrepreneurial behaviour. This would enable scholars and practitioners to identify the subtleties of different or exceptional behaviour from people in particular roles, and start to understand what type of behaviour, from what actors, at what times, may advance (or prevent) policy change.

Policy change theories do not talk in detail about rules. They are there, but in the background. This research elevated the importance of rules to policy change, not beyond actors or ideas, but at least to an equal level. It is the rules, or their absence, that comprise the landscape that actors have to navigate to advance or prevent policy goal change. Simultaneously, actors can take action to avoid or mitigate rules, depending upon the rules' ambiguity and the actor's power. Successful actors are those who know the rules, and can bend, break, change, negotiate or use them to advance their preferred policy change. This research detailed the specific formal rules involved in ODA policy goal change, and what they meant for actors' power and behaviour. In doing so, this research indicates the utility of explicitly exploring rules in policy goal change, and their interactions with actors and ideas – something the policy change theories canvassed in Chapter Three do not do as well as they could.

In terms of actor networks, in the two cases what brought and kept actors together were shared policy values and policy goal ideas – essentially ideas-based networks. This reinforces the notion present in some policy change theories that it is shared beliefs that actors coalesce around. Yet, the ideas-based networks in my findings were not the same as each other. One network, which spanned both changes, was tight and coherent, while the 2009 change network was loose, and there was no status quo defence network in 2001. This relates to the different nature of change in each of the two cases, as well as the presence of different types of actors in roles prescribed by different rules. In particular, the 2009 change involved a powerful minister behaving entrepreneurially,

and the change was a return to the status quo. Therefore, a robust pro-change network may not have been necessary. In terms of the types of actors involved in these networks, they cut across society and government, although parliament's role was limited. NGOs were the dominant societal actors, while the political executive were the main governmental actors. Overall, these findings indicate the complex and diverse interactions between actors in policy change, emphasising the challenges of describing and explaining actor-groupings' roles in policy goal change.

The finding that policy values and goals are the adhesive that brought and held actors together, gives support to the punctuated equilibria and advocacy coalition policy change theories, in that actors come together in networks based on their policy values, which then inform their policy goal ideas. These shared ideas also signal credibility and trustworthiness between various actors, in that those with shared policy values are more likely to listen to each other without suspicion. Hall's (1993) paradigm shift also highlights shared policy goal ideas. Yet he argues that the actors change after, or as, the ideas changed. In the cases analysed here, it was the actors who drove the changes in deliberate ways.

Examining two cases of policy change within a broad temporal boundary highlights issues of studying policy change. As discussed in Chapter Nine, if one had observed New Zealand's ODA policy in 1997 and then again in 2011, it would appear as if only incremental change had occurred. That would be inaccurate. This reinforces policy scholars' advice to examine policy change over long periods of time. It also indicates that analytical methods that can trace processes across time, such as causal process tracing, are the most fruitful for understanding policy change's complexity. Further, ensuring that one is clear about what aspect of change is under examination is important. Although, even then, what might look like similar changes when commencing research can begin to look different with more knowledge about the change. At first reading, the two changes investigated here look similar. Yet, when details come to light through analysis, the changes begin to appear different in their nature. Again, this highlights the importance of history in policy analysis, the complexity of the subject matter, and the need for transparency in research.

Contribution

Lifting these suggestions to a more abstract level, this research contributes to knowledge in three key ways. First, this research brought policy change theories to ODA policymaking analyses. In doing this, ODA policymaking thinking has been enriched with the insights from policy studies. Policy change theories also benefit, to a lesser degree, through reinforcing or undermining current theories' emphases on various actors, ideas, rules, and their interactions. Second, this research provides the first in-depth case examination of specific ODA policy goal change instances. The literature to this point shows great variation across donors, and the need for more small-n case studies. This research responds robustly to the call for more individual case studies. Exploring and explaining policy goal change also offers a sharper view of the actors, ideas and rules involved at signifcant junctures in ODA policymaking, which are likely to be different from routine policymaking. Third, New Zealand policy studies gains through this research, as there is little analyses of New Zealand's ODA policymaking. The thesis also contributes to understanding the domestic politics of New Zealand policymaking, with its exploration of an unusual policy domain.

Practical Uses

Deep practical motivations inspired this research and the findings offer useful insights for practitioners. Many individuals and organisations aim to influence or change ODA policy. Yet historically, at least in Australia and New Zealand, advocates have paid inadequate attention to political parties, parliamentarians and collective action. The academic literature has only just begun to offer useful findings for practitioners to exploit. As Lunsgaard (2013), and Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015) highlight, NGOs can find it difficult to overcome competitiveness and achieve collaborative action. This research also found that private sector entitites did not appear to be collectively organised in ways that would assist them to engage in ODA policymaking. However, collective networks are important components in ODA policy change, even if only small or loose. Societal groups concerned about ODA policy need to actively find ways to overcome barriers to their collective engagement.

Simultaneously, individuals who can and will behave entrepreneurially are important factors in ODA policy goal change. These individuals need to be situated in roles where

they have enough power to make their entrepreneurial behaviour effective. It is possible entrepreneurial behaviour will also be important in objective changes. This means change actors need to be aware of what power level their desired change decision will be elevated to, and analyse who within their network has the required power to engage entrepreneurially to advance, or prevent, change.

Analysing power requires paying attention to the rules constructing the context within which actors need to manoeuvre to advance change or protect the status quo. As there was no ODA legislation in place, the most fundamental rule to attend to was that of the electoral term – three years in New Zealand. In both the 2001 and 2009 cases, change ideas were formulated in the years leading-up to an election, meaning those driving change were prepared and ready to take action when they gained power in government. In contrast, in both cases, those resisting change only learned of the potential for change when the agenda was set and policy was being formulated. This was too late, and mitigated their power in resisting change. Change actors need to think years ahead, and watch their 'opposition' to detect change efforts during the agenda-setting stage.

Finally, the public. As Chapter Four detailed, ODA policy characteristics mean that the professional executive and interest groups dominate ODA policymaking. For policy goal changes, this research also adds the political executive to these actors, particularly ministers. The public were not a feature in the two ODA policy goal changes examined here. Yet, NGOs in particular often try to mobilise the public. This research provided some evidence that this may be because in attempting to effect change, NGOs' access to the executive, especially the political executive, may be difficult and so they resort to external strategies. Ultimately, the public could be an insurance policy to activate for or against policy change. But like any good insurance policy, the public have to be activated swiftly, meaning they need to be already primed for action. This requires consistent engagement over long time periods. With scarce resources, those wishing to influence ODA policy goals may be better off cultivating relationships with the political and professional executives, parliamentarians, and political parties. If the past is any guide for the future, these are the actors that are central to decisions about ODA policy goal change (at least in New Zealand), and the locus of much entrepreneurial behaviour.

Further Research

As with all in-depth analyses, often more questions are raised than answered. Certainly, this research brings forth many opportunities for further study. Having found particular actors, ideas and rules pertinent in New Zealand ODA policy goal change, there is the potential to use the findings from this research and apply them to other policy goal changes, such as those in Australia or Canada. Ongoing learning in this vein will contribute to holistic theorising about ODA policymaking, including goal, objective and setting change. The value of this theorising will be to contribute practical ideas for change actors, enabling them to analyse what is occuring and how they should act with greater confidence to make ODA policy as effective as possible for the people and countries that need it.

Related to the lack of specificity in ODA policy analyses, outlined above, are the concepts of ODA quantity versus ODA quality. Much attention is given to ODA quantity in academic ODA analysis, often using ODA amounts to infer donor country motivations. In contrast, this research focused on ODA quality. This raises questions about how funding decisions are made and their relationship to the policy goal decsions examined in this research. Arguably, different processes may be at play for ODA quantity decisions compared with ODA quality decisions, and they may occur at the objective level, rather than at the goal level. There is space for more exploration of these issues.

Exploring how and if policy goal changes filter down through objectives and settings would also be useful. This is particularly so because policy scholars have found that while goals might change, objectives and settings may not, or goals may remain stable while objectives change considerably (Cashore and Howlett, 2007, p. 543). Significant amounts of resources can be funnelled into changing goals, when there is no effect on objectives or settings, i.e.: in the countries and thematic programmes ODA funds on the ground, where it is most important to implement quality ODA policy. Again, greater understanding of this will enhance efforts to improve ODA policy.

How does ODA policy goal change stick? This is an important question for various actors concerned with ODA policy, particularly given ODA policy regularly changes and donors attempt to achieve a variety of foreign policy outcomes with their ODA

policy. For those who believe ODA policy should focus solely on recipients' development outcomes, being able to achieve policy changes that withstand changes in government policy values is important. This did not occur in New Zealand, but it is possible, as the United Kingdom's experience shows (although that may be changing now). After oscillation for several decades (Barder, 2005), the Department for International Development (DfID) remained a stand-alone ODA Programme focused on poverty alleviation across both left and right-leaning governments. Scholars have examined how this was achieved (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012, for example), but more analysis across a variety of cases will provide robust answers.

What this research emphasises is that, at least for New Zealand ODA policy goal changes, the public is not a necessary actor. A great deal can be accomplished without them. Yet, political executive interviewees did express a concern about public opinion, and in 2009 the pro-status quo network attempted to raise public opinion in their support. Therefore, important actors in democratic processes obviously believe the public has power. Further, despite repeated studies showing little or indirect linkages between the public and policy, academics also continue to pursue a deeper understanding of the relationship (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 62). ODA scholars and actors spend significant resources attempting to know the public's views on ODA and international development, and how this might translate through to policy, [for example:(Milner and Tingley, 2013, Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson, 2012)]. If the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes is viewed as a chain comprising interacting variables or conditions, analyses often halts once the door to parliament is reached. There is the potential for improving understanding with more holistic, comprehensive research, using methods that can handle complex relationships along causal processes. Again, for real-world change actors, knowing if, when, why and how to expend their resources on engaging the public would be very useful.

Final Thoughts

This study brought together two different scholarly areas: policy studies and ODA analyses. In doing so, the study has advanced thinking about ODA policymaking and created insights useful for policy studies. This highlights the benefits of bringing together different scholarly schools of thought. As outlined above, there are opportunities for more work in this area. Arguably, as this research and others like it

show, at this point in time more can be learned about ODA policymaking from in-depth case analysis than from large-n, statistical analysis of ODA volumes. Like all policy, ODA policy and its associated dynamics are complex. Therefore, to fully understand them qualitative exploration using causal process tracing will complement findings from cross-country, quantitative work, and advance our knowledge further.

Increasingly, nation states' problems are regional and global problems, requiring collective action. ODA policy is an important part of this, and sophisticated foreign affairs actors will find ways to use ODA for distant interests, while using more effective tools for their close interests. Already, in recognition of global problems, attention has turned to policies on taxation, climate change and immigration, to name a few issues that cross borders. This opens up more opportunities to build donor policies that advance international development efforts. While these may be in different technical areas, these policies will still experience the severe feedback and accountability gaps ODA policy does, because the results are felt by non-taxpayers and non-voters in far-flung countries. This means the insights from this study are likely to be pertinent for advocates wishing to promote policy goal change for other international development policies.

More broadly, however, is the point that those who wish to change donor policies to make them more conducive to international development, and entrench those changes, need to acknowledge that this endeavour is fundamentally political. Change involves actors' negotiating the power the rules prescribe, and using that power or avoiding it, to see particular ideas captured in policy (or legislation). Erudite change advocates will think carefully about how to set the rules to entrench their ideas into the future. With the rise of the far-right in Europe and the USA, this political struggle becomes ever-more important, and it is one that academics and practitioners all have a stake in.

In advancing ideas of global social justice, practitioners and academics have a lot to offer each other, as do academics from different disciplines. This research is an example of what bringing disciplines together can offer to academic research, and what academics can offer practitioners. I hope it is useful for both. But more importantly, I hope this research stimulates a desire for both academics and practitioners to engage in the global struggle for social justice.

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Appendix One: List of Interviewees

The following is a list of the individuals interviewed who gave their permission to have their name and role listed in this Appendix. Two interviewees requested I did not list their name. The list below is ordered alphabetically and does not correspond to interview numbers.

- Peter Adams, former Executive Director ODA Programme, NZAID/MFAT
- Hon. Jim Anderton, former Deputy Prime Minister (1999-2002) and Leader of the Alliance (1993-2002)
- Dave Bamford, former Tourism Resource Consulting, independent consultant
- Stuart Batty, Rotary World Service
- Colin Bell, former Director of External Aid Division (1972-1999)
- Dr. Brian Bell, Director, Nimmo-Bell and Company, Ltd.
- Paul Brown, Chief Executive Officer, ChildFund
- Gordon Campbell, journalist
- Don Clarke, former professional executive ODA Programme, former Executive Director CID
- Les Clarke, former Tourism Resource Consulting, independent consultant
- Barry Coates, former NGO representative
- Candis Craven, former Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development (ACEAD) Chair
- David Culverhouse, former Executive Director, CID
- David Cuthbert, former Alliance Caucus Secretary and Senior Advisor to Jim Anderton
- Stephen Eagle, Director, International, Fraser-Thomas
- John Egan, professional executive, ODA Programme, MFAT
- Charles Finny, former diplomat, former Chambers of Commerce Director and Wellington Chamber of Commerce Chief Executive Officer
- Rachel Fry, professional executive, ODA Programme, MFAT
- Hon. Phil Goff, former Labour Party Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999-2005)
- Bryan Gould, independent consultant

- Michael Greenslade, Pacific Trade and Investment, former Pacific Commissioner New Zealand Trade and Enterprise
- Gill Greer, NGO representative, former International Development Advisory Committee member, current International Development Advisory and Selection Panel member.
- Joseph Grossman, independent consultant
- John Hayes, former diplomat and former National Party parliamentarian (2005-2014)
- Steve Hoadley, Associate Professor, Politics and International Relations, University of Auckland
- Ana Ilic, Chief Executive Officer, FCG ANZDEC
- Rae Julian, former Executive Director, CID
- Graham Kelly, former parliamentarian and Chair of Foreign Affairs and Trade Select Committee
- Peter Kiely, lawyer, business representative, former ACEAD Chair
- Andrew Ladley, former Chief of Staff, Alliance, constitutional law academic
- Annettee Lees, independent consultant
- Jonathan Ling, former Chief Executive Officer, Fletchers
- Hon. John Luxton, former National Party parliamentarian (1987-2002) and Associate Minister for Overseas Trade, and private sector
- Rahul Malhotra, Team Leader, DAC Peer Reviews, OECD DAC
- Russell Marshall, former Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs (1987-1990)
- Claire-Louise McCurdy, NGO representative, former KOHA-PICD Administrator
- Pauline McKay, Executive Director CWS
- Dennis McKinley, former Executive Director, UNICEF
- Jean McKinnon, independent consultant
- John McKinnon, independent consultant and academic
- Rt. Hon. Sir Don McKinnon former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1990-1999) (National)
- Simon Murdoch, former MFAT Secretary (2002-2009)
- Garth Nowland-Foreman, independent consultant
- Phil O'Rielly, former Chief Executive, BusinessNZ
- John Overton, Professor, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington

- Graeme Roberts, Technical Director, Planning, BECA International
- Hon. Matt Robson, former Alliance Party Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999-2001)
- David Shearer, former ministerial advisor and Labour Party parliamentarian (2009-2016)
- Gordon Shroff, former professional executive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Maryan Street, former Labour Party parliamentarian (2005-2014)
- Phil Twyford, former NGO representative, current Labour Party parliamentarian (2008-present)
- Neil Walter, former MFAT Secretary (1999-2002)
- Darren Ward, former NGO representative
- Chris Whelan, former professional executive, ODA Programme, NZAID/MFAT
- Barbara Williams, former professional executive, ODA Programme, NZAID/MFAT
- Andrew Wilson, Manager BECA International Ltd.